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 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Evaluation is considered as an important determinant of behavior and has 
therefore been studied extensively (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). We define 
evaluation as the effect of stimuli on evaluative responses (De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). This functional definition implies that 
evaluation is conceptualized as an effect rather than as a mental process that 
mediates the impact of environment on behavior (De Houwer, 2009a; De 
Houwer et al., 2012; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011).  
Traditionally, evaluation was captured most often by self-reported 
evaluative judgments, that is, using evaluative responses that are given in a 
deliberate and controlled manner. Effects of stimuli on this type of evaluative 
responses are typically named explicit evaluations (De Houwer, 2009b; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). For instance, an answer to the question “On a 
scale from 1 to 5, how much do you like Bob?”, given without time pressure, on a 
Likert scale would be considered an instance of explicit evaluation. During the 
last decade, researchers have also started to examine automatic or implicit 
evaluations (De Houwer, 2009b; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Implicit 
evaluations differ from explicit evaluations as they occur in an automatic (i.e., 
unintentional, uncontrolled, unconscious, or fast; see Moors & De Houwer, 2006, 
for a thorough review of features of automaticity and De Houwer and Moors, 
2012, for how those features can be defined functionally). Implicit evaluation 
have been studied in many different areas of research, from addiction (e.g., 
Wiers & Stacy, 2006), to clinical psychology (see Teachman, Cody, & Clerkin, 
2010), close relationships (e.g., Dewitte, De Houwer, & Buysse, 2008), consumer 
behavior (see Perkins & Forehand, 2010), forensics (see Snowden & Gray, 2010), 
psychopathology (e.g., Roefs et al., 2011), politics (see Nosek, Graham, & 
Hawkins, 2010), and social interactions (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003).  
In the present dissertation, we focus on the learning of implicit 
evaluation, that is, on how the learning history of an individual moderates the 
evaluative responses that are elicited by a stimulus (see De Houwer et al., 2012). 
One way in which implicit evaluation can be acquired is through pairings of 
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stimuli. The change in liking of a stimulus (named conditioned stimulus or CS) 
due to its pairing with another stimulus (named unconditioned stimulus or US; 
De Houwer, 2007) is called evaluative conditioning (EC; for reviews see De 
Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). In other words, we will focus on EC of 
implicit evaluation, that is, a subset of EC effect that regards changes in implicit 
evaluation.  
 
Associative accounts of implicit evaluation  
As an effect, implicit evaluation can in principle be due to a variety of 
processes. Virtually all mental accounts of implicit evaluation, however, attribute 
these evaluations to the activation of associations in memory (for a review, see 
Hughes et al., 2011). Associations are defined as simple links between mental 
representations that are formed after the experience of repeated pairings of 
physical stimuli (Shanks, 2007). For instance, if a stimulus X is repeatedly paired 
with a picture of a spider, a mental association between the representations of 
“X” and of “spider” will be formed automatically. Later, if the stimulus X is 
encountered again, it would trigger automatically the mental representation 
associated to it, that is, the concept “spider”. Consequently, not only the 
semantic content of the mental representation will be automatically activated, 
but also its associated valence, which in this case is negative. In that way, the 
repeated pairing of the stimulus X with a picture of a spider would produce a 
negative implicit evaluation towards the stimulus X, and this effect would be 
mediated by the excitation of mental associations between the mental 
representations of the physical stimuli involved. This associative assumption has 
been fundamental to research on implicit evaluation for many years without 
being called into question, and has led to the development of a number of 
process models of evaluation. First, a number of purely associative models (e.g., 
Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; Fazio, 2007; Olson & Fazio, 
2009) have been proposed. These accounts postulate that both implicit and 
explicit evaluations are based on the formation and activation of mental 
associations, formed after repeated CS-US pairings. These accounts also 
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postulate that the strength of the object-valence association determines the 
evaluation’s accessibility: if the representations are strongly linked, the 
associated representation of valence is assumed to be more accessible and can 
therefore be activated automatically.  
In addition to those purely associative accounts, a number of dual process 
models (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006) have 
been proposed. The main characteristic of these models is that they describe two 
different processes that can be responsible for either implicit or explicit 
evaluation. According to dual process models, implicit evaluation is based on a 
network of mental associations, in the same fashion as postulated by the purely 
associative models. On the other hand, explicit evaluation is formed via the 
action of a propositional system of reasoning, responsible for the confirmation or 
disconfirmation of the validity of the automatically activated mental 
associations. Propositional reasoning operates on mental representations called 
propositions. Propositions are defined as qualified links between mental 
representations, which hold a truth value (De Houwer, 2009c). Hence, unlike 
associations, propositions specify how concepts are related (e.g., A is B, A is 
opposite to B, A causes B, etc.; see Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 
2007). In addition, propositions can be formed not only via the actual experience 
of pairings of stimuli, but also via instructions, inferences and intervention (see 
De Houwer, 2009c). 
 
Alternative process models of implicit evaluation: the Propositional accounts 
An alternative
1
 to associative and dual process accounts are purely 
propositional, single-process models (De Houwer, 2009c; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009). Unlike dual process models, that postulate a strict division 
between an associative system (responsible for implicit evaluation acquisition) 
and a propositional system (responsible for explicit evaluation acquisition), 
propositional accounts postulate that every instance of evaluation and EC is 
mediated by propositions. As we pointed out above, propositions are qualified 
links between mental representations, and can hold information describing the 
relation between physical objects (e.g., equivalence, opposition, etc.). Dual 
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process models already recognize the role of propositional processes in the 
explanation of explicit evaluation. The only necessary precondition for a purely 
propositional model to allow for an explanation of implicit evaluation is that 
propositions can be activated automatically from memory. For instance, once the 
proposition “the substance X heals cancer” has been formed and stored in 
memory, this proposition can be automatically retrieved from memory upon the 
next encounter with substance X, which could lead to positive evaluative 
responses to substance X. Interestingly, because propositions contain 
information about the way in which concepts are relation, single process 
propositional models raise the possibility that implicit evaluation might be 
sensitive to relational information, that is, information about the way in which 
stimuli are related. We will return to this issue in the next section of this 
introduction. In addition, purely propositional accounts of implicit evaluation 
postulate that the sources of information that influence implicit evaluation are 
not limited to stimulus pairings, but also include instructions, inference, and 
intervention (De Houwer 2009c). The assumptions propositional models make 
clearly allow for interesting new predictions in implicit evaluation research. 
 
 
The present dissertation 
 
Our research was inspired by the non-associative approach to (the 
formation of) implicit evaluations. Our basic assumption is that, besides co-
occurrences of stimuli, also the way in which stimuli are related (i.e., relational 
information) is a factor that can impact implicit evaluation. If we could 
demonstrate an impact of relational information on implicit evaluation, this 
would support propositional accounts of implicit evaluation but would be 
difficult to account for by accounts that attribute implicit evaluation merely to 
associative processes. Given their nature of simple, excitatory links between 
mental representations, associations are structurally unable to represent 
relations. For example, imagine that a certain unknown substance X, present in 
the blood, is detected to be co-occurring with cancer. At a very superficial level, 
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the mere contingency substance X-cancer may tell us already something, and 
probably would lead to a negative implicit and explicit evaluation of that 
substance, due to the formation and activation of the association “substance X-
cancer”. However, the unknown substance X and the disease may be related in 
several ways. For example, the substance X could be a cause of the disease, or a 
harmless byproduct of it, or even an effect that signals that the disease is 
spontaneously healing (see Lagnado et al., 2007). Clearly, the way in which the 
unknown substance X is related to the disease is bound to have an important 
impact on how much people explicitly like the substance. But could this 
relational information also influence implicit evaluations of the substance? A 
purely associative account would exclude this hypothesis, because the 
association between the substance X and cancer would be the same regardless 
of how X and cancer are related. Therefore associative accounts of implicit 
evaluation would assume that, once the association substance X-cancer is 
mentally formed, encountering the physical substance X would trigger the 
excitatory link implied by the mental association, and therefore result in its 
negative implicit evaluation (i.e., in line with the valence of the associated 
representation, that is, cancer). Conversely, we argue that relational information 
may also play a role in (the acquisitions of) implicit evaluations. This would be 
evidenced by the observation that substance X evokes more negative implicit 
evaluations when it is said to cause cancer than when it is said to be a byproduct 
of cancer or an indication that the cancer is healing. In sum, the main aim of our 
research was to examine the impact of relational information on the acquisition 
of implicit evaluations, more specifically, EC of implicit evaluations.  
 
The study of the relational determinants of implicit evaluation 
Researchers only recently started to take into account the role of 
relational information on EC effects (Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; Förderer & 
Unkelbach, 2012; Moran & Bar-Anan, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Zanon, 
De Houwer & Gast, 2012). In a particularly intriguing set of experiments, Peters 
and Gawronski (2011) have examined the influence of validity (i.e., true, false) 
information on EC effects of explicit and implicit evaluation. In their key 
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Experiment 3, participants were told that they had to imagine they were about 
to start a new job. Then, they were told that they would see the pictures of four 
of their future co-workers (CSs). Each picture was accompanied by either a 
positive behavioral description (USpos), or by a negative behavioral description 
(USneg), that were indicated to be representative of what the paired co-worker 
does or is. Participants were told that some of these behavioral statements were 
true and some were false. However, at this stage of the experiment, they were 
told to assume that every behavioral description was true, and further 
information about their validity would be told only afterwards. So for example, if 
the picture of a man named CHRIS was paired with the statement “often insults 
the secretary”, participants had to assume that their future co-worker Chris does 
often insult the secretary. Two CSs were consistently paired with positive USs 
(resulting in the pairings Apos and Bpos), whereas two were consistently paired 
with negative USs (resulting in the pairings Cneg and Dneg). Importantly, in 
addition to the presentation of the CS-US pairings, the validity of the CS-US co-
occurrences was also manipulated.  
Whereas the pairings of the CSs A and C were described as true (and 
therefore their implications were valid), the pairings of stimuli B and D were 
described as false (and therefore their implications had to be mentally reversed). 
Alternatively, another possible way to name the two validity relations would be 
employing the terms “relation of equivalence” (for the true validity relation) and 
“relation of opposition” (for the false validity relation). To get back to the 
previous example, if the picture of CHRIS was paired with the statement “often 
insults the secretary”, but this co-occurrence was stated to be false, participants 
had to assume that their future co-worker Chris does often praise the secretary. 
With this manipulation, Peters and Gawronski obtained four CSs that differed in 
terms of co-occurrence and validity information: A (positive-true), B (positive-
false), C (negative-true), and D (negative-false). Importantly, they manipulated 
the time at which validity information was disclosed. In their short-delay 
condition, validity information was presented after each CS-US pairing. 
Conversely, in their long-delay condition, validity information was presented only 
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twice at the end of the series of the twenty CS-US pairings. After the acquisition 
phase, implicit and explicit evaluations of the four CSs were assessed.  
Peters and Gawronski’s hypotheses were in line with the theorizations of 
dual process models. Hence, for both conditions, they expected the implicit 
evaluation of the CSs to be influenced by the mental associations formed on the 
basis of the CS-US co-occurrences. They did not expect validity information, 
mentally represented as propositions, to have an influence on implicit 
evaluation. In other words, they hypothesized for the positively paired CSs (A and 
B) to be implicitly liked more than the negatively paired CSs (C and D). 
Conversely, in terms of explicit evaluation, they expected the CSs to be evaluated 
on the basis of CS-US associations corrected by the validity propositions, and 
therefore that the positive-true and negative-false CSs (A and D) would be liked 
more than the positive-false and negative-true CSs (B and C).  
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the results of their crucial study (Peters & 
Gawronski, 2011, Experiment 3).  
 
 
Figure 1: Implicit and Explicit evaluation in the short-delay condition as a function 
of US valence (positive vs. negative) and validity information (true vs. false), 
(Peters & Gawronski, 2011, Experiment 3). 
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Figure 2: Implicit and Explicit evaluation in the long-delay condition as a function 
of US valence (positive vs. negative) and validity information (true vs. false), 
(Peters & Gawronski, 2011, Experiment 3). 
 
However, only their explicit evaluation results confirmed their 
hypotheses, showing a moderation of validity information on explicit evaluation 
of the four CSs in both the short- and long-delay conditions. The positively paired 
CS was preferred to the negatively paired CSs in the true validity condition, 
whereas, in the false validity condition, the negatively paired CS was preferred 
over the positively paired CS. However, the results of their implicit measure of 
evaluation were somewhat unexpected. For the true validity condition, the 
positively paired CS was always implicitly liked more than the negatively paired 
CS, in both the short- and long-delay conditions. For the false validity condition, 
participants showed an implicit preference for the CSneg over the CSpos in the 
short-delay condition. In the long-delay condition, they showed only an 
attenuation of the EC effect, and thus no implicit preference for either of the CSs.  
Peters and Gawronski’s (2011; Experiment 3) implicit evaluation results 
are extremely intriguing. They showed that, when relational information is 
available at the time of the CS-US encoding (short-delay condition), it can 
influence implicit evaluation of the CS to a degree that it reverses the EC effect 
(i.e., less implicit liking for a CS paired with a positive US than for a CS paired with 
a negative US). Conversely, when this information is made available long after 
the time at which the CS-US pairs were encoded (long-delay condition), its 
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impact is less strong, in that it does not produce a reverse EC effect but in an 
absence of the EC effect.  
Peters and Gawronski’s (2011) paper represents indeed one of the first 
examples available in the literature of investigation of the impact of relational 
information on implicit evaluation. Although the authors were inspired by a dual 
process view, and therefore by an associative explanation of implicit evaluation, 
their results are contradicting this simplistic view, by showing hints for processes 
of implicit evaluation acquisition that go beyond the mere association formation.  
 
Overview of the empirical chapters 
This dissertation consists of four empirical chapters, each of which aims at 
shedding light on whether and how relational information moderates the 
acquisition of implicit evaluation. In all experiments, we focused on a specific 
way in which implicit evaluation is acquired, that is, via pairings of stimuli (i.e., EC 
of implicit evaluations). In order to be able to control this process, we most often 
employed novel stimuli (e.g., nonwords), that were unlikely to be pre-
experimentally associated with any affectively relevant concept. 
 In Chapter 1, we examined the impact of a relational context on implicit 
evaluation. We report three experiments, which share the same design and 
differ only in the implicit measure that was administered. Two compounds 
consisting of two nonwords each (XF and YH) were presented, paired 
respectively with a positive and with a negative US (resulting in the target 
pairings XFpos and YHneg). These target pairings were our CS-US pairings. In 
addition, in each condition a number of unrelated, context stimulus pairings 
were presented. In condition Opposite, the target pairings XFpos and YHneg 
were accompanied by a series of context pairings, which implied a certain rule. 
The pairings presented were Apos, Bpos, ABneg, Cneg, Dneg, and CDpos. The 
rule implied by this series of pairings was that a single cue (e.g., A), when 
presented alone, was followed by a certain outcome (e.g., Apos). However, when 
the same cue was presented in compound with another cue (e.g., AB), it was 
followed by the opposite outcome (e.g., ABneg). Conversely, in condition Same 
the series of pairings presented along with the target pairings consisted of Apos, 
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Bpos, ABpos, Cneg, Dneg, and CDneg. In this condition, the rule implied by the 
context pairings stated that a single cue (e.g., A), when presented alone, was 
followed by the same outcome (e.g., Apos) of when it was presented in 
compound with another cue (e.g., ABpos). Finally, after the context pairings, in 
both conditions, Opposite and Same, the target CS-US pairings XFpos and YHneg 
were repeatedly presented. Importantly, the cues X and Y were never presented 
on their own, but always in compound with the cues F and H, respectively. The 
only difference between the two conditions consisted in the content of the rule 
(Opposite vs. Same), that regulated the context pairings. Therefore, applying the 
rule to the target compound pairings, one could infer the outcome of the single 
target cues X and Y, even if they were never physically presented on their own. 
After all (context and target) pairings were presented, implicit evaluation of the 
single cues X and Y was assessed, employing several implicit measures and 
explicit valence ratings.  
This design is interesting as it allows for a comparison between the effect 
of mere CS-US co-occurrences and of context rules on implicit evaluation. For 
both conditions Same and Opposite, a purely associative view would predict that 
the cue X (the CSpos) would be evaluated more positively than the cue Y (the 
CSneg). This prediction would be based on the assumption that participants, 
after the experience of several XFpos and YHneg pairings, would form 
associations between the mental representations of the co-occurring stimuli. 
Therefore, the valence of the co-occurring USs would be transferred to the 
paired CSs, resulting in a standard EC effect for the cues X and Y, thus an implicit 
preference in line with the valence implied by the mere CS-US co-occurrences. 
However, an alternative (i.e., propositional) account could assume that not only 
the CS-US co-occurrences, but also the relational information implied by the two 
different contexts may play a role in the implicit evaluation acquisition, and 
therefore lead to divergent results between conditions. In condition Same, both 
CS-US co-occurrences and context rule have the same implications for framing 
the single CSs X and Y. They are only presented in compounds (XF and YH), and 
consistently followed by a positive and by a negative outcome, respectively. At 
the same time, the context rule implies that a cue that is presented in a 
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compound would be followed by the same outcome, also when presented alone. 
Therefore, participants could infer that the single cue X and Y, if presented alone, 
would be followed by a positive and a negative outcome, respectively. 
Conversely, in condition Opposite, the implications deriving from the CS-US co-
occurrences and from the context rule diverge. The cues X and Y are still 
consistently experienced in compounds (XF and YH), co-occurring with a positive 
US and with a negative US, respectively. However, the context rule implies that a 
certain cue (e.g., A), when presented alone, would be followed by an outcome 
(e.g., Aneg) that is the opposite of the one that follows it when it is presented in 
compound with another cue (e.g., ABpos). If participants learned these rules 
from the context pairings, and applied them to the test pairings, one would 
expect different implicit evaluation of the CSs X and Y across the two conditions 
Same and Opposite. Namely, the CSpos would be implicitly liked more than the 
CSneg in condition Same, whereas the CSneg would be implicitly liked more than 
the CSpos in condition Opposite. This hypothesis assumes that relational 
information influences implicit evaluation acquisition, and it could not be derived 
from purely associative account of implicit evaluation. The aim of Chapter 1 is to 
test this hypothesis, that is, whether a relational context rule can moderate the 
acquisition of implicit evaluation. 
 Chapter 2 focuses on another potential moderator of the effect of 
relational information on implicit evaluation, namely the implicit measures that 
are employed in order to assess implicit evaluation. Implicit measures create 
situations in which participants have to respond to a number of stimuli (see 
Gawronski & De Houwer, in press, for an extensive review). These situations may 
differ between implicit measures in terms of their procedural features and of the 
responses that participants are required to produce, as well as by the different 
conditions of automaticity that they imply. Implicit evaluation is traditionally 
derived from a measurement outcome (i.e., a score) that each implicit measure 
produces. The measurement score can be based on the combination of several 
factors (e.g., reaction times, errors). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the 
different sub-sets of conditions implied by each implicit measure may represent 
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potential moderators of implicit evaluation, for instance facilitating or impeding 
the impact of relational information.  
The aim of Chapter 2 was to test the sensitivity of three widely used 
implicit measures to relational information: the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the Affective Misattribution Procedure 
(AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005) and the Evaluative Priming with 
a picture-picture naming task (Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, & 
Eelen, 2006). In Experiments 1-3, we adopted a simplified version of the design 
employed in the experiments reported in Chapter 1. Two nonwords X and Y 
served as CSs. They were presented always in compound with a cue R and 
consistently followed by a positive (USpos) and by a negative (USneg) outcome, 
respectively, resulting in the target CS-US pairings XRpos and YRneg. At the 
beginning of the experiment, participants were told that the cue R had a special 
function, namely it reversed the usual outcome of the cue it was paired with. In 
order to exemplify this rule, a series of context pairings were presented along 
with the target CS-US pairings. These pairings were Apos, ARneg, Bneg, and 
BRpos. These pairings follow the rule that was described in the instructions: a 
certain cue presented alone (e.g., A) gives the opposite outcome when it is 
presented in compound with the reverse-cue R (e.g., Apos and ARneg). After the 
acquisition phase, implicit and explicit evaluation of the target cues X and Y were 
measured. It is important to note that the cues X and Y were always presented in 
compound with the cue R during the learning phase, and were presented on 
their own only in the measurement phase. In Experiment 1, as implicit measure 
of evaluation, we have employed an IAT. Conversely, in Experiments 2 and 3 we 
have employed an AMP. If relational information has an effect on implicit 
evaluation for the cues X and Y, this would lead to a reverse EC effect, that is, an 
implicit preference for the negatively paired cue over the positively paired cue. 
In addition, different results between implicit measures could tell us which 
implicit measures are more or less sensitive to the impact of relational 
information. 
Experiment 4 adopted a different design, similar to that of Experiment 3 
by Peters and Gawronski (2011), already described above. Briefly, four CSs were 
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paired with either positive or negative USs, and the CS-US relation was described 
to be either true or false. This way, four different combinations of valence and 
validity were obtained, resulting in a positive-true CS, a positive-false CS, a 
negative-true CS, and a negative-false CS. After the acquisition phase, implicit 
and explicit evaluations of the four CSs were measured. Whereas Peters and 
Gawronski employed an evaluative priming task with an evaluative decision (EPT, 
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995), in our replication we employed an 
evaluative priming with a naming task (cf. Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 
1986; Spruyt et al., 2007). To sum up, Chapter 2 explores whether the most 
widely used implicit measure of evaluation are, in different extent, sensitive to 
relational information. This may lead to interesting findings, and extend our 
knowledge about how to interpret these measurement outcomes. 
 The aim of Chapter 3 was to investigate the conditions under which 
information that qualifies the relation between CSs and USs is effective in 
moderating implicit evaluation of the CSs. In particular, we were interested in 
how the timing in which relational information is experienced (e.g., before or 
after the experience of stimulus pairings) impacts implicit evaluation. In 
Experiment 1, a first nonword (CS1) was repeatedly paired with a word of a 
positive valence (USpos), and a second nonword (CS2) was repeatedly paired 
with a word of negative valence (USneg). Either before (condition Instructions 
Before) or after (condition Instructions After) the pairings, verbal instructions 
were presented. These instructions stated that each CS was actually the antonym 
of its paired US, and therefore the two were opposite to each other. For 
example, if the nonword LOKANTA (CS) was presented with the word HAPPY 
(USpos), according to the pre- or post-pairings instructions, its real meaning 
would be “sad” (the opposite of “happy”). After the acquisition phase, implicit 
and explicit evaluations of the two CSs were assessed. The aim of this 
experiment was to test whether the timing in which (opposite) relational 
instructions are presented can moderate EC effects of implicit evaluation, thus 
replicating the findings of Peters and Gawronski (2011).  
With Experiment 2, we tested the assumption that the mere CS-US co-
occurrence represents a cue that indicates that the CS and the US are equivalent, 
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and therefore share the same valence. In particular, we aimed at changing this 
spontaneous framing of equivalence into a framing of opposition (i.e., the CS is 
framed as being opposite to the US). To this end, we presented participants with 
three training series of CS-US pairings. After each series, verbal instructions 
stated that the CSs were actually the opposite of the paired USs (in the same 
fashion as the instructions in Experiment 1). Aim of this manipulation was to 
create an environment in which the co-occurrence of stimuli becomes a cue that 
signals that they are oppositely (and not equivalently) related. After the three 
training series of pairings, a fourth, target CS-US series of pairings was presented 
that was followed either by instructions that stated that the CS and the US were 
equivalent (condition Instructions Equivalent), by instructions that stated that 
the CS and the US were opposite (condition Instructions Opposite) or by no 
instructions (condition No Instructions). After the acquisition phase, implicit and 
explicit evaluation of the two target CSs was measured. If the training CS-US 
pairings and instructions successfully changed the spontaneous framing of 
equivalence of the target CS-US pairings, we would expect a reduced impact of 
the implications of the mere CS-US co-occurrences on implicit evaluation. In 
addition, the manipulation of the post-pairings instructions allowed us to test the 
moderating influence of different relational (i.e., equivalence, opposition) 
instructions that one disclosed only after the CS-US pairings have been encoded. 
Finally, with Experiment 3 we aimed at testing the assumption that when 
two propositions, based on CS-US relations, are formed one after the other, the 
first will have a stronger impact on implicit than on explicit evaluation. To this 
end, we presented participants with CS-US pairings, and with both pre- and post-
pairings instructions qualifying the relation between the CSs and the USs. These 
instructions could be either of equivalence or of opposition. Therefore, in 
addition to the CS-US pairings, each participant experienced one of four possible 
combinations of pre- and post-pairings instructions (equivalence-equivalence, 
equivalence-opposition, opposition-equivalence, or opposition-opposition). In 
case of incongruent combinations of instructions, the second one was described 
as being the valid one. After the acquisition phase, implicit and explicit 
evaluations were assessed for the two CSs, in counterbalanced order. Our 
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hypotheses were that, if the relative impact of the first proposition was bigger on 
implicit evaluations than on explicit evaluations, we would observe a bigger 
difference in EC between consistent conditions (i.e., equivalence-equivalence; 
opposition-opposition) and inconsistent conditions (i.e., equivalence-opposition; 
opposition-equivalence) on the explicit evaluation ratings rather than on the 
implicit evaluation measure.  
To conclude, Chapter 4 is a replication of a recent study by Moran and 
Bar-Anan (2012), who reported findings that were to some extent controversial. 
Although recent research has shown that relational information does, in various 
degrees, moderate implicit evaluation (Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Zanon et al., 
2012), Moran and Bar-Anan reported two experiments in which relational 
information impacted only on explicit evaluation, while being totally ineffective 
in influencing implicit evaluation. In their original study, Moran and Bar-Anan 
presented four CSs, each of which started or ended the presentation of either a 
pleasant sound (USpos) or of an aversive sound (USneg). Hence, their design 
consisted in a starting-positive CS, a stopping-positive CS, a starting-negative CS, 
and a stopping-negative CS. Their assumption was that a CS that starts an US 
acquires a valence in line with the US. Conversely, their second assumption was 
that a CS that ends a certain US would acquire a valence opposite to the US. 
After the acquisition phase, they measured implicit and explicit evaluations of 
the four CSs. Interestingly, their results on the explicit evaluations showed a 
moderation of the relational information: the CS that started a positive sound 
was evaluated more positively than the CS that stopped it. In addition, the CS 
that stopped a negative sound was evaluated more positively than the CS that 
stopped a positive sound. However, their implicit evaluation measures showed 
no moderation of the relational information: the CSs that were paired with the 
USpos were always evaluated more positively than the CSs that co-occurred with 
the USneg, regardless of whether they were presented at their beginning or at 
their end. These results support a dual process view of evaluation, in which 
explicit evaluation is influenced by higher-order propositional processes (capable 
to encode relations), and implicit evaluation is based on the mere content of the 
CS-US co-occurrences, encoded in form of associations. 
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However, in Chapter 4 we replicated this experiment, adding two, in our 
opinion, crucial procedural modifications (regarding the instructions and the 
implicit measure) to the original Moran and Bar-Anan’s design. Our aim was to 
test whether, with the changed design, we could find an impact of relational 
information not only on explicit, but also on implicit evaluation.
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Footnotes 
 
1 
As pointed out by Hughes et al. (2011), there are also functional 
alternatives to associative models of implicit evaluations, alternatives which 
stem from Relational Frame Theory (RFT, Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001; 
see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & Vahey, 2012, for a detailed discussion). However, 
in the present dissertation, we decided to focus on cognitive models of 
evaluation and will therefore not discuss the non-cognitive, functional RFT 
approach. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the functional RFT approach can 
contribute in important ways to future developments in research on implicit 
evaluation.  
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Introduction 
 
Because preferences drive behavior, cognition, and emotion, it is 
important to understand how those likes and dislikes are formed and how they 
can be influenced. Research has shown that people do not necessarily evaluate 
stimuli in a conscious, controlled and intentional manner. As Zajonc (1980) 
argued in his seminal paper, evaluations can arise also in a spontaneous, 
uncontrolled, unconscious, efficient and fast manner. We refer to this type of 
automatic preferences as implicit evaluations, whereas we refer to non-
automatic preferences as explicit evaluations.
1
 Implicit evaluations have been 
shown to play a crucial role in many important psychological phenomena 
including psychopathology (see Roefs et al., 2011), addiction (Wiers & Stacy, 
2006), and social interactions (Fazio & Olson, 2003).  
Implicit evaluations often arise as the result of repeated experiences. For 
example, the implicit evaluation of a neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) 
might be changed by repeatedly pairing it with an affectively relevant (positive or 
negative) stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, US). A change in liking that occurs as 
the result of pairings of stimuli is typically referred to as evaluative conditioning 
(EC; De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De 
Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). EC can involve changes in both 
explicit and implicit evaluations. Hence, implicit evaluations that result from the 
repeated pairing of stimuli are a subset of EC effects, namely those EC effects 
that involve changes in automatic rather than non-automatic evaluations. 
At a mental process level, it is often assumed that EC of both implicit and 
explicit evaluations is due to the slow and gradual formation of associations in 
mind, that is, of unqualified links between mental representations. This view is 
endorsed by several associative (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den 
Bergh, 1992) and dual process models (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Dual process models of evaluations postulate the 
existence of two separate but interacting mental systems of processing: an 
associative, impulsive system which is responsible for the formation of implicit 
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evaluations and a propositional, reflective system which is responsible for the 
formation of explicit evaluations (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006). The associative 
system consists of a network of mental representations that are linked via 
unqualified associations. Associations are typically assumed to result from the 
direct experience of stimulus pairings. Once an association has been formed 
between the CS and US representations as the result of CS-US pairings, 
presentation of the CS not only results in the activation of the CS representation 
but also, via automatic spreading of activation, in the automatic activation of the 
US representation. As a result, the originally neutral CS will evoke implicit 
evaluations that are in line with the valence of the US. Under certain conditions, 
the automatic activation of the US representation can bias explicit CS evaluations 
as well and thus lead to EC of explicit evaluations (see Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006, for details). In sum, dual process models typically locate the 
source of EC effects, particularly those involving implicit evaluations, within an 
associative system.  
Recently, single process models have been proposed that reject the 
existence of an associative system. More specifically, propositional models 
attribute all instances of EC (and other types of associative learning
2
) to the non-
automatic formation of propositions about stimulus relations (e.g., De Houwer, 
2007, 2009c; Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009). Propositions are 
statements about the world that can be true or untrue. They can specify not only 
that two stimuli are related, but also the way in which the stimuli are related 
(e.g., that the stimuli simply co-occur or that one stimulus causes another 
stimulus). Because the impact of stimulus pairings on evaluative and other 
responses is, according to propositional models, mediated by the formation of 
propositions, EC can occur only after a proposition about the stimulus pairings 
has been formed and will depend on the content of the proposition that is 
formed. 
Propositional models also incorporate several other assumptions that 
generate a number of interesting predictions. First, the formation of propositions 
is assumed to be a non-automatic process that requires awareness and cognitive 
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resources. Hence, propositional models postulate that EC and other types of 
associative learning should depend on awareness of the stimulus pairings. 
Although there have been reports of unaware EC, questions have been raised 
about the validity of these findings (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et 
al., 2009), and many studies have failed to find EC effects in the absence of 
contingency awareness (e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Stahl, 
Unkelbach, & Corneille, 2009). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis showed that 
awareness of the stimulus pairings was by far the biggest moderator of the size 
of EC effects (Hofmann et al., 2010). Second, it is assumed that propositions can 
be formed not only on the basis of direct experience but also on the basis of 
instructions or inferences (De Houwer, 2009c). In line with this assumption, De 
Houwer (2006) showed that merely informing participants about stimulus 
pairings without actually presenting these pairings is enough to induce EC effects 
(see also Gast & De Houwer, 2012). Third, it has been proposed that after the 
non-automatic formation of a proposition, the proposition can be stored in 
memory from which it can be retrieved automatically (e.g., Bar-Anan, De 
Houwer, & Nosek, 2010; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). This 
latter assumption allows propositional models to explain EC of implicit 
evaluations.  
In the present paper, we report studies that were inspired by the central 
idea of propositional models, namely that the effect of CS-US pairings on liking 
should depend on the content of the proposition about the CS-US relation rather 
than on the pairings themselves. Importantly, the same objective CS-US pairings 
could lead to propositions about the CS-US relation with different content 
depending on the context in which those pairings are presented. For instance, if 
a neutral stimulus co-occurs with a positive stimulus (e.g., a neutral nonword and 
a positive word) in a context in which this implies that the neutral stimulus 
actually has negative properties (e.g., when the nonwords are said to be 
antonyms of the existing words), such co-occurrences should lead to the 
formation of negative propositions about the initially neutral stimulus (e.g., the 
nonword has a negative meaning). As a result, the originally neutral stimulus 
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should become negative even though it was paired with positive stimuli. Recent 
studies support this prediction. For instance, Förderer and Unkelbach (2011; see 
also Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2010) showed that neutral faces paired with positive 
pictures were rated less positive than neutral faces paired with negative pictures 
when participants were told that the depicted people loathed the pictures they 
were paired with. At a functional level, studies such as these are important 
because they show that the effect of stimulus pairings on liking depends on the 
(verbal) context in which they are presented. At the level of mental process 
theories, they provide support for propositional models of EC.  
It is a different question, however, whether this type of context effects 
can be found also for EC of implicit evaluations. Assuming that in particular 
implicit evaluations are determined by associations in memory and that 
associations in memory are determined by actual stimulus pairings (e.g., Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006), one could predict that EC of implicit evaluations will reflect 
stimulus pairings independent of what the context implies about the way in 
which the CS and US are related. Therefore, observing context effects on EC of 
implicit evaluations would constrain theories about the determinants of implicit 
evaluations more than observing context effects on EC of explicit evaluations. 
A recent study suggests that contextual information about the way CS 
and US are related can also moderate EC of implicit evaluations. Peters and 
Gawronski (2011) presented pictures of four neutral faces (CSs), two paired with 
a number of positive descriptions (USs+), and two paired with a number of 
negative descriptions (USs-). After each trial, participants were explicitly told 
whether the pairing they had just seen was true or false. If the pairing was said 
to provide false information, participants were asked to “mentally reverse” the 
pairing (e.g., when someone was described as SAD, they should infer that this 
person was HAPPY). Employing an affective misattribution procedure (AMP, 
Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005) and an affective priming task (Fazio, 
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) to capture implicit evaluations of the CSs, 
they found that EC effects depended not only on the valence of the USs but also 
on the relational information (true vs. false) that was presented right after each 
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pairing. In particular, a standard EC effect (i.e., preference for CSs paired with 
positive USs over CSs paired with negative USs) was found when the pairings 
were said to provide correct information. However, when pairings were said to 
provide false information, a reversed EC effect was observed (i.e., more negative 
rating for CSs paired with positive USs than for CSs paired with negative USs).  
In the current research, we wanted to investigate further whether and 
when EC of implicit evaluations is moderated by the context in which pairings are 
presented. Unlike earlier studies (Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011; Peters & 
Gawronski, 2011), we manipulated the context in an indirect way, that is, 
without verbally instructing participants about how the CS and US are related. 
Moreover, our context manipulation was embedded in a traditional EC 
procedure that involved pairings of single stimuli as CSs and USs rather than 
statements or personality trait descriptions as used by Peters and Gawronski 
(2011). More specifically, we manipulated relational information by presenting 
the target CS-US pairings in the context of other pairings that followed a certain 
rule. A first CS X was always presented in compound with cue F and was always 
paired with a positive US (i.e., winning a game; XF+). A second CS Y always 
occurred in compound with cue G and was always paired with a negative US (i.e., 
losing a game; YG-). In addition to these target compounds, we also presented 
context cues and manipulated the rule that determined when a context cue was 
paired with a win or a loss. In condition Same, a context cue was always followed 
by the same US regardless of whether it was presented alone or in compound 
with another cue (i.e., A+, B+, AB+, C-, D-, CD-). In condition Opposite, however, a 
context cue was followed by a different US when it was presented on its own 
than when it was presented in compound with another cue (i.e., A+, B+, AB-, C-, 
D-, CD+). Our dependent measure was the implicit and explicit evaluation of the 
two target stimuli X and Y when presented on their own (and thus in the absence 
of the cues F and G with which they appeared on compound trials).  
Different mental process models of EC on implicit measures make 
different predictions regarding the outcome of our studies. Regarding the 
condition Same, all currently available models make the same predictions. 
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Although postulating different mediating processes, in functional terms they 
would all expect a standard EC effect, that is, a change in implicit evaluation of 
the CSs that reflects the valence of the USs they co-occurred with. The models 
do, however, make different predictions about whether this effect will also be 
found in condition Opposite. A purely associative account of EC of implicit 
evaluations implies that the change in implicit evaluation is driven simply by 
associations that are formed between stimuli that co-occurred. Importantly, in 
both conditions, the target stimulus X was paired with a positive outcome (XF+) 
whereas target stimulus Y was paired with a negative outcome. Because the 
pairings involving X and Y were identical in both conditions, the implicit 
evaluations of the target stimuli X and Y should not differ between the conditions 
Same and Opposite. In both cases, X should be evaluated more positively than Y.  
A propositional account, on the other hand, would predict different EC 
effects in condition Same than in condition Opposite. In condition Same, the 
context pairings (A+, B+, AB+, C-, D-, CD-) imply that a stimulus is paired with the 
same US when presented on its own and when presented in compound with 
another stimulus. Based on this information, participants can infer from the XF+ 
and YG- trials that X on its own will be followed by a positive outcome and that Y 
on its own would be followed by a negative outcome. Hence our dependent 
measure (i.e., the evaluation of X and Y in the absence of their paired compound 
cues F and G) should reflect the valence of the paired USs. In condition Opposite, 
however, the context pairings (A+, B+, AB-, C-, D-, CD+) imply that a cue is paired 
with different outcomes when presented alone than when presented in 
compound. Hence, the XF+ pairings imply that X on its own will be followed by a 
negative outcome whereas Y would be followed by a positive outcome. 
Therefore in this case, the evaluation of X and Y when presented on their own, 
should reflect the opposite of the valence of the US with which they were paired. 
Provided that participants indeed use the context trials to form propositions 
about the X-US and Y-US relations, and transfer the rule from the context 
pairings to the target pairings, propositional models would thus predict that 
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participants will prefer X over Y in condition Same but will prefer Y over X in 
condition Opposite.  
Finally, a third possible scenario for condition Opposite would be a 
significant reduction of the EC effect compared to condition Same but not a 
reversal. This result would allow for two theoretical interpretations. A 
propositional account of such a result would entail that participants form two 
competing propositions, one based on the experienced co-occurrences and 
another based on the rule implied by the context pairs. Whereas these two 
propositions would lead to the same preferences in condition Same (e.g., “X goes 
with F and with win” and “X on its own goes with win”) this would not be the 
case for condition Opposite (e.g., “X goes with F and with win” and “X on its own 
goes with loss”). This might result in a preference for X over Y in condition Same 
but not in condition Opposite. Such a pattern of results, however, would also be 
in line with a hybrid account that assumes that both associative and 
propositional processes contribute to implicit EC effects. Whereas both 
processes would result in a preference for X over Y in condition Same, they 
would oppose each other in condition Opposite. For instance, the XF+ pairings 
would result in an association between X and winning (and thus a liking of X) but 
in the proposition that X on its own will be followed by a loss (and thus a disliking 
of X). Hence, in condition Opposite, X will not be liked more than Y.  
In sum, if we observe that X and Y are evaluated differently in condition 
Same than in condition Opposite (either reversed or reduced effects in condition 
Opposite), this would support the idea that propositional processes (co-
)determine EC of implicit evaluations. In addition, it would go beyond the study 
of Peters and Gawronski (2011) by showing that context effects in EC of implicit 
evaluations are not limited to the rather atypical EC procedure that they used in 
which USs were explicitly said to provide a true or false description of the 
personality of the CSs.  
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Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
 
In three studies, we examined context effects in the following manner (see 
De Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010, for a similar approach in research on causal 
learning). Participants were informed that on each trial of a learning phase, they 
would see the picture of a slot machine frame on the screen. The slot machine 
had two displays, one at its top and one at its bottom. On each trial, the top one 
displayed one or two neutral nonwords, whereas the bottom one displayed an 
outcome that could either be a win or a loss. Participants were instructed that 
each nonword or compound of nonwords would be the cause of the respective 
outcome, which could either be a win or a loss. We refer to different nonwords 
with different letters (A-G, X and Y), to a win with “+”, and to a loss with “-“. In 
condition Opposite, participants experienced the pairings A+, B+, AB-, C-, D-, 
CD+, XF+, YH-. In condition Same, participants experienced the pairings A+, B+, 
AB+, C-, D-, CD-, XF+, YH-. The stimuli X and F which are in the learning phase 
always presented in compound with the stimuli, F and H, respectively, serve as 
CSs. After the repeated presentation of these pairings, we measured the implicit 
evaluations of the single stimuli X and Y, employing a range of implicit measures, 
that is, measures of implicit evaluations. More specifically, in Experiment 1, we 
used the implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998), 
in Experiment 2 the personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004), and in Experiment 3 
the affective priming task (Fazio et al., 1995). We employed a variety of implicit 
measures to ensure that our conclusions were not specific to one particular 
measure.  
 
Method 
We report all three studies in the same section because in all three 
studies we employed the same procedure during the learning phase. The only 
major difference between experiments concerned the nature of the measure of 
implicit evaluations.  
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Participants. All participants were students at Ghent University. Fifty-six 
students participated in Experiment 1 (mean age = 18.64, SD = 1.77; 68% 
women), 46 in Experiment 2 (mean age = 19.63, SD= 2.86; 83% women); and 50 
in Experiment 3 (mean age = 19.64, SD= 2.75; 76% women). All participants were 
native Dutch speakers. For their participation in the experiments, they were 
given either course credits or four Euros. 
 
Materials.  
Materials Learning phase. Each cue and outcome appeared on one of 
two displays of a slot-machine picture, which was presented on a computer 
screen in the size of 26 (height) x 17 (width) cm. The cues appeared on a display 
at the top, whereas the outcomes appeared on a display at the bottom. In all 
three experiments, eight nonsense words (“BAYRAM”, “ENANWAL”, “UDIBNON”, 
“KADIRGA”, “LOKANTA”, “SARICIK”, “FEVKANI” and “NIJARON”) were used as 
stimuli during the learning phase. The nonwords “LOKANTA” and “FEVKANI” 
were the target stimuli, whereas the other nonwords constituted the set of 
context stimuli. All context and target stimuli were written in black, upper case 
letters, and in the font “Arial Black”, font size 40. We used nonsense words to 
avoid any potential pre-experimental association between our stimuli and the 
outcomes. The positive outcome was the Dutch word for “win” (“winst”), 
presented in green color, upper case letters, and in the font “Britannic Bold”, 
font size 100.The negative outcome was the Dutch word for “loss” (“verlies”), 
presented in red color, upper case letters, and in the font “Haettenschweiler”, 
font size 100. The positive outcome was presented together with a pleasant 
sound (a soft melody) and several pictures of 2 euro coins. The negative outcome 
was presented together with an unpleasant sound (a loud buzzer) and two 
cartoon pictures of a sad face.  
Materials Measurement phase. In Experiment 1, we employed an implicit 
association test designed to measure the evaluation of the target words (IAT, 
Greenwald et al., 1998). In this IAT, the attribute stimuli referring to the category 
positive were the Dutch words for “happy” (“gelukkig”), “honest” (“eerlijk”), 
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“pleasant” (“prettig”) and “sincere” (“oprecht”). The attribute stimuli for the 
category negative were the Dutch words for “mean” (“gemeen”), “rude” 
(“brutaal”), “aggressive” (“agressief”) and “deceptive” (“bedrieglijk”). The target 
stimuli were the cues X and Y (“LOKANTA” and “FEVKANI”). As we were 
interested in the single nonwords X and Y, we deviated from the standard IAT 
procedure by using only one stimulus for each of the target categories. To avoid 
that stimuli were classified only on the basis of simple perceptual features, each 
target stimulus was presented in four different fonts (lower case Arial Black, 
upper case Arial Black, lower case Fixedsys, and upper case Fixedsys), resulting in 
8 different target stimuli. De Houwer (2006) showed the reliability of this 
procedural modification and its suitability to capture recent learning. 
In Experiment 2, we employed a personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004) 
which differed from the standard IAT in two important ways. First, the attribute 
labels were “I like” (“Heb ik graag”) and “I don’t like” (“Heb ik niet graag”), 
instead of “positive” and “negative”, and second, there was no error feedback 
for the stimuli of the attribute categories. In addition to that, the attribute 
stimuli were selected in such a way that their valence could easily be judged in a 
personal (e.g., non-normative) manner. We used the Dutch words for “holiday” 
(“vakantie”), “summer” (“zomer”), “gift” (“cadeau”), “party” (“feest”). The 
attribute stimuli for the negative category were the Dutch words for “war” 
(“oorlog”), “vomit” (“braaksel”), “accident” (“ongeluk”), “divorce” (“scheiding”). 
As in Experiment 1, the target stimuli were different perceptual instantiations of 
the nonwords “lokanta” and “fevkani”. 
In Experiment 3, we applied an affective priming procedure (Fazio, et al., 
1995). As targets we used the positive and negative attributes from Experiment 
1. The nonwords X and Y were used as primes. 
All tasks were presented on an Intel Core2 Duo PC with a 19'' 100 Hz 
monitor, screen resolution 1280 by 1024 pixels, and implemented using custom 
made Inquisit 2.0 programs. For each implicit measure, the responses were given 
by pressing the key A (left key) or the key P (right key) on a standard AZERTY 
keyboard. 
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Procedure. At the beginning of each experiment, participants were 
informed that they would see a series of trials in a slot machine game. They were 
told that each trial consisted of the presentation of one or two slot-machine 
words, followed by a winning or losing outcome. Their task was to identify which 
of the presented slot-machine words predicted a win and which predicted a loss. 
They were asked to detect and remember this information because it was 
important for another upcoming task. Finally, we took measures to ensure that 
participants would register the rule that determined the outcome of the context 
cues. From the perspective of propositional models, detection of the context rule 
is a precondition for finding an impact of this context element on EC. In all 
experiments, participants were therefore told that a hidden rule regulated the 
presentation of the slot-machine words and their outcome and were asked to try 
to discover the rule from the series of stimuli. In Experiment 2, we implemented 
an additional measure by actually informing the participants about the nature of 
the rule. That is, in condition Opposite, participants were told that words 
presented in compound result in the opposite outcome than when presented 
alone. In condition Same, they were told that words presented in compound 
produce the same outcome as when presented alone. Although these measures 
imply that we cannot draw strong conclusions about whether participants can 
learn these kinds of rules in a spontaneous manner, they are instrumental for 
determining whether the rules that operate in a certain context can moderate EC 
of implicit evaluations. In any case, unlike the case in previous related studies 
(e.g., Förderer & Unkelback, 2011; Peters & Gawronski, 2011), participants were 
not directly instructed about how CS-US pairings should be interpreted.  
After the instruction page, participants could start the learning task by 
pressing a key. Each trial of the learning task represented a slot-machine game. A 
trial started with the presentation of the picture of a slot-machine, together with 
one or two nonword(s) which appeared at the top display position for 2000 ms. 
Then the outcome (the Dutch word for “win” or “loss”) was added on a second 
display at the bottom of the slot-machine, together with the pleasant or 
unpleasant sound. The nonword(s) and the outcome remained on the screen 
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together for 3000 ms during which the sound was also present. The next trial 
started after an inter trial interval of 3000 ms during which the screen was blank 
and no sounds were played. The sequence of trials presented was the following. 
First, A+, B+, and AB+ (Condition Same) or A+, B+, and AB- (Condition Opposite) 
trials were presented twice each, resulting in a block of six trials (Block 1). This 
block was followed by C-, D-, and CD- (Condition Same) or C-, D-, and CD+ 
(Condition Opposite) trials, each presented twice, resulting in another block of 
six trials (Block 2). The series of pairings of Block 1 and Block 2 constituted the 
context, that varied between conditions. Finally, for both condition Same and 
Opposite, the target trials XF+ and YH- were presented two times each, resulting 
in a final block of four trials (Block 3). Block 3 constituted the series of target 
pairings of our design. This sequence of three blocks of trials was presented five 
times, adding up to a learning phase of eighty trials. Exclusively in Experiment 2, 
the trials of Block 1 (the pairings of the stimuli A, B and AB) and of Block 2 (the 
pairings of the stimuli C, D and CD) were only presented one time per block, 
instead of twice (like in Experiment 1 and 3). This was an attempt to shorten the 
learning phase and thus keep participants focused during the whole learning 
phase. The trial order within blocks was determined randomly for each 
participant and block separately, and the assignment of the cues X or Y to the 
positive or negative outcome was counterbalanced across participants. 
After the presentation of all learning trials, participants performed an 
implicit measure with which we aimed to assess the implicit evaluation of the 
target stimuli X and Y. In Experiment 1, we applied an IAT (Greenwald et al, 
1998). Our IAT consisted of seven phases: a target discrimination phase (B1), an 
attribute discrimination phase (B2), a combined (targets and attributes) practice 
phase (B3), a combined (targets and attributes) phase (B4), a reversed target 
discrimination phase (B5), a reversed combined practice phase (B6), and a 
reversed combined phase (B7). Phases (B1), (B2), and (B5) served only for 
practice, whereas Phases (B3), (B4), (B6) and (B7) were the combined test phases 
that served as measures of implicit evaluation. Before each phase, participants 
were informed about the assignment of the different categories to the left and 
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right key. During the target and reversed target discrimination phase (B1 and 
B5), each target stimulus was presented four times, resulting in 32 trials. During 
the attribute discrimination phase (B2), each attribute stimulus was presented 
four times, also resulting in 32 trials. Finally, both combined phases consisted of 
two blocks (practice – B3 and B6 - and test phase – B4 and B7) of 32 trials each. 
In each block of these phases, each attribute and target stimulus was presented 
twice. During the reversed combined phase, the assignment of targets to 
response keys was opposite to the assignment during the other combined phase. 
The assignment of the target categories to the two response keys (e.g., during 
Phases B1, B3, and B4, press left for X and right for Y or vice versa) was 
counterbalanced across participants. Whether the X-positive / Y-negative task 
(e.g., X assigned to the same key as positive attributes and Y assigned to the 
same key as negative attributes) was presented before or after the X-negative / 
Y-positive IAT task (e.g., X assigned to the negative key and Y assigned to the 
positive key) was thus also counterbalanced across participants. The order of 
trials in each phase was determined randomly. On each trial, a word was 
presented in the center of the screen until a valid response (pressing key A or P) 
was registered. If the response was correct, the next word appeared after 400 
ms. If the response was incorrect, a red cross was presented for 400 ms, also in 
the center of the screen. In this case, the next word was presented 400 ms after 
the red cross had disappeared. 
 In Experiment 2, we employed a personalized IAT (see Olson & Fazio, 
2004). The procedure was identical to the standard IAT in Experiment 1, except 
for two modifications that are characteristic of the personalized IAT: Firstly, the 
attribute category labels were the Dutch words for “I like” instead of “Positive” 
and “I don’t like” instead of “Negative”. Secondly, there was no error feedback 
for the attribute stimuli. (see Materials section). 
In Experiment 3, we applied an affective priming procedure. Each trial 
started with a 500- ms presentation of a fixation star in the center of the screen. 
Next, one of the cues was presented as prime for 200 ms, immediately followed 
by the target (stimulus onset asynchrony of 200 ms), both in the center of the 
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screen. The task was to categorize the targets as quickly as possible as positive or 
negative by pressing one of two keys. Once a response was made, the next trial 
started after an intertrial interval of 1000 ms. After 16 practice trials, participants 
completed a block of 128 test trials in which combinations of the primes (2) and 
the positive (4) or negative (4) targets were realized equally often, and presented 
in random order.  
 For exploratory reasons, after performing the implicit measure, 
participants were also asked to rate, on a 9-point Likert scale, the pleasantness 
of cues A, C, X, Y, XF, and YH. The ratings for the cues A and C (presented in a 
random order) were given first, followed by the ratings for the cues X and Y 
(presented in a random order), and finally the ratings for the compounds XF and 
YH (also presented in a random order). Subsequently, participants were asked to 
judge for cues A and C first (presented in a random order), and then for cues X 
and Y (also presented in a random order) to what extent they were likely to 
cause “win” or “loss” in a potential new slot-machine game. This question served 
as a measure of the causal relations learning between stimuli and outcomes. 
After the causal ratings, participants were asked to report whether they had 
discovered the context rule and, if so, to write it down. Finally, but only in 
Experiments 2 and 3, participants received a list of all stimuli (single and 
compounds) they experienced in the learning phase. They were asked to 
indicate, for each of the presented cues (A, B, C, D) and combinations of cues 
(AB, CD, XF, YH), the outcome it was paired with. This series of questions served 
as a measure of contingency awareness. After this last questionnaire was 
completed, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results 
Experiment 1. 
IAT. IAT scores were calculated using the D600 scoring algorithm 
(Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji, 2003). Trials in Blocks 3 and 6 of the IAT were 
entered as mixed practice blocks whereas trials in Blocks 4 and 7 were treated as 
mixed test blocks. A positive value for the D600 indicates better performance in 
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the X-positive / Y-negative IAT block than in the X-negative / Y-positive IAT block. 
In other words, a positive value represents implicit evaluations in line with the 
target pairings (X paired with win and Y with loss). Although it is well known that 
caution is required when interpreting the absolute value of IAT scores (e.g., 
Blanton & Jaccard, 2006), we believe that a positive value of our IAT scores can 
be interpreted as reflecting a preference for X over Y. Unlike the case in most IAT 
studies, the target stimuli that we used were nonwords that were unknown to 
the participants before the experiment. Moreover, a nonword functioned equally 
often as cue X and cue Y. Hence, the direction of the IAT score (positive or 
negative) can reflect only the acquired relative preference of X compared to Y.  
Most importantly, the difference between the two conditions was 
significant, t(54) = 2.21, p = .031, d = 0.58. In condition Same, the D600 measure 
was positive (M = 0.23, SE = 0.11) and significantly different from zero, t(27) = 
2.09, p = .046, d = 0.40. In condition Opposite, the D600 measure was negative 
(M = - 0.10, SE = 0.10) but did not significantly differ from zero, t(27) = -.98, ns.  
Explicit valence ratings. Our experiments do not allow for strong 
conclusions regarding EC of explicit evaluations because explicit evaluations were 
always assessed after the implicit measure. Nevertheless, for exploratory 
reasons, we did conduct Cue x Condition ANOVAs on the explicit valence ratings 
for the target cues X and Y. For this experiment and all subsequent experiments, 
the relevant mean explicit valence ratings can be found in Table 1. The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of cue, F(1, 54) = 5.40, p = .024, but not of 
condition, F(1, 54) = 1.77, p =.19. Furthermore, the interaction between cue and 
condition was significant, F(1, 54) = 10.96, p < .01, ns, partial η
2
=.17. A post-hoc t-
test showed a significant effect of the cue in condition Same, t(27) = 4.247, p < 
.01, d = 0.80, but not in condition Opposite, t(27) = -0.66, p = .51. This pattern of 
results reflects that of the IAT data. The Pearson correlation between implicit 
and explicit ratings (for the cues X and Y) was also significant, r = .52, p < .01.  
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Table 1. Means (and standard errors) of the explicit valence ratings for the target 
cues in Experiments 1 – 3. X was always paired with a positive outcome 
whereas Y was always paired with a negative outcome.  
Experiments Cue 
Condition 
Same 
Condition 
Opposite 
X 6.68 (0.48) 5.07 (0.48) 
Experiment 1 
Y 3.21 (0.50) 5.68 (0.50) 
X 6.10 (0.51) 5.60 (0.59) 
Experiment 2 
Y 3.90 (0.49) 5.60 (0.56) 
X 5.86 (0.40) 4.95 (0.43) 
Experiment 3 
Y 4.00 (0.40) 4.61 (0.43) 
 
Causal ratings. Cue x Condition ANOVAs were also conducted on the 
causal ratings of the target cues X and Y (see Table 2 for all relevant means for 
Experiments 1-3). The analysis revealed a significant main effect of the cue, F(1, 
54) = 16.50, p < .01, partial η
2
=.23, but no effect of the condition, F(1, 54) < 1. We 
also found an interaction, F(1, 54) = 38.84, p < .01, partial η
2
=.42. A post-hoc t-
test showed a significant effect of the cue in condition Same, t(27) = 10.80, p < 
.01, d = 2.04, but not in condition Opposite, t(27) = -1.23, p = .23. Hence, in 
condition Same, participants indicated that, in a potential new game, the cues X 
and Y would be followed by the outcome predicted by the context rule, whereas 
in condition Opposite this effect was not present. 
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Table 2. Means (and standard errors) of the causal ratings for the target cues in 
Experiment 1 – 3 
 A high score indicates that the cue is deemed to cause a win in a potential 
new game. X was always paired with a positive outcome whereas Y was 
always paired with a negative outcome. 
Experiments Cue 
Condition  
Same 
Condition 
Opposite 
X 7.82 (0.54) 4.64 (0.54) 
Experiment 1 
Y 1.89 (0.50) 5.89 (0.50) 
X 7.30 (0.60) 3.00 (0.69) 
Experiment 2 
Y 2.05 (0.54) 5.40 (0.63) 
X 6.86 (0.59) 3.67 (0.64) 
Experiment 3 
Y 2.33 (0.50) 3.39 (0.54) 
 
Experiment 2. 
Personalized IAT. As in Experiment 1, we used the D600 scoring algorithm 
(Greenwald et al., 2003). Data of the participants who, when asked at the end of 
the experiment, did not remember correctly the pairings of the test compounds 
XF and YH (n = 11), were excluded from the analyses. We did so because, 
according to the assumptions of propositional models, awareness of the 
contingencies is a crucial factor in the process of proposition formation. 
Furthermore, people who did not remember the target pairings may have had a 
distorted memory and might actually have formed a proposition different from 
what was implied in the learning phase. Within this sample (n = 35), the 
difference between the two conditions was significant, t(33) = 2.10, p = .044, d = 
0.68. In condition Same, the D600 measure was positive (M = 0.23, SE = 0.08) and 
significantly different from zero, t(19) = 2.66, p =.015, d = 0.60. In condition 
Opposite, it was negative (M = - 0.10, SE = 0.14) but not significantly different 
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from zero, t(14) = -0.71, ns. Note that the difference between conditions was no 
longer significant when all participants were included in the analysis, t(44) = 1.39, 
ns.  
Explicit valence ratings. Also for the valence ratings and the causal 
ratings reported below, only the analyses for the participants who correctly 
retrieved the target compound co-occurrences will be reported. The analysis for 
the test cues X and Y did not reveal a significant effect of cue, F(1, 33) = 2.62, p = 
.12, partial η
2
=.07, nor of condition, F(1.33) = 3.09, p = .09, partial η
2
=.08. The 
interaction Cue x Condition was not significant, F(1,33) = 2.62, p = .12, partial 
η
2
=.07. The Pearson correlation between implicit and explicit ratings of the cues 
X and Y was marginally significant, r = .33, p = .05. 
Causal ratings. For the test cues X and Y, the ANOVA did reveal a 
significant main effect of the cue, F(1, 33) = 4.24, p = .047, partial η
2
=.11, but not 
of condition, F(1, 33) < 1. The Cue x Condition interaction was significant, F(1, 33) 
= 30.58, p <.01, partial η
2
=.48. A post-hoc t-test showed a significant effect of the 
cue in condition Same, t(19) = 6.53, p < .01, d = 1.46, and a marginal effect in 
condition Opposite, t(14) = -2.02, p = .06. Therefore, in condition Same, 
participants indicated that, in a potential new game, the cues X and Y would be 
followed by the outcome predicted by the context rule, whereas in condition 
Opposite this effect was only marginally significant.  
 
Experiment 3. 
Affective priming. Trials in which an incorrect response was given (7. 90% 
of all trials) were discarded. All latencies were pre-processed by discarding 
latencies that were outliers in an individual’s reaction time distribution according 
to Tukey’s (1977) extreme outlier criterion (e.g., latencies above the third 
quartile plus 3 times the individual’s interquartile range). The data of three 
participants who made more than 50% errors and seemingly reacted to the 
prime rather than to the target were excluded from the analyses. In line with the 
analyses for Experiment 2, we excluded the data of eight participants who did 
not remember the test cue pairings correctly at the end of the experiment. 
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In this study, we defined trials in which the target had the same valence 
as the outcome with which the prime co-occurred in the previous learning phase 
as congruent trials (e.g., X followed by a positive target and Y followed by a 
negative target). Trials in which the target had the opposite valence as the 
outcome with which the prime co-occurred in the previous learning phase are 
incongruent trials (e.g., X followed by a negative target and Y followed by a 
positive target). We conducted an ANOVA with congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) as a within subjects factor and context condition as a between 
subjects factor. The two-way interaction between congruency and condition was 
marginally significant, F(1,37) = 3.95, p = .05, partial η
2
=.10. Again, in Condition 
Same, reaction times for congruent trials (M = 603 ms, SE = 24.2) were 
marginally faster than reaction times for incongruent trials (M = 615 ms, SE = 
26.7), t(20) = 1.938, p = .07, d = .42. In Condition Opposite, reaction times for 
congruent (M = 559 ms, SE = 26.2) and incongruent (M = 555 ms, SE = 27.5) trials 
did not differ t(17) = -0.81, ns. Note that the Congruence x Condition interaction 
was not significant when the data of all participants were included in the 
analyses, F(1,45) =1.79, p = .19, partial η
2
=.04.  
Explicit ratings. Also for the valence ratings and the causal ratings 
reported below, only the analyses for the participants who showed a correct 
retrieval of the target co-occurrences will be reported. The analysis for the test 
cues X and Y revealed a significant effect of cue, F(1, 37) = 5.80, p = .021, but not 
of condition, F < 1. We did not find an interaction F(1, 37) = 2.81, p =. 10, partial 
η
2
=.071. The Pearson correlation between implicit and explicit ratings of the cues 
X and Y was not significantly different from zero, r = .15, ns.  
Causal ratings. For the test cues X and Y the ANOVA did reveal a main 
effect of the cue, F(1, 37) = 17.49, p < .01, partial η
2
=.32, and a marginal effect of 
condition, F(1, 37) = 3.50, p = .07, partial η
2
=.09. We found a significant Cue x 
Condition interaction, F(1, 37) = 13.67, p < .01, partial η
2
=.27. A post-hoc t-test 
showed a significant effect of the cue in condition Same, t(20) = 5.78, p < .01, d = 
1.26, but not in condition Opposite, t(17) < 1. Therefore, in condition Same, 
participants indicated that, in a potential new game, the cues X and Y would be 
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followed by the outcome predicted by the context rule, whereas in condition 
Opposite this effect was not present. 
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General Discussion 
 
The main aim of our research was to test the influence of context 
variables on EC of implicit evaluations. In three experiments, we compared the 
implicit evaluations of two target stimuli (X and Y) in two conditions that differed 
only with regard to the context in which the stimuli were presented. In both 
conditions, the test stimuli X and Y were consistently presented in compound 
with another neutral cue (F or H) and consistently followed by the same, positive 
or negative outcome (XF+, YH-). The context was manipulated by presenting the 
target cues intermixed with context cues that were paired with outcomes 
according to a certain rule. In condition Same, each of the context cues was 
consistently paired with the same outcome, regardless of whether it was 
presented alone or in compound with another cue (A+, B+, AB+; C-, D-, CD-). In 
condition Opposite, each of a series of other context cues was paired with a 
certain outcome when presented alone and with the opposite outcome when 
presented in a compound with another cue (A+, B+, AB-; C-, D-, CD+). Given that 
in both conditions the target stimulus X always co-occurred with a positive 
outcome and the target stimulus Y always co-occurred with a negative outcome, 
purely associative models of implicit attitudes that take into account only the 
pairings would predict no difference between the conditions. Results showed, 
however, that the two conditions differed significantly in terms of implicit 
evaluations towards the target cues. Across all three experiments, various 
implicit measures always reflected a preference for the positively paired cue X in 
condition Same. This preference was always absent in condition Opposite. The 
current results thus demonstrate that EC of implicit evaluations can be 
moderated by rules that are implied by the context.  
We did not, however, find a reversed EC effect in the condition Opposite. 
The latter finding stands in contrast to recent results by Peters and Gawronski 
(2011, Experiments 1 & 2) who found reversed EC of implicit evaluation when 
participants were verbally instructed after CS-US pairings to mentally reverse the 
valence of the US. More specifically, the authors provided participants with 
information about the personality traits of four fictitious people. Persons A and B 
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were paired in 75 % of the cases with positive USs whereas persons C and D were 
paired in 75 % of the cases with negative USs. The participants’ task was, for 
each pairing, to guess whether the information provided about each of the four 
individuals was true or false. Information provided by pairings involving persons 
A and C was said to be true for the frequent valence and false for the infrequent 
valence, whereas the information provided by pairings involving persons B and D 
was said to be false for the frequent valence and true for the infrequent valence. 
Whereas A was preferred over C (i.e., standard EC effect), B was liked less than D 
(i.e., reversed EC effect). A possible explanation for why we did not find such a 
reversed EC effect might be that we did not directly instruct participants about 
how to interpret the CS-US pairings. Instead, our manipulation was more indirect 
and could have succeeded only if (a) participants noticed the context rule that 
governed the pairings involving the context cues and (b) they actually applied 
those rules to make inferences about the USs that were paired with the target 
cues X and Y when these cues were presented on their own. Although we took 
measures to ensure that participants did encode the context rule, it might be 
that some participants did not actually use the rule to make inferences about the 
target cues X and Y. From this perspective, it is interesting to note that in a 
related study that we conducted, but with a simplified rule and the explicit task 
to state conclusions about the target stimuli (please see Chapter 2, Experiment 1 
for details), we did find significant reversed EC. This study was more similar to 
the studies of Peters and Gawronski in that it was much clearer to participants 
how the CS-US pairings had to be interpreted.  
It is also interesting to note that Peters and Gawronski did not find a full 
reversal when participants were only informed about the correct interpretation 
of the CS-US after all the pairings had been presented, instead of after each trial. 
It is therefore possible that the presence of the relational information at the time 
of encoding represents a crucial factor in obtaining a reversed EC effect. In our 
studies, particularly in condition Opposite, different participants might have 
discovered the context rule at different moments during the learning phase. 
Consequently, the relational information embedded in the context may have 
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been available at the time of the encoding of the CS-US pairings for only some of 
the participants. This could explain the lack of a reverse EC effect in our studies 
and its presence in studies in which the encoding of both valenced and relational 
information is ensured to happen at the same time. Again, note that we did find 
a reversed EC effect in a study that resembled the Peters and Gawronski studies 
(see Chapter 2, Experiment 1). Because a simpler rule was used in that 
experiment than in Experiments 1-3, participants might have become aware of 
the rule sooner and have already used this information during the first 
presentation of the target cues X and Y.  
Regardless of the exact reasons for why we did not observe a reversal of 
the EC effect in Experiments 1-3, the fact that we did find a modulation of EC of 
implicit evaluations has important theoretical implications. First, as we explained 
in the introduction, purely associative models postulate that the experience of 
pairings should unequivocally lead to the formation of associations between the 
mental representations of those stimuli. Because implicit evaluation is assumed 
to be determined only by associations in memory, one should observe an EC 
effect that is determined by the experienced pairings in a way that is 
independent of what the context implies about the meaning of those pairings. 
The fact that EC was significantly moderated by the properties of the context in 
which these pairings were experienced does not fit well with these ideas.  
According to propositional models, on the other hand, the effect of CS-US 
pairings on liking is mediated by the formation of a proposition about the CS-US 
relation. As the content of this proposition depends not only on the CS-US 
pairings but also on the context in which these pairings occur, aspects of the 
context should be able to moderate the effect of stimulus pairings on liking. 
Hence, we predicted EC effects on implicit measures that are moderated by the 
context rule that is implemented in the pairings of other stimuli. The most 
straightforward prediction from these models would have been that participants 
inferred a reversed relation between CS and US in condition Opposite, which 
according to a purely propositional model, should have led to a significantly 
reversed EC effect. The fact that we did not find significant reversal speaks 
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against this interpretation. However, propositional models can account for the 
lack of a reversed EC effect in condition Opposite if certain additional 
assumptions are made. As we explained in the introduction, one could assume 
that participants formed two propositions that are relevant for the evaluation of 
the target stimuli: one determined by the context and one determined by the co-
occurrences. Both propositions could cancel each other out, resulting in a null 
implicit evaluation. In sum, the current results do not refute a strict propositional 
model but additional assumptions are needed before such a model can explain 
the exact pattern of results.  
Importantly, the current results can also be explained by a hybrid 
associative-propositional account of EC of implicit evaluations that assumes that 
both associative and propositional processes contribute to such EC effects. As we 
explained in the introduction, associative and propositional processes might 
cancel each other out in condition Opposite, which would explain the null-finding 
in this condition. On the other hand, there might be circumstances in which 
propositional processes dominate implicit evaluations, for instance, when 
unambiguous information is presented about how CS-US pairings should be 
interpreted. This would explain why Peters and Gawronski (2011) did find a 
reversed EC effect when participants were instructed to mentally reverse the 
meaning of CS-US pairings. A hybrid account also fits well with the observation of 
Peters and Gawronski that verbal information has a stronger effect when 
presented immediately after a CS-US pairing. In such cases, propositional 
inferences could overrule the formation of associations based on CS-US pairings 
and thus dominate implicit evaluations (see Peters & Gawronski, 2011, for 
details). Note that these ideas are in line with recent dual process models such as 
the Associative and Propositional Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). Regardless of whether one favors a strictly 
propositional account or a hybrid account of our results, it is important to note 
that our results confirm the idea that propositional processes do (co-)determine 
EC of implicit evaluations (also see Peters & Gawronski, 2011).  
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To conclude, our results show that EC of implicit evaluations depends not 
only on the objective CS-US pairings but also on elements in the context that 
specify the implications of these CS-US pairings. Although we are not the first to 
observe such context effects (i.e., Peters & Gawronski, 2011; see Förderer & 
Unkelbach, 2011, for a study on EC of explicit evaluations), we are the first to 
show that these context effects are not restricted to explicit verbal instructions 
about how CS-US pairings should be interpreted. Our results suggest that context 
effects in EC of implicit evaluations might be widespread and confirm the idea 
that propositional processes do contribute to EC of implicit evaluations.  
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Footnotes 
 
1
 Note that we use the term implicit evaluation to refer to a behavioral 
phenomenon (i.e., the fact that a stimulus evokes an evaluative response 
automatically) rather than to a type of mental representation (e.g., implicit 
attitudes; see De Houwer, 2009a, 2011). Although the study of implicit 
evaluations imposes limits on theories about the mental representations that 
mediate implicit evaluation, it should not rely on a priori assumptions about the 
nature of those representations (e.g., the assumption that implicit and explicit 
attitudes are separate entities).  
 
2 
Associative learning is defined as changes in behavior that are due to 
relations between events (e.g., De Houwer, 2009c). 
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Introduction 
 
During the last decade, the interest of researchers in automatic (implicit) 
evaluation has considerably risen. In order to further knowledge on implicit 
evaluation, it is important to investigate how it can be measured. If evaluation is 
defined as an effect, more specifically as the effect of stimuli on evaluative 
responses (De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2012), implicit evaluation 
is defined as a subset of evaluation, namely as evaluation that occurs under 
certain instances of automaticity (De Houwer et al., 2012; De Houwer & Moors, 
2012). The increase of interest in implicit evaluation has been made possible by 
the development of measurement techniques (see Gawronski & De Houwer, in 
press, for an extensive review). Most of those are based on the accurate 
recording of responses and reaction times. These measures create situations in 
which people respond to a number of stimuli. These situations differ across 
implicit measures with regard to the nature of the responses that are required, 
as well as with regard to the conditions of automaticity that they imply.  
In order to examine how evaluations can be measured, it is a useful 
strategy to work with novel stimuli whose learning history can be controlled 
fully. In this way, one can experimentally manipulate the properties of the stimuli 
and thus make clear predictions about the way in which these stimuli should be 
evaluated (see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt & Moors, 2009, for a 
detailed discussion). A widely explored way in which evaluation is acquired is 
through stimulus pairings. This effect, called evaluative conditioning (EC; De 
Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010), refers to the change in liking of a stimulus 
(named conditioned stimulus, CS) that is due to its pairing with another stimulus 
(named unconditioned stimulus, US). Recently, more attention has been given to 
research on the possible moderation of the relation occurring between CS and 
US on EC effects (Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2011; 
Moran & Bar-Anan, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Unkelbach, Förderer, & 
Stahl, 2012; Zanon, De Houwer & Gast, 2012). We use the term “relational 
68  CHAPTER 2 
 
information” to refer to the content of this relation. For example, a certain 
unknown substance X may co-occur with a certain object (for example a disease), 
but could be related to it in different ways. To name a few, it could cause it, 
prevent it or be an effect of it (see Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 
2007, for an insightful discussion). Obviously, the way in which the unknown 
substance X is related to the disease is a very important piece of information that 
can have important implications for how one evaluates the substance. As 
mentioned above, research has recently started to investigate the impact of 
relational information on evaluation (e.g., Peters & Gawronski, 2011). In this 
research, several explicit and implicit measures of evaluation have been used. 
However, it is still not completely clear whether and when relational information 
can moderate implicit instances of evaluation, and, in particular, which specific 
implicit measures are sensitive to relational information. In our studies, we are 
mostly interested in relational information that implies a relation of opposition 
between a CS and an US. This type of relation is particularly interesting, as 
different cognitive accounts of EC (i.e., association formation models and 
propositional models) make different predictions about its impact on evaluation 
(see the Introduction for a detailed review of cognitive models of evaluation). 
Consequently, the present series of experiments aimed at shedding light 
on the question of whether relational information can moderate implicit 
evaluation and, more specifically, whether different instances of implicit 
evaluation (i.e., evaluations that are captured by different implicit measures) are 
differentially sensitive to relational information. To this end, we examined a 
series of widely used implicit measures of evaluation and tested their sensitivity 
to relational information. In this paper, we focus on the implicit association test 
(IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998), the affective misattribution 
procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), and evaluative 
priming with a naming task (cf. Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; 
Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, Eelen, 2007). The following 
paragraphs provide a brief description of the nature of and knowledge about 
these three implicit measures.  
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The IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) is definitely the most widely used implicit 
measure in psychological research. In a typical IAT, participants are asked to 
quickly categorize stimuli of different categories (e.g., pictures of White and 
Black persons intermixed with positive or negative words) by pressing one of two 
keys. In the relevant blocks, each of the two keys is assigned to two categories at 
the same time (e.g., right key for White and positive; left key for Black and 
negative). Stimuli belonging to all categories are presented one by one and have 
to be categorized as fast as possible by pressing one of the two keys. The crucial 
measurement is a difference in performance (as calculated via an algorithm 
based on reaction times and errors; see Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji, 2003) 
between blocks that differ in the way that categories are assigned to responses 
(e.g., press the right key for Blacks and positive and the press left key for Whites 
and negative versus press the right key for Whites and positive and press the left 
key for Blacks and negative). The idea behind this implicit measure is that 
participants perform better when associated categories are assigned to the same 
response than when related categories are assigned to different responses. 
Hence, the difference in performance is thought to provide an index of how the 
extent to which categories are associated.  
The AMP (Payne et al., 2005) is another widely used implicit measure. A 
trial of this procedure typically consists of the presentation of a (neutral) Chinese 
ideograph, preceded by the brief presentation of a prime picture and followed by 
a mask. When used as an implicit measure of evaluation, the primes are stimuli 
belonging to the to-be evaluated categories. For instance, when the aim is to 
capture the evaluation of flowers and spiders, pictures of flowers and spiders can 
be used as primes. The participant has the task to evaluate each of the 
ideographs as being more or less pleasant than average, by pressing one of two 
keys. The crucial measurement here is the number of “pleasant” responses that 
are emitted as a function of the nature of the prime (e.g., the number of 
“pleasant” responses when the prime depicts a flower versus when the prime 
depicts a spider). According to the authors, participants who perform this task 
misattribute the valence of the prime to the target, producing an AMP effect. For 
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example, Chinese ideographs that are preceded by a positive stimulus (e.g., the 
picture of a flower) would be, on average, judged more positively than those that 
are preceded by a negative stimulus (e.g., the picture of a spider). Although AMP 
effects are not based on reaction times, they could be interpreted as implicit 
evaluation, as the impact of the primes on the evaluation of the targets is 
considered to be automatic in the sense of uncontrolled. Payne and colleagues 
(2005) have shown that AMP effects emerge even when participants are 
instructed not to be influenced by the prime, and even when they are informed 
about the possible effect of the primes on their responses. However, Bar-Anan 
and Nosek (2012) reported a series of studies in which they found an AMP effect 
only for those participants who deliberately rated the primes instead of the 
targets. Indeed, there is still an open debate among researchers about whether 
these effects are independent from participant’s control on their responses.  
The third implicit measure we will focus on is an pictorial evaluative 
priming procedure with naming responses (see Spruyt et al., 2007), which is a 
variation of the standard evaluative priming paradigm (Fazio et al., 1986). In this 
task, participants are presented with a series of trials, each consisting of a brief 
presentation of a positive, negative, or neutral picture prime, followed by a 
positive or negative target picture. Participants have to name the object depicted 
in target picture, as quickly as possible, while ignoring the prime. A voice key is 
used to record the response time, that is, the time interval between the onset of 
the target picture and the onset of the naming response. For example, if the 
target is the picture of a dolphin, participants would have to react to its 
presentation, as quickly as possible, by saying out loud the word “dolphin”. A 
congruent trial would consist, for example, of a picture of a flower as a prime, 
and the picture of a puppy as a target (congruent positive valence). Conversely, 
an incongruent trial could, for example, consist of the picture of a skull as a 
prime and the picture of a puppy as a target (incongruent valence). The 
evaluative priming effect is calculated by comparing reaction times between 
congruent and incongruent trials. If this task is used as an implicit measure of 
evaluation, the to-be evaluated stimuli are used as primes. The characteristic 
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that makes this task particularly intriguing is the fact that, unlike the previously 
described implicit measures, it does not require an explicit evaluation of stimuli 
(i.e., a conscious intentional self-assessment of how much one likes or dislikes an 
object). In fact, the participant’s task is simply to verbally name the target 
pictures they are presented with. There is also evidence that, unlike most other 
implicit measures, effects in this measure might be mediated by the spreading of 
activation of CS-US associations (e.g., Spruyt et al., 2007). Given that associations 
do not contain relational information, effects in this naming task might be 
particularly insensitive to the impact of relational information.  
In the present set of experiments, we aimed at testing the impact of 
relational information on EC effects of implicit evaluation. In addition, we were 
interested in testing how sensitive three different implicit measures of 
evaluation were to relational information. In Experiments 1, 2 and 3, we adopted 
a learning procedure inspired by De Houwer and Vandorpe (2010), similar to the 
one described in Chapter 1 (Zanon et al., 2012). In the experiments presented in 
Chapter 1, we found an attenuation of an EC effect of implicit evaluation due to 
information about a relation of opposition, information that was implied by a 
context of stimulus pairings. However, in the crucial Opposite condition, we did 
not find a significant reverse EC effect, that is, an implicit preference for the 
CSneg over the CSpos. In their seminal article, Peters and Gawronski (2011 – 
Experiment 3) reported evidence that this reverse EC effect could be obtained 
under certain conditions. They presented a series of CS-US pairs, together with 
opposition and equivalence relational information, either presented after each 
pairing (short-delay condition) or at the end of the whole series of pairings (long-
delay condition). In their short-delay condition, they obtained a reverse EC 
effect, whereas in their long-delay condition they obtained only an attenuation 
of the EC effect. In light of the implications of these results, with Experiment 1 
we aimed at extending the findings of Zanon and colleagues (see Chapter 1), by 
presenting a similar but simpler design in which CS-US pairings were presented 
along with other pairings, embedding a rule that implies opposition between CSs 
and paired USs. Our hypotheses were that, if relational information derived from 
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the rule implied by the context impacted implicit evaluation, our implicit 
measures would show a reverse EC effect (preference for the CSneg over the 
CSpos), thus confirming the finding of the short-delay condition of Peters and 
Gawronski (2011). If relational information did not impact the outcome of the 
implicit measures at all, we would expect a standard EC effect (preference in line 
with the valence of the CS-US co-occurrences). Obtaining a reverse EC effect 
would allow us to conclude that the implicit measure is sensitive to relational 
information. An attenuation of the effect, that is, no preference for either of the 
CSs, is also a possible result. On the one hand this could tell us that an implicit 
measure is sensitive to opposite relational information, because it did not show a 
standard EC effect. On the other hand, it could be plausible that a certain implicit 
measure does not capture any evaluation at all or is simply less sensitive to any 
type of manipulation. In the absence of a control condition in which no relational 
information is present or the context implies a relation of equivalence, finding a 
null effect in a context that implies a relation of opposition would not allow us to 
draw strong conclusions. Nevertheless, because both a significant standard EC 
effect and a significant reverse EC effect would allow us to draw strong 
conclusions, in our Experiments 1, 2 and 3 we only presented the crucial 
condition in which the context rule implied opposite relational information.  
In the procedure of Experiments 1, 2 and 3, was similar to that of the 
experiments reported in Chapter 1. More specifically, context pairings of neutral 
cues and positive and negative outcome were presented. This series of pairings 
embedded a relational rule. The rule implied that a special cue reversed the 
valence of the outcome of the neutral cue it was presented with. For example, if 
the neutral cue A, presented on its own, was followed by a positive outcome (we 
will call this pairing Apos), the compound of A and a second cue R would have 
resulted in a negative outcome (ARneg). In the acquisition phase, Apos, ARneg, 
Bneg and BRpos trials were presented. These pairings form a context in which 
the rule is embedded. The target pairings, also presented, were XRpos and 
YRneg. It is important to note that the neutral cues X and Y (the CSs) were never 
presented with only the outcome, but always in compound with the special cue 
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R. In Experiment 1, we measured the evaluation of X and Y with an IAT, whereas 
in Experiments 2 and 3 we adopted an AMP.  
Finally, Experiment 4 was a replication of the long-delay condition of 
Experiment 3 of Peters and Gawronski (2011) who measured evaluative priming 
in an evaluative categorization task. They observed that opposition information 
cancelled out the EC effect that was observed with equivalence information. 
Hence, with a long-delay, opposition information did have an effect on implicit 
evaluation, but this effect was not strong enough to reverse the effect. Our aim 
was to test whether opposition information would produce different results in an 
evaluative priming task with naming responses. Based on the idea that effects in 
the naming task are mediated by spreading of activation across associations (see 
Spruyt et al., 2007), we hypothesized that effects in the naming task would be 
insensitive to relational information and would thus reveal a standard EC effect 
despite the opposition instructions. In line with Peters and Gawronski (2011, 
Experiment 3), we presented the pictures of four individuals A, B, C, and D and 
paired them with either positive or negative behavioral statements (Apos, Bpos, 
Cneg, and Dneg). Participants were asked to assume that the person in the 
picture did hold those features. In one of the conditions (long-delay condition), 
participants were later informed that two of the statements were true, whereas 
the other two were false and had to be reversed (Atrue, Bfalse, Ctrue, Dfalse). 
Therefore, this manipulation produced a fully crossed design of contingency 
(positive vs. negative) and validity of information. In line with our previous 
experiments (see Chapter 2), we refer to this latter factor as the type of relation 
(equivalence vs. opposition). The crossing of these factors results in the four CS 
conditions: Apos-equivalent; Bpos-opposite; Cneg-equivalent and Dneg-opposite. 
Implicit evaluation of the four CSs was then measured, employing an evaluative 
priming procedure with a naming task.  
 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we employed a procedure similar to that used in 
condition Opposite of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 of Chapter 1. In this procedure, 
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single cues and compounds of cues were followed by positive and negative 
outcomes (wins and losses in a slot machine game). The series of cue-outcome 
pairings in the experiments of Chapter 1 were regulated by rule, namely that the 
outcome of a single cue was always the opposite of the outcome of that cue 
when presented in compound with another cue. The first important difference 
with the studies reported in Chapter 1 was that we now used a simplified context 
rule. In Experiment 1, stimuli were either shown alone or in a compound with the 
cue R. Participants were told that the cue R reversed the outcome of the cue 
with which it was paired. This rule is less complex because the reversal cue R is 
the same across all compounds and because a smaller total number of cues is 
needed to implement this rule. We therefore hoped that the use of the reversal 
cue would encourage participants infer on the basis of XRwin and YRloss trials 
that Y(CSneg) on its own leads to win and X(CSpos) on its own leads to loss. A 
second important difference was that participants were asked to make causal 
judgments about X and Y before administrating the IAT. We implemented this 
change to give participants the opportunity to relate the context rule to the 
target cues X and Y and thus to form the propositions about the target cues that 
were implied by this information. A third difference to the experiments in 
Chapter 1 is that we only realized condition Opposite. We expected that the 
above mentioned changes to the design would make it more likely that people 
form propositions about the reversal rules and therefore expected that we 
would find a significantly reversed EC effect for stimuli sown in compound with a 
reversal cue.  
 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-one students at Ghent University participated (mean 
age = 19.03, SD = 1.68; 74% were women). They either received course credits or 
four Euros. 
Materials. Learning phase. During the learning phase, the nonsense 
words “UYATA”, “SOKOG”, “QUQQ” (context stimuli), “LOKANTA”, and 
“FEVKANI”(target CSs) were presented in black on a white background, in four 
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different combinations of font styles (Arial Black or Fixedsys) and font sizes 
(ranging from 30 point to 40 point). The positive US was the Dutch word for “a 
win” (“WINST”), presented in green on a black background, font style Britannic 
Bold, font size 78pt, surrounded by a number of color pictures of 2 euro coins, 
and accompanied by a soft melody. The negative US was the Dutch word for “a 
loss” (“VERLIES”), presented in red on a black background, font style 
Haettenschweiler, font size 100, surrounded by two cartoon faces expressing 
sadness, and a loud buzzer sound. CSs and USs were always presented in a top 
and bottom display of a slot machine frame, respectively. We refer to the CS that 
co-occurred with the positive US as CSpos and to the CS that co-occurred with 
the negative US as CSneg. For half of the participants, the nonword “LOKANTA” 
was the CSpos, and the nonword “FEVKANI” was the CSneg. This assignment was 
reversed for the other half of the participants. 
IAT. The target stimuli used in the IAT were the CSs “LOKANTA” and 
“FEVKANI”. Each target stimulus was presented in four different fonts (lower 
case Arial Black, upper case Arial Black, lower case Fixedsys, and upper case 
Fixedsys), resulting in eight different target stimuli, which were identical to those 
presented in the acquisition phase. We varied the font of the target words in 
order to avoid that stimuli would be classified only on the basis of simple 
perceptual features. De Houwer (2006) showed the reliability of this procedural 
modification and its suitability to capture recent learning. In addition, in order to 
resemble as much as possible the learning phase, each target stimulus was 
presented in the top display of a slot machine frame. The positive attributes 
were the Dutch words for “happy” (“GELUKKIG”), “honest” (“EERLIJK”), 
“pleasant” (“PRETTIG”) and “sincere” (“OPRECHT”). The negative attributes were 
the Dutch words for “mean” (“GEMEEN”), “rude” (“BRUTAAL”), “aggressive” 
(“AGRESSIEF”) and “deceptive” (“BEDRIEGLIJK”). Both positive and negative 
attributes were presented in the middle of the screen, in black color on a white 
background, font style Arial Black, font size 48 point. The error signal was a red 
cross, which also appeared in the middle of the screen. 
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Causal ratings. Participants were first asked to rate for the cues “UYATA” 
and “SOKOG” (presented in random order) and then for the cues “LOKANTA” and 
“FEVKANI” (also presented in random order) to what extent they were likely to 
cause either “win” or “loss” in a potential new slot-machine game, by indicating 
a number on a scale ranging from 1 (loss) to 9 (win). 
Explicit valence ratings. Participants were asked to rate, on a 9-point 
Likert scale, how pleasant they found the cues “UYATA”, “SOKOG”, “LOKANTA”, 
“FEVKANI” and the compounds “LOKANTA + QUQQ” and “FEVKANI + QUQQ”. 
Participants could respond by selecting a value ranging from 1 (very unpleasant) 
to 9 (very pleasant).  
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
explicitly told that they were about to see a series of slot machine games. Each 
game would consist either of a single cue followed by an outcome, or of two cues 
followed by an outcome. The outcome could be a win or a loss at the slot 
machine. The initial instructions also explained that when two cues were shown, 
one of them was always a particular reverse-cue that had the function of 
reversing the outcome of the other cue that was presented at the same time on 
the screen. Participants were asked to pay attention during the presentation of 
the slot machine games, as questions about them were going to be asked 
afterwards.  
After the instruction page, participants could start the task by pressing a 
key. At the beginning of each trial, the neutral cue(s) appeared on a slot machine 
frame. After 2000 ms, the outcome appeared on a second display of the slot 
machine frame and both cue(s) and outcomes remained on the screen for 3000 
ms. Afterwards, the screen turned blank for a 3000 ms intertrial interval. The 
sequence of trials during the learning task was the following. First, Apos (single 
cue A followed by a positive outcome) and ARneg (nonword A and reverse cue R, 
followed by a negative outcome) trials were presented twice each (Block 1). This 
block of four trials was followed by Bneg and BRpos trials (Block 2), each 
presented twice. Finally, XRpos and YRneg were presented twice each (Block 3). 
Whereas A, B, and R were the context cues, X and Y were the CSpos and CSneg, 
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respectively. This sequence of three blocks was presented five times. In total, the 
learning phase consisted of sixty trials. The trial order within the blocks was 
determined randomly for each participant and block separately. 
After the presentation of all learning trials, participants were asked to 
judge first for the cues A and B (presented in random order) and then for the 
cues X and Y (also presented in random order) to what extent they were likely to 
cause “win” or “loss” in a potential new slot-machine game. After these causal 
ratings, participants performed an IAT. After performing the IAT, participants 
were asked to rate the pleasantness of cues A, B, X, Y, and of the compounds XR 
and YR on a 9-point Likert scale. The ratings for the cues A and B (random order) 
was asked first, followed by the ratings for the cues X and Y (random order), and 
the ratings for the compounds XR and YR (random order). As our focus is on 
implicit measures of evaluation, explicit ratings were only assessed for 
exploratory purposes and always after the implicit measure. After completing 
the experiment, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results  
IAT. Scores were calculated using the D4 algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek 
and Banaji, 2003). High scores indicate an implicit preference in line with the 
valence of the co-occurrences (CSpos liked more than the CSneg). As predicted, 
the D600 measure for the single cues X and Y was negative (M = −0.15, SE = 0.49) 
and significantly different from zero, t(80) = −2.98, p < .01, d = 0.33. This 
indicates that the cue that had co-occurred with the negative outcome was liked 
more than the cue that had co-occurred with the positive outcome.  
Explicit evaluation. Scores of the explicit valence ratings were coded in a 
way that high scores reflect a preference for the CSpos over the CSneg. The 
explicit score was negative, and significantly different from zero, (M = −1.38, SE = 
0.49), t(80) = −2.85, p < .01, d = 0.45. Like in the IAT, the CSneg was evaluated 
more positively than the CSpos.  
Causal ratings. The causal ratings were coded in a way that high scores 
indicated a causal judgment based only on mere co-occurrences (i.e., what co-
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occurred with “win” was more likely to cause “win”). The causal rating score was 
negative and significantly different from zero, (M = −4.68, SE = 0.55), t(80) = 
−8.51, p < .001, d = 0.95, reflecting the implications of the rule implied by the 
context pairings. In other words, participants indicated that the CS that was in 
the losing (winning) compound would have been, when on its own, more likely to 
cause win (loss) in a potential new game.  
The IAT score was positively correlated with the explicit valence ratings (r 
= .53, p < .001), but not with the causal ratings (r = .12, p = .57). Explicit valence 
ratings and causal ratings were not correlated either (r = .20, p = .07). 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, two CSs were repeatedly shown together with a 
positive or negative USs and an additional cue. Participants were instructed that 
this additional cue indicated that the US that would follow a particular stimulus 
would be reversed if this cue was present. This rule was also implemented in the 
presentation of context stimuli A and B. The additional cue thus indicated that a 
CS that was followed by a certain outcome would be followed by the opposite 
outcome when presented alone. The CSs, however, where never shown alone. 
The results of an IAT showed that participants formed an implicit preference for 
the CS that co-occurred with the negative US (and the reversal cue) over the CS 
that co-occurred with the positive US and the reversal cue. The implicit 
preference as shown in the IAT, are thus in line with the context rule, that is, 
opposite to the valence implied by the mere CS-US co-occurrences. The same 
pattern was found for explicit evaluation. This result confirms the findings of 
Peters and Gawronski (2011) and generalizes them to different stimulus types. 
Experiment 1 thus showed that the measurement outcome of an IAT, as 
an instance of implicit evaluation, is sensitive to relational information. In the 
following experiments, we tested whether other implicit valence measures show 
the same sensitivity to relational information. 
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Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we tested whether the AMP (Payne et al., 2005) is 
sensitive to relational information that was presented in a learning phase. We 
employed the same induction phase as in Experiment 1 but used the AMP as 
implicit measure. In the AMP a prime (a positive, a negative or a neutral picture) 
is presented briefly and followed immediately by a neutral Chinese character and 
then by a mask. Participants have to indicate by pressing one of two keys 
whether the Chinese ideograph is more or less pleasant than the average 
ideograph. Payne and colleagues have shown that the evaluation of the Chinese 
characters is influenced by the valence of the primes. Ideographs that are 
preceded by positive primes are more likely to be evaluated positively than 
ideographs that are presented after negative primes (Payne et al., 2005). In our 
version of the AMP, the primes were the two CSs (i.e., nonwords X and Y). 
Another nonword that was not presented during the acquisition phase, served as 
a neutral prime. The measure of implicit preference that is provided by the AMP 
is based on the ratio of positive responses towards the Chinese ideograph that 
follow a particular prime. If the AMP is sensitive to relational information, we 
should find a higher ratio of positive responses to the ideographs preceded by 
the negatively paired CSs than to the ideographs preceded by the positively 
paired CSs. 
 
Method 
 Participants. Sixty-two Ghent University students participated in the 
experiment, in exchange for course credit or four euro (mean age = 20.27, SD = 
4.64; 85% were women). 
Materials. Learning phase. The materials used in the learning phase were 
identical to those used in Experiment 1.  
AMP. The stimuli used as primes in the AMP were the CSs, the nonwords 
“LOKANTA”, “FEVKANI”, and the nonword “ENANWAL” (neutral prime), which 
were presented in black on a white background, font style Arial Black, font size 
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48. The target stimuli were 36 Chinese ideographs, which were drawn in black on 
a white background.  
Causal and explicit valence ratings. The materials employed for the 
causal ratings and explicit valence ratings were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure of the acquisition phase was identical to that 
of Experiment 1. After the acquisition phase, participants performed the causal 
ratings as in Experiment 1. Afterwards, participants could proceed to the AMP 
instructions by pressing a key. Before the main block was presented, participants 
performed ten practice trials, whose structure was identical to that of the test 
trials. Then, participants performed the main block, in which the cues X (CSpos), 
Y (CSneg), and Z (neutral prime) were employed as primes. Each of these primes 
were used 12 times, adding up to 36 trials, which were presented in random 
order. Within each trial, the prime was presented for 75ms, followed by a 
Chinese character for 200ms and a mask. Participants had to indicate, by 
pressing one of two keys, whether the Chinese ideograph was more or less 
pleasant than average. They were asked to respond only on the basis of their 
liking of the Chinese character and thus to ignore the primes. After the AMP, 
participants performed the explicit valence ratings with the same modalities as in 
Experiment 1. 
 
Results  
AMP. We calculated the percentage of positive responses for each of the 
three primes (positive, negative, and neutral). High scores thus indicate a 
preference for the specific prime (Payne et al., 2005). Data of three participants 
were discarded due to an excessive rate of responses with the same key (>95%). 
Means and standard errors of the percentages of pleasant responses for each 
prime can be found in Table 1. Results were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA 
with three conditions of the factor prime. The main effect of prime was not 
significant, F(2,58) = 0.42, p =.58, partial η
2
 = 0.01. In addition, a t-test did not 
reveal a difference between positive and negative primes, t(59) = −0.46, p = .65, 
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d = 0.06. In sum, our AMP did not show a significant implicit preference for any 
of the CSs.  
Explicit evaluation. As in Experiment 1, scores of the explicit valence 
ratings were coded in a way that high scores reflect a preference for the CSpos 
over the CSneg. The explicit score was negative, and marginally different from 
zero, (M = −0.97, SE = 0.48), t(58) = −2.00, p = .50, d = 0.26. This result means 
that the CSneg was evaluated marginally more positively than the CSpos.  
Casual ratings. The causal ratings were coded in a way that high scores 
indicated a causal judgment based only on mere co-occurrences (i.e., what co-
occurred with “win” was more likely to cause “win”). The causal rating score was 
negative and significantly different from zero, (M = −5.32, SE = 0.64), t(59) = 
−8.33, p < .001, d = 1.08, meaning that, on average, participants indicated that 
the CS that was in the losing (winning) compound was deemed, when on its own, 
more likely to cause win (loss) in a potential new game.  
The AMP score was not correlated with the explicit valence ratings (r = 
.07, p = .61), neither with the causal ratings (r = .12, p = .36). In addition, explicit 
valence ratings and causal ratings were correlated (r = .40, p < .01). 
Table 1. Means (and standard errors) of the percentage of “pleasant” responses 
on the AMP in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Prime Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Positive 53.4 (2.42) 53.5 (2.73) 
Negative 55.2 (2.48) 52.3 (3.33) 
Neutral 52.1 (2.40) 54.6 (2.85) 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with a different type of 
implicit measure, the AMP. In this experiment, the context rule effect that was 
found with the IAT could not be replicated with the AMP. The results of the 
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causal ratings suggest that participants understood the context rule, but that the 
AMP did not pick up its effect. Please note that we also did not find an effect in 
line with the co-occurrences, which might suggest that the impact of the co-
occurrences and the impact of the opposite relational information cancelled 
each other out. Because we do not have a control condition without opposite 
relational information that showed a significant effect on the AMP, it is also 
possible that the AMP was just not sensitive enough for any evaluative 
information. A possible reason why the AMP produced a null result in this 
experiment is that we used nonwords as primes, whereas the AMP usually 
employs pictures as prime stimuli. Therefore, with Experiment 3 we replicated 
Experiment 2, employing picture stimuli instead of nonwords. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 2 with the difference that 
pictures instead of nonwords were used as CSs and as primes. 
 
Method 
 Participants. Twenty-nine Ghent University students participated in the 
experiment, in exchange for course credit or four euro (mean age = 18.55, SD = 
0.63; 90% were women). 
Materials. Learning phase. The materials used in the learning phase were 
the cartoon characters (Pokemons) Diglett, Kakureon, Jigglypuff and Ruriri. They 
were chosen because they had already successfully been used in previous EC 
research (Olson & Fazio, 2001). The two characters (“Jigglypuff”and” Ruriri”) 
which were evaluated most similarly and neutrally in a previous normative 
procedure (Olson & Fazio, 2001) served as CSs. As the special reverse-cue (R), we 
used a simple symbol, composed of two half-circular arrows. 
The CSpos was the CS consistently paired with the positive US, whereas 
the CSneg was the CS consistently paired with the negative US. For half of the 
participants, the picture of “Jigglypuff” was the CSpos, and the picture of “Ruriri” 
ON THE SENSITIVITY TO RELATIONAL INFORMATION OF IMPLICIT MEASURES OF EVALUATION 83 
  
was the CSneg. This assignment was reversed for the other half of the 
participants. 
AMP. The stimuli used as primes in the AMP were the pictures of the 
Pokemons “Jigglypuff” and “Ruriri” (the CSs) and of a grey rectangle (neutral 
prime). The target stimuli were 36 Chinese ideographs, which were drawn in 
black on a white background 
Causal ratings and explicit evaluative ratings. The materials employed 
for the causal ratings and explicit evaluative ratings were identical to those 
adopted in Experiment 1 and 2, except that the CSs were Pokemon pictures 
instead of nonwords. 
Procedure. Except for the use of pictures as CSs, the procedure of the 
whole experiment was identical to that of Experiment 2. 
 
Results  
AMP. We calculated the proportion of positive responses for each of the 
three primes (positive, negative, and neutral) in the same way as in Experiment 2 
(high scores indicate a preference for the specific prime). Results were analyzed 
using a one-way ANOVA with three conditions of the factor prime. The main 
effect of prime was not significant, F(2,28) = 0.20, p =.82, partial η
2 
= 0.015. In 
addition, a t-test did not reveal a difference between positive and negative 
primes, t(29) = 0.27, p = .79, d = 0.06. Therefore, like in Experiment 2, our AMP 
did not show a preference for any of the CSs. Means and standard errors of the 
proportions of “pleasant” responses for each prime can be found in Table 1. 
Explicit evaluation. As in Experiment 1 and 2, scores of the explicit 
valence ratings were coded in a way that high scores reflect a preference for the 
CSpos over the CSneg. The explicit score was positive, but not different from 
zero, (M = 0.14, SE = 0.47), t(28) = 0.29, p = .77, d = 0.05. This result means that 
participants did not show an explicit preference for either of the CSs. 
Causal ratings. As in Experiment 1 and 2, the causal ratings were coded in 
a way that high scores indicated a causal judgment based only on mere co-
occurrences (i.e., what co-occurred with “win” was more likely to cause “win”). 
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The causal rating score was negative and significantly different from zero, (M = 
−4.31, SE = 1.08), t(29) = −3.99, p < .001, d = 0.74. On average, participants 
indicated that the CS that was in the losing (winning) compound was deemed, 
when on its own, more likely to cause win (loss) in a potential new game.  
The AMP score was not correlated with the explicit valence ratings (r = 
.16, p = .41), neither with the causal ratings (r = - .06, p = .76). Moreover, explicit 
valence ratings and causal ratings were not correlated either (r = .12, p = .55). 
 
 
Discussion 
As was the case in Experiment 2, the effect of rule learning on EC was not 
obtained even though we now used and AMP with pictures (Pokemons). This null 
effect occurred even though, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the results of the causal 
ratings showed a general understanding of the rule regulating the CS-US 
presentations. To conclude, also the AMP with picture stimuli did not seem to be 
sensitive to our manipulation, that is, both the CS-US co-occurrences and the 
opposite relational information implied by the context pairings. Again, we cannot 
be sure whether the observed null effect is due to a problem with our version of 
the AMP or to a combined influenced of co-occurrences and relational 
information. 
 
Experiment 4 
 
 After testing the effect of opposite relational information on implicit 
preference as measured with the IAT and with the AMP, with Experiment 4 we 
aimed at testing the impact of relational information on evaluative priming in the 
picture-picture naming task. Previous research (Spruyt et al., 2007) suggested 
that effects in this task is mediated by the spreading of activation across 
associations, and therefore may be less sensitive to the impact of relational 
information. The design of the current experiment was inspired by Experiment 3 
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of Peters & Gawronski (2011). This means that we also realized conditions in 
which the context did not suggest an opposite relationship but a relation of 
equivalence. In case of a null finding in the condition with opposite relational 
information, this design allows us to draw conclusions about whether the implicit 
measure was just not sensitive to any evaluative information or whether the 
effect of co-occurrences and relational information might have cancelled each 
other out. Furthermore replicating the design of Peters and Gawronski with a 
different type of implicit measure (they used an evaluative priming procedure 
with an evaluative decision task while we used an evaluative priming procedure 
with a naming task), allows us to draw conclusions about whether these types of 
evaluative priming procedures differ in their sensitivity to evaluative information. 
 
Method 
 Participants. Twenty-seven Ghent University students participated in the 
experiment, in exchange for course credit or four euro (mean age = 20.55, SD = 
1.67; 85% were women). 
Materials. Learning phase. All materials were adapted from Peters and 
Gawronski (2011). In the learning phase, four neutral color pictures depicting the 
faces and the name of four young men and ten positive and ten negative 
behavioral descriptions were employed. The four pictures were used as CSs, 
whereas the positive behavioral descriptions were the USpos, and the negative 
behavioral descriptions were the USneg. 
We refer to the CS that co-occurred with the positive US as CSpos and to 
the CS that co-occurred with the negative US as CSneg. The assignment of 
pictures and the valence of the behavioral statements was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
Naming task. The stimuli used as primes in the naming task were the four 
faces employed in the acquisition phase. In addition, two neutral pictures were 
also employed as primes. The target stimuli were ten IAPS pictures, five of which 
were positive (bride, teddy bear, kitten, dolphin, baby) and five were negative 
(gun, skulls, corpse, worms, explosion).  
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Explicit valence ratings. Following the procedure of Peters and Gawronski 
(2011), we assessed explicit evaluation of the four CSs by asking participants to 
rate them in random order on likeability, friendliness, and trustworthiness. The 
responses were given on a 7-point Likert scale, whose anchors ranged from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Procedure. The procedure mimicked that of Peters and Gawronski (2011). 
Initial instructions introduced the experiment as a study on impression 
formation. Participants were instructed that they had to imagine to have recently 
found a new job, and they were about to see pictures of four of their new co-
workers, together with second-hand comments that other colleagues had 
previously made about them. Hence each picture was accompanied with a 
behavioral description that was instructed to be descriptive of the person in the 
picture. The instructions also stated that some of the behavioral descriptions 
may have been false. However, the initial task was to assume that all the 
descriptions were true, and in a later stage their validity would be 
communicated. Once they had read the instructions, participants could move to 
the pairing phase by pressing a key. The pairing phase consisted of twenty trials, 
each of which started with the presentation of a CS in the center of the screen 
for 2000 ms. Afterwards, a behavioral description appeared below the CS. Both 
stimuli remained together on the screen for 6000 ms. Then, before the next trial, 
the screen remained blank for an intertrial interval of 2000 ms. The sequence of 
trials consisted of the (random) presentation of trials Apos (face A followed by 
one of five positive behavioral descriptions), Bpos, Cneg, Dneg, each of which 
presented five times. After all twenty trials were presented, participants were 
instructed that the behavioral statements about two of the persons (A and C) 
were actually true, and that the statements about the other two people (B and 
D) were false, and thus had to be mentally reversed. This information was 
repeated twice.  
Once participants had read these instructions, they performed the 
evaluative priming task. It started with an instruction page that explained the 
procedural features of the task. The first block was a practice phase consisting of 
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ten trials, in which each target picture was presented together with its name. 
The participant’s task was to name each picture out loud into a microphone by 
using the word displayed below the picture. This phase served to familiarize the 
participant with the task and to tune their voice tone to an optimal volume (i.e., 
to name the stimuli sufficiently loudly), to be easily picked up by the voice key 
device. After this short practice phase, the experimental block started. It 
consisted of 120 trials, in which each of the primes (four CSs and two neutral 
pictures) were presented on the screen for 250 ms. After the prime disappeared, 
one of the ten target pictures appeared, and stayed on the screen until the 
participant had responded. The next trial appeared after a 1000 ms intertrial 
interval. Afterwards, participants completed the explicit valence ratings of the 
four CSs, before being thanked and debriefed. Unlike Peters and Gawronski 
(2011), we preferred to not counterbalance the implicit-explicit measurements 
order, and kept the implicit measure always first. We did so because we were 
particularly interested in studying the effect of our manipulation on our implicit 
measure (i.e., evaluative priming in the picture-picture naming task). 
 
Results  
Evaluative Priming. The data preparation was based on Spruyt et al. 
(2007). Neutral priming trials were considered filler trials and were not included 
in the analyses. In addition, the data from naming trials on which the voice key 
was not appropriately activated or trials on which an incorrect response was 
given were excluded from the analysis. Finally, for each of the four crucial 
priming conditions, response latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard 
deviations from a participant’s mean latency were also discarded (4%). Implicit 
evaluation scores were obtained by subtracting, for each prime, the reaction 
time of trials in which positive targets were presented from that in which 
negative targets were presented. This way, higher scores reflect quicker 
responses to positive targets and, therefore, could serve as a measure of implicit 
preference for the correspondent prime. 
88  CHAPTER 2 
 
We conducted a 2 (validity, true vs. false) x 2 (valence, positive vs. 
negative) ANOVA on the implicit evaluation scores. Both main effects and the 
interaction were not significant, all Fs < 1. Means and standard errors of the 
reaction times for each prime can be found in Table 2.  
Explicit evaluation. The scores for each of the three items of the explicit 
evaluation questionnaire (likeability, friendliness, and trustworthiness) were 
averaged, and coded so that high values indicate a preference for the relative CS 
(high likeability, high friendliness and high trustworthiness). Then, a 2 (validity, 
true vs. false) x 2 (valence, positive vs. negative) ANOVA was conducted on these 
scores. We found a main effect of valence, F(1,26) = 18.97, p <.001, partial η
2
 = 
0.42, but no significant main effect of validity, F(1,26) = 2.95, p =.098, partial η
2
 = 
0.10. The interaction was significant, F(1,26) = 48.36, p <.001, partial η
2
 = 0.65. 
For the true validity conditions, the CSpos was evaluated more positively than 
the CSneg, t(26) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 1.54. In addition, for the false validity 
condition, the explicit evaluations of the CSpos and the CSneg did also differ 
significantly, t(26) = -2.71, p = .012, d = 0.52, but in the opposite direction (the 
CSneg was evaluated more positively than the CSpos). Means of all explicit 
evaluation scores can be found in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Means (and standard errors) of the implicit and explicit evaluation 
scores, Experiment 4. 
US valence Validity Implicit evaluation Explicit evaluation 
Positive True 61,17 (8.80) 5,44 (0.27) 
Negative True 57,10 (9.43) 1,96 (0.24) 
Positive False 60,67 (10.56) 2,75 (0.25) 
Negative False 54,33 (7.94) 3,89 (0.28) 
 
 
Discussion 
ON THE SENSITIVITY TO RELATIONAL INFORMATION OF IMPLICIT MEASURES OF EVALUATION 89 
  
The implicit measure used in Experiment 4 (evaluative priming with a 
naming task) with which we assessed implicit valence after a learning phase 
adopted from Peters and Gawronski (2011) did not show an effect of the co-
occurrences, nor of validity information. These results differ from those that 
Peters and Gawronski found with evaluative priming of evaluation responses. 
Given that no effect was present neither of the co-occurrences, nor of the 
validity information, we assume that our implicit measure may have just failed 
and did not successfully tap into any potential effect derived from our acquisition 
phase (neither of co-occurrence nor of validity). The explicit evaluation scores, 
even if collected for exploratory reasons only, were in line with the findings of 
Peters and Gawronski. That is, we observed a significant effect of valence, which 
was moderated by the relational information for both equivalently and 
oppositely-related CSs.  
 
General Discussion 
 
In four experiments, we tested the extent to which three different 
implicit measures of evaluation are sensitive to relational information. Each 
implicit measure represents a specific situation in which people experience 
stimuli while performing a task that allows one to capture the evaluative 
response that the presented stimuli evoke. Hence, given that evaluation is 
defined as the effect of stimuli on evaluative responses, different implicit 
measures can be conceived as different instances of implicit evaluation. In other 
words, each different measure creates a different subset of conditions under 
which implicit evaluation can be observed. Hence, from a functional perspective, 
studying the impact of relational information in various implicit measures 
corresponds to an exploration of the conditions under which relational 
information moderates implicit evaluation.  
 In order to optimize control over the evaluative responses that stimuli 
would evoke, we repeatedly paired neutral stimuli (CSs) with affectively relevant 
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stimuli (USs), that is, we realized a typical EC procedure. In addition, we provided 
relational information that qualified the CS-US relation, via verbal instructions 
and/or via context. Finally, implicit evaluation of the CSs was assessed employing 
various implicit measures.  
 In Experiment 1, the CS paired with a positive outcome (i.e., Xpos) and 
the CS paired with a negative outcome (i.e., Yneg) were always presented 
together with a special cue R. This special cue had the function to reverse the 
outcome of the CS it was paired with. Therefore, if a cue A was followed by a 
positive outcome (Apos), the same cue A presented with the cue R was then 
followed by a negative outcome (ARneg). A series of context pairings (Apos, 
ARneg, Bneg, and BRpos), presented in addition to the target CS-US pairings, 
followed this rule. The relation implied by this rule (relation of opposition) is 
particularly intriguing, as its implications are opposite to those of the mere CS-US 
co-occurrences. After the acquisition phase, a series of causal ratings tested 
whether participants had learned and applied the rule. Next, implicit evaluation 
was assessed with an IAT. Results of this experiment showed a reverse implicit 
EC effect (that is, a preference for the CSneg over the CSpos), thus replicating the 
results of the short-delay condition of Peters and Gawronski (2011, Experiment 
3). The findings of Experiment 1 imply that the IAT is sensitive to the impact of 
relational information that is implied by the context. 
  The results of Experiment 1 confirmed that the procedure that was used 
in this experiment can be used to demonstrate an impact of relational 
information on implicit measures of evaluation. Hence, in Experiments 2 and 3, 
we employed the same procedure to test the impact of relational information on 
the AMP. Unfortunately, the AMP did not replicate the results of the IAT. 
Instead, it showed no implicit preference for any of the CSs. One possible reason 
why the AMP did not show any influence of our manipulation would be that the 
stimuli used in Experiment 2 were not the traditionally employed AMP stimuli, as 
they were nonwords, whereas the AMP typically features picture stimuli as 
primes. For this reason, Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 2, but with 
pictures instead of nonwords as CSs and primes. Unfortunately, the results of 
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Experiment 3 were also inconclusive: despite a good causal learning of the 
context rule, participants did not show an implicit preference for neither the 
CSpos or the CSneg.  
 A number of post-hoc explanations can be constructed for why our AMP 
performed so poorly in these two experiments. On the one hand, the AMP could 
have been influenced by both co-occurrences and relational information. Given 
that the implications of these two pieces of information are opposite to each 
other (the rule implies that a stimulus presented in a compound paired with a 
USpos would, if presented on its own, be paired with a USneg), the sum of the 
two could have resulted in a null effect. On the other hand, it could just be that 
the AMP was simply insensitive to either co-occurrences or relational 
information, and therefore it did not tap in the effect of anything (neither CS-US 
co-occurrences nor CS-US relations). Unfortunately, not having presented a 
control condition (i.e., a condition in which equivalence, instead of opposition, 
relational information is presented) prevents us from making strong conclusions 
about the extent to which AMP effects are sensitive to relational information. 
For exploratory reasons, we also registered explicit evaluations. Whereas 
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed an explicit preference in line with the context rule 
(CSpos liked more than the CSneg), this was not the case in Experiment 3, in 
which no preference is found. Given that the order of the implicit and explicit 
measures was not counterbalanced, we refrain from interpreting these results.  
 In Experiment 4, a different design was adopted. The acquisition phase 
was inspired by Experiment 3 by Peters and Gawronski (2011) but, unlike to what 
was the case in their experiment, we used evaluative priming with naming 
responses as the task to capture implicit evaluation. In addition, only the long-
delay condition was implemented. In Experiment 4, two neutral stimuli were 
repeatedly paired with positive behavioral statements (Apos, Bpos) whereas 
another two stimuli were consistently paired with negative behavioral 
statements (Cneg, Dneg). At the end of the series of CS-US pairings, validity 
information was given in form of instructions. Participants were informed that 
the relation between two CS-US pairs (Apos and Cneg) was true (i.e., a relation of 
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equivalence), whereas they were informed that the relation between the other 
two CS-US pairs (Bpos and Dneg) was false and had to be reversed (i.e., a relation 
of opposition). This way, a fully crossed valence-validity designed was obtained 
(Apos-true; Bpos-false; Cneg-true and Dneg-false). Afterwards, implicit 
evaluation for the four CSs was measured, employing an evaluative priming 
procedure with a naming task. This measure did not show an implicit preference 
for any of the CSs. It is important to note that an implicit preference was not 
found even for those CSs that were said to be equivalent to the USs. The results 
of the original study by Peters and Gawronski (2011, Experiment 3), who found a 
standard EC effect for these stimuli, and an attenuation for the CSs said to be 
opposite to the USs, suggest that our picture-picture naming task simply did not 
tap in any effect of the induction phase. Again, we added at the end of the 
experiment a series of explicit valence ratings, for exploratory reasons. The 
explicit liking of the CSs was in line with the valence-relation combination: the 
CSpos was preferred to the CSneg when the CS-US pairings were equivalently 
related. Conversely, when the CS-US pairings were oppositely related, the CSneg 
was explicitly evaluated more positively than the CSpos. Although their order 
was not counterbalanced with the implicit measure, the results of our explicit 
ratings show an effect of relational information on the acquisition of explicit 
evaluation, thus replicating the findings of Peters and Gawronski (2011). 
 Unfortunately, the results of Experiments 2-4 are inconclusive. On the 
one hand, one could argue that AMP effects and evaluative priming of naming 
responses are less sensitive to relational information than the IAT. Whereas 
Experiment 1 revealed a significant reversed EC effect on the IAT measure, an EC 
effect was not observed in Experiment 2-4 that employed an AMP of evaluative 
priming measure. On the other hand, it is possible that our implicit measures in 
Experiments 2-4 simply failed to capture any evaluation at all. This would mean 
that based on the results of those experiments, we cannot make any definite 
statement about the measures’ sensitivity to relational information. In 
Experiment 4, an EC effect was not even present for CSs that were said to be 
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equivalent to USs. This support the idea that the implicit measure in Experiment 
4 simply failed to capture the evaluation of stimuli.  
 Given that we cannot interpret the results of Experiments 2-4 in a 
conclusive manner, it is also impossible to derive theoretical conclusions based 
on these results. The results of Experiment 1, however, confirm that relational 
information can influence IAT effects. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, this 
finding does constrain theoretical models of implicit evaluation and EC. More 
research is needed, however, to determine whether different measures of 
implicit evaluation are differentially sensitive to the impact of relational 
information.  
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Introduction 
 
The way in which stimulus evaluations are acquired has been drawing the 
interest of researchers for a long time. We use the term evaluation to refer to 
the effect of stimuli on evaluative responses (De Houwer, Gawronski & Barnes-
Holmes, 2012). Furthermore, the term “implicit evaluation” is meant to refer to 
instances of evaluation that occur under conditions of automaticity (e.g., under 
time pressure or without awareness of the effect) whereas “explicit evaluation” 
refers to all other instances of evaluation (e.g., instances that occur when there 
is ample time and participants are aware of the effect). In this paper, we focus on 
one way in which implicit and explicit evaluations can be acquired, namely as the 
result of stimulus pairings. This type of acquisition is often referred to as 
evaluative conditioning (EC). EC is defined as the change in the evaluation of a 
stimulus (named conditioned stimulus, CS) that is due to its pairing with another 
stimulus (named unconditioned stimulus, US) (De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, 
Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 
2010). For example, imagine that a person evaluates a stimulus A as neutral (e.g., 
by indicating a zero score on a Likert scale). In a second phase, A is repeatedly 
paired with a picture of positive valence. EC can be said to have occurred if, as a 
result of the stimulus pairings, the person responds to the nonsense word in a 
more positive way after the pairings than before the pairings (e.g., indicates a 
positive score on the Likert scale). Research has shown that EC can be found for 
both implicit and explicit evaluation (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; 
Hermans, Baeyens & Eelen, 2003).  
In the present studies on EC, we focus on the role of the information 
regarding the type of relation between the stimuli that are paired (Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). Stimuli and events can be related in many 
different ways. For instance, one stimulus can be the cause of another stimulus 
or it can be the effect of another stimulus (e.g., Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, 
& Sloman, 2007). The way in which stimuli are related can have important 
implications for behavior. For instance, if a certain chemical substance in one’s 
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blood causes a disease, it makes perfect sense to try to remove the substance 
from the blood in order to cure the disease. If, however, the substance is merely 
a harmless byproduct of the disease, filtering it from the blood makes little 
sense. Until recently, however, EC research (and associative learning research in 
general) ignored the impact of this vital factor.  
In recent years, a handful of studies demonstrated that EC can be 
moderated by cues that provide information about the nature of the relation 
between the paired stimuli (Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; Peters & Gawronski, 
2011; Unkelbach, Förderer, & Stahl, 2012; Zanon, De Houwer & Gast, 2012). In a 
particularly intriguing set of studies, Peters and Gawronski (2011) tested the joint 
impact of three factors on both implicit and explicit CS evaluation: CS-US 
pairings, relational information concerning CS and US, and the point in time at 
which this relational information became available. Across three experiments, 
they presented participants with pairings of four neutral faces (CSs) and positive 
and negative behavioral statements (USs). In the crucial third experiment, the 
faces A and B were consistently paired with positive statements, whereas the 
faces C and D were consistently paired with negative statements, for a total of 
twenty CS-US pairings. Peters and Gawronski also presented verbal instructions 
that provided relational information. More specifically, participants were either 
told that the CS and US are equivalent (i.e., the person in the picture does or is 
what is stated in the behavioral description) or opposite (i.e., the person in the 
picture does or is the opposite of what is stated in the behavioral description). By 
doing so, they obtained a fully crossed USvalence-validity design which included 
a positive-true CS, a positive-false CS, a negative-true CS and a negative-false CS. 
Finally, they presented the relational information (i.e., are CS and US equivalent 
or opposite) immediately after each CS-US pairing trial (i.e., short-delay 
condition) or only after all twenty CS-US pairings had been shown (i.e., long-
delay condition). In the subsequent measurement phase, implicit and explicit 
evaluations of the four faces were assessed. Results showed that, in the short-
delay condition, implicit and explicit evaluations of the four faces were in 
accordance with the combination of valence and validity. That is, participants 
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evaluated the positive-equivalent CS and of the negative-opposite CS more 
positively than the positive-opposite CS and the negative-equivalent CS. Hence, 
informing participants that the USs described the opposite of what was true, 
actually reversed both the explicit and implicit evaluations of the CSs. 
Conversely, in the long-delay condition, such a reversal was found only for 
explicit evaluation, whereas the results of the implicit evaluation measures were 
merely attenuated. More specifically, when the relational information was given 
after the entire set of pairings, implicit evaluation of the positive-equivalent CS 
was more positive than that of the negative–equivalent CS, but the evaluation of 
the positive-opposite CS and negative-opposite CS did not differ. 
The results of Peters and Gawronski (2011) have important implications 
for mental process theories of EC. Current cognitive theories postulate that EC is 
mediated either by associations, by propositions, or by both associations and 
propositions. Propositions are statements about the world that can be valid or 
invalid. When they concern relations between stimuli, propositions can encode 
not only that stimuli are related but also how they are related. Associations, on 
the other hand, are merely structures that link mental representations. 
Associations are therefore not valid or invalid and do not contain relational 
information (Lagnado et al., 2007). Whereas it is typically assumed that 
associations are formed as the result of actual stimulus pairings, propositions can 
be based not only on experience but also on instructions or inferences (De 
Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Finally, it is often 
assumed that explicit evaluations reflect the content of propositions whereas 
implicit evaluations are determined only by associations in memory (e.g., 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnel, 2006).  
Single process association formation models have difficulties dealing with 
the observation of Peters and Gawronski (2011) that implicit evaluations are 
impacted by relational information. Because associations do not contain 
relational information and assuming that implicit evaluations are driven solely by 
associations in memory, one would indeed expect to observe that CS-US pairings 
lead to the same implicit evaluations regardless of how the CS and US are said to 
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be related. In order to accommodate the results, single process association 
formation models could be revised in such a way that association formation is 
driven not by the actual CS-US pairings but by the mental encoding of those 
pairings (e.g., Melchers, Lachnit & Shanks, 2004). For instance, if participants see 
a CS that co-occurs with the US word UNFRIENDLY while being told the CS is 
opposite to the US, participants might mentally recode the US as FRIENDLY, thus 
resulting in a pairing of the CS and the concept “friendly”. Such mental recoding 
could lead to an association between the CS representation and the 
representation of the concept “friendly”. One could raise at least two objections 
against such a post-hoc association formation account of the results of Peters 
and Gawronski. First, such instances of mental recoding seem to rely on 
propositional representations in that it requires knowledge about how stimuli 
are related and about what relation is valid. Hence, although the mental 
recoding assumption could be added to single process association formation 
models, it would actually change these models into dual process models that 
require both propositions and associations. Second, adding the mental recoding 
assumption would still not explain the second crucial result of Peters and 
Gawronski, namely the differential effect of the timing of the relational 
information (during or after the pairings) on implicit and explicit evaluations. If 
all changes in evaluation are mediated by associations, no such dissociations 
between implicit and explicit evaluations should arise.  
Dual process models of EC and evaluation (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011; Rydell & McConnell, 2006) can account for 
dissociations between changes in implicit and explicit evaluations if it is assumed 
that both types of evaluations are mediated in a different way by propositions 
and associations. For instance, one could assume that explicit evaluations are 
mediated only by propositions whereas implicit evaluations reflect only 
associations or a mix of associations and propositions. If propositions are 
sensitive to relational information regardless of when this information is 
presented, then explicit evaluations would be in line with that relational 
information regardless of when it is presented. If one also adds the assumption 
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that association formation can be blocked by propositional processes (e.g., when 
relational information is presented during the pairings) or that it can in part 
reflect the content of propositional processes (e.g., by mental recoding as the 
result of relational information that is available during the pairings), it can be 
explained that implicit evaluations are affected by relational information but 
more so when that information is presented during the pairings.  
The results of Peters and Gawronski (2011) also challenge single process 
propositional models of EC. Such models postulate that all associative learning, 
including EC, is mediated by the formation of propositions about stimulus 
relations (De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009). If this is the case, there seems 
to be little reason to expect dissociations between EC of implicit and explicit 
evaluations. Hence, the fact that the time of giving relational information does 
moderate EC of implicit evaluations but not EC of explicit evaluations seems 
problematic for single process propositional models of EC.  
Nevertheless, a post-hoc propositional account of the results of Peters 
and Gawronski can be constructed. It is reasonable to assume that, at the time of 
encoding, participants formed propositions based on both the pairings and the 
relational information. For instance, the pairing of a CS with the word 
UNFRIENDLY would result in the proposition “the CS is unfriendly” in the 
equivalence information condition but in the proposition “the CS is friendly” in 
the opposition information condition. Importantly, even if relational information 
was not provided during the pairings, participants might still form propositions 
about the CS and US relation. Because in daily life, the co-occurrence of two 
stimuli most often points at some type of similarity or dependence between the 
stimuli (i.e., a frame of co-ordination; see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, 
for a discussion), participants might assume by default that the US provided a 
valid description of the CS (e.g., “the CS is unfriendly” when the CS and the US 
word UNFRIENDLY are paired) even when they were not explicitly told that the 
CS and US were related in this manner. When relational information was 
presented after the pairings, participants may have constructed a second set of 
propositions (e.g., “the CS is unfriendly” in the equivalence information condition 
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or “the CS is friendly” in the opposition information condition). Therefore, the 
resulting attenuation of the implicit evaluation in the invalid information 
condition could be explained by the conflict between two opposite sets of 
propositions.  
In order to explain that explicit evaluations did reverse in the invalid 
information condition but implicit evaluations did not, one additional assumption 
is necessary, namely the assumption that implicit evaluations are more sensitive 
to initial propositions than explicit evaluations. That is, when two propositions 
are formed one after the other, the impact of the first proposition relative to the 
second proposition will be bigger for implicit evaluations than on explicit 
evaluations. Initial support for this latter assumption is provided by Gregg, Banaji 
and Seibt (2006, Experiment 3), who presented participants with a description of 
two fictitious social groups. Whereas group A was initially said to hold positive 
characteristics, group B was described as holding negative characteristics. 
Afterwards, participants were told that, due to a computer malfunction, they 
received the wrong induction procedure, and were asked to mentally switch the 
descriptions (i.e., that A is negative and B is positive). Hence, participants were 
given conflicting relational information on two occasions, which should have 
allowed participants to form two conflicting propositions, one after the other. 
Gregg et al. observed that, at the end of the experiment, the explicit evaluation 
of A and B was in line with the most recent information whereas implicit 
evaluations were in line with the initial information. Although this result suggests 
that implicit evaluations are influenced more by the first than by the second 
relational information, one could also explain Gregg et al.’s results by arguing 
that implicit (but not explicit) evaluations are impacted more by equivalence 
information than by opposition information. Such an alternative account is 
possible because equivalence information was provided first (i.e., A is positive, B 
is negative) and opposition information second (i.e., reverse the initial 
information). In order to exclude this alternative account, the order in which 
information is presented (first or second) needs to be manipulated 
independently from the type of information that is presented (equivalence or 
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opposition). Also note that Gregg et al. measured implicit evaluations twice, once 
after the initial information and once after the opposition instructions. The fact 
that implicit measures had been administrated before the presentation of 
opposition instructions could have rendered them less susceptible to the 
opposition instructions.  
The aim of our research was two-fold. First, we wanted to replicate and 
extend the results of Peters and Gawronski (2011). Although their results do not 
refute in a definite manner any of the three classes of models of EC (i.e., 
association formation, propositional, dual process), they do impose serious 
constraints on all of these models in that they force the models to change or add 
core assumptions. Given the high theoretical value of their results, it is important 
to examine whether the main findings of Peters and Gawronski can be replicated 
across a range of situations. The need for replication is underscored also by the 
fact that Moran and Bar-Anan (2012) recently failed to find an impact of 
relational information on implicit evaluations. Given these mixed results, it is 
clear that further research is necessary. Apart from trying to replicate the main 
findings of Peters and Gawronski, we aimed to extend their findings in several 
ways. First, to test the generality of the findings, we used different stimuli that 
are related in slightly different ways. We also used an implicit measure different 
from those used by Peters and Gawronski. Second, in Experiments 2 and 3, we 
included baseline conditions in which no instructions were given about the way 
in which stimuli are related. This allowed us to compare the impact of 
instructions about different types of relations.  
The second main aim of our research was to test the post-hoc 
propositional explanation of the findings of Peters and Gawronski. This could 
inform us not only about the validity of propositional models of EC but also shed 
new light on the conditions under which relational information influences 
implicit and explicit evaluations.  
Experiment 1 provided a conceptual replication of the crucial third 
experiment of Peters and Gawronski (2011) in which the time of presentation of 
the relational information was manipulated. As in the studies of Peters and 
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Gawronski, we presented a series of CS-US pairings. This time, however, the CSs 
were nonwords which were said to have a meaning in a foreign language 
unknown to the participants. The USs were positive and negative English words. 
We also presented information that implied a relation of opposition between CSs 
and USs, namely that each foreign word’s meaning was the antonym of the 
paired English word. The relational content of these instructions was thus very 
similar to that in the opposition (false information) condition in the study by 
Peters and Gawronski. Half of the participants received these relational 
instructions before experiencing the pairings, and the other half received these 
instructions after the pairings. Later on, implicit and explicit evaluation for the 
CSs was assessed. Different from Peters and Gawronski (2011), we kept the 
number of times in which we presented relational (validity) information equal 
between conditions. In their short-delay condition, Peters and Gawronski 
presented relational information after each pairing (resulting in 20 presentations 
of the validity instructions) whereas in their long-delay condition, they presented 
their validity instructions only twice at the end of the experiment. In our 
experiment relational information was always given only once, either before or 
after the pairings. 
Experiments 2 and 3 further tested the generality of the effects of Peters 
and Gawrsonki (2011) and directly tested the two assumptions that must be 
made by propositional accounts in order to explain their results. The first 
assumption is that the mere CS-US spatio-temporal co-occurrence represents a 
cue that suggests that the two stimuli are equivalent. As we noted earlier, the 
tendency of framing co-occurring stimuli as being equivalent is probably a 
default response (Hayes et al., 2001). If this assumption is correct, one would 
expect that the results change if one undermines the spontaneous interpretation 
of paired stimuli as being equivalent. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we tried to 
create a context in which the co-occurrence of stimuli is perceived as a cue that 
implies, instead of equivalence, opposition between the stimuli. To this end, we 
added a pre-training phase in which we presented three series of stimulus 
pairings. At the end of each series, we provided a verbal instruction that implied 
THE IMPACT OF RELATIONAL INFORMATION ON IMPLICIT EVALUATION 109 
  
a relation of opposition between the paired stimuli (i.e., we told that the US 
always corresponded to the antonym of the CS). With this procedure we aimed 
at creating an environment that encouraged participants to believe that the 
stimuli paired in the fourth series – the actual CS-US pairings – were opposites. 
The test series of CS-US pairings was then followed either by verbal instructions 
implying a relation of opposition between the CSs and the USs (opposition 
condition), verbal instructions implying a relation of equivalence between the 
CSs and the USs (equivalence condition) or by no instructions. If participants 
form propositions about the relation between a CS and a US even when 
information about the relation is not given explicitly and if we are successful in 
changing this default way of framing into a frame of opposition, then one would 
expect a reversed conditioning effect in the no instructions condition. In other 
words, CSs paired with positive USs should be liked less than CSs paired with 
negative USs. The reason for this reversal is that, because of the pre-training, a 
CS-US pairing would be seen as a cue to form the proposition “the CS is opposite 
to the US”. In the opposition condition, the propositions formed during the CS-
US pairings (i.e., “CS is opposite to US”) will be in line with the propositions 
formed after providing the relational information (i.e., that the US is indeed the 
opposite of the CS), which, if anything, should strengthen the reversed 
conditioning effect. In the equivalence condition, however, no conditioning 
effect should arise. Assuming that during the pairings, participants encode the CS 
and US as being opposite, these initial propositions should counteract the effect 
of the propositions formed after presenting the relational information. In sum, 
we predicted the reverse pattern of results as in the long-delay condition of 
Peters and Gawrsonki: A stronger (reversed) EC effect in the opposition condition 
than in the equivalence condition. Moreover, we expected to observe a reversed 
EC effect in the no instructions condition.  
Experiment 3 tested the assumption that when two conflicting 
propositions are formed one after the other, the first proposition will have a 
bigger effect on implicit evaluations than on explicit evaluations. To this end, in 
Experiment 3, we presented two instructions that informed participants about 
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the CS-US relations. One of these was presented before and one after a series of 
CS-US pairings. Both instructions could either state that the CS and the US were 
equivalent or that they were opposite to each other. Hence, each participant 
received one of four different combinations of pre- and post-pairings 
instructions, which could be either congruent with each other (equivalence-
equivalence or opposition-opposition) or incongruent with each other 
(equivalence-opposition or opposition-equivalence). In case of incongruent 
combinations of instructions, the second information was always described as 
being the valid one. We also added a control condition, in which no relational 
information was presented. After the learning phase, implicit and explicit 
evaluation of the CSs were measured. If the relative impact of the first 
proposition is bigger on implicit evaluations than on explicit evaluations, we 
would expect to observe a bigger difference in EC between consistent conditions 
(i.e., equivalence-equivalence; opposite-opposite) and inconsistent conditions 
(i.e., equivalence-opposite; opposite-equivalence) on explicit evaluations than on 
implicit evaluations.  
 
Experiment 1 
Participants were shown a series of trials in which a nonword (CS) was 
paired with a positive or negative word (US). Either prior to or after the pairings, 
participants were instructed to imagine that the CSs were actually the Turkish 
translations of the antonyms of the paired US. For example, when the nonword 
LOKANTA was presented together with the word HAPPY, participants were asked 
to imagine that LOKANTA was the Turkish word for SAD. After the learning 
phase, the implicit evaluations of the CSs were measured using an Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). In addition, 
explicit evaluation was measured, for exploratory reasons, after the implicit 
measure.  
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Method 
Participants. A total of 532 English-speaking volunteers (mean age = 
31.2, 59.2 % women) participated online in the experiment, which was posted on 
the website of Project Implicit (http://implicit.harvard.edu).  
Materials. Learning phase. As CSs, we used the nonwords LOKANTA and 
FEVKANI. The words HAPPY and UGLY were used as USs. We refer to the CS that 
paired with the positive US as CSpos and to the CS paired with the negative US as 
CSneg. The codes USpos and USneg are used to refer to the positive US and 
negative US, respectively. Half of the participants were presented with the 
nonword “LOKANTA” as CSpos and the nonword “FEVKANI” as CSneg, and the 
reverse assignment was presented to the other half of the participants. Both CSs 
and USs were presented in white, uppercase letters in 30pt Arial font on the 
center-left and the center-right of a black screen, respectively. The verbal 
instructions were written in black, 18pt Arial font, presented on a white page. 
IAT. The positive attributes employed in the IAT were the English words 
GLORIOUS, MARVELOUS, SUCCESS, and WONDERFUL. The negative attributes 
were the negative English words AGONY, EVIL, FAILURE, NASTY and 
UNPLEASANT. Both positive and negative attributes were presented in green, 
18pt Arial font, in the middle of a black screen. The target stimuli were the 
nonwords LOKANTA and FEVKANI. They were presented in white, and in eight 
different combinations of font types (Arial Black and Fixedsys), capitalizations 
(uppercase and lowercase) and size (16pt and 18pt), resulting in a total of eight 
different stimuli. This measure was taken in order to avoid categorization based 
on simple perceptual features of the nonwords, and has been successfully 
employed in previous research (De Houwer & Vandorpe, 2010; Zanon et al., 
2012). In addition, the error message was a red X that appeared in the middle of 
the screen. If they made an error, participants had to correct their response in 
order to proceed to the next trial.  
Explicit valence ratings. For exploratory reasons, explicit valence ratings 
were also administered after the IAT. Participants rated their liking of each of the 
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CSs by answering to the question “How much do you like the word (CS)” by 
selecting an option on a dropdown menu, indicating a value on a 5-point- scale, 
with “Not much at all”, “A little bit”, “A moderate amount”, “A lot” and “Very 
much” as possible answers. 
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were 
instructed that they were about to take part in a study about the meaning of 
words. The first part of the task was described as consisting of a series of pairings 
of Turkish and English words. In addition, the instructions also requested 
participants to pay attention during the presentation of the pairings, and to try 
to remember the words, because questions about the pairings would be asked in 
a later stage of the experiment. In condition Instructions Before, participants 
were also requested to imagine that the Turkish words they were about to see 
were antonyms of their paired English word, and therefore had the opposite 
meaning. This was illustrated with the example that if a Turkish word A was to be 
paired with the English word “fast”, the supposed real meaning of the word A 
would be “slow”, that is, the antonym of “fast”. In condition Instructions After, 
participants were simply told that the relation between English and Turkish 
words would be revealed only at the end of the acquisition phase. After reading 
the instructions, participants could move to the subsequent acquisition phase by 
pressing a key.  
The acquisition phase consisted in a simple slideshow in which two pairs 
of neutral nonwords and English words were presented for six times each. The 
CSpos was consistently paired with the USpos, whereas the CSneg was 
consistently paired with the USneg. Each CS-US pair was presented for 3000ms. 
The intertrial interval was 1000 ms.  
After the acquisition phase, participants in condition Instructions After 
were asked to imagine that the Turkish and English words that had just been 
presented together were antonyms, and therefore had the opposite meaning. 
The example described above was also added, in order to keep this post-pairings 
instruction page as similar as possible to the pre-pairings instructions of 
condition Instructions Before. Conversely, after the CS-US pairings, participants 
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in condition Instructions Before did not receive supplemental instructions and 
proceeded directly to the subsequent phase.  
After instructions and pairings were presented, participants performed a 
so-called inference check. It consisted of two questions, in which participants 
were asked to indicate the first letter of the CSs’ real meaning. For example, 
imagine that the Turkish word LOKANTA had been repeatedly paired with the 
English word HAPPY, and further instructions had indicated to imagine that 
Turkish and English words are antonyms. A correct answer to the request “Please 
indicate the first letter of the real English meaning of the Turkish word LOKANTA, 
would be “s”, that is, the initial letter of the word SAD, the antonym of “happy”. 
The aim of the inference test was to check whether participants had understood 
our instructions and formed the appropriate propositions on the basis of the 
stimulus pairings and the instructions. The order of the inference test in the 
sequence was counterbalanced: half of the participants received it before the 
IAT, the other half received it after the IAT. 
After or before the inference check (depending on the counterbalancing 
condition), the IAT was administered. At the beginning of the task, participants 
were instructed about the assignment of each category of stimuli (CSpos, CSneg, 
positive and negative attributes) to the right or to the left key. The first phase 
(Block 1, B1) was a target discrimination phase, consisting of 20 trials in which 
the targets (the CSs) were presented 10 times each. The second phase (B2) was 
an attribute discrimination phase that consisted of 20 trials in which five positive 
and five negative attributes were presented, twice each. For example, in this 
phase participants had to press the left key for negative attributes, and the right 
key for positive attributes. The following two phases, B3 (20 trials) and B4 (40 
trials), constituted the first combined phases, in which both attributes and 
targets were presented, and each of the two keys was assigned to two types of 
stimuli. For example, participants had to press the left key to categorize the 
CSneg and the negative stimuli, and the right key to categorize the CSpos and the 
positive stimuli. These two blocks were followed by B5 (40 trials), that is, an 
inverted target discrimination phase, in which the target words were presented 
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as in B1, but with inverted labels. In the example, participants in this phase 
would have to categorize the CSpos using the left key, and the CSneg using the 
right key. The last phase was the second set of the combined phase, that 
consisted of B6 (20 trials) and B7 (40 trials), in which both targets and attributes 
were presented. The difference from the first combined phase (B3 and B4) is that 
the CSs had to be categorized according to reversed response assignments.  
After completing the IAT, participants were asked to rate the valence of 
the CSs, as a measure of explicit evaluation. Finally, participants were asked a 
last memory question, namely to select, from a dropdown list, the US that was 
paired with each CS.  
 
Results 
Implicit evaluation. IAT data from 23 of the 532 participants (4.3%) were 
excluded from analysis because of too high error rates (larger than 40% in a 
single block or larger than 30% overall), resulting in valid IAT scores for 509 
participants. The IAT scores were calculated using the D2-algorithm (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). This algorithm impie that latencies for all trials are 
calculated from the onset of the stimulus until the correct response is made, also 
for trials in which initially a wrong response was given. Trials with reaction times 
shorter than 400 milliseconds are discarded. Positive scores indicate an implicit 
preference for the CSpos over the CSneg, that is, a preference for the 
conditioned stimuli in line with the valence of the unconditioned stimuli they co-
occurred with.  
Overall, the IAT score was not significantly different from zero, M = -0.01, 
SD = 0.50, t(509) = -0.63, p = .53, d = 0.03. We conducted a 2 (Instructions Order: 
Before the pairings vs. After the pairings) x 2 (Inference Check Order: Pre-IAT vs. 
Post-IAT) ANOVA on the IAT scores. Results did not show an interaction between 
both variables, F < 1. The main effect of the Inference Check Order was not 
significant, F < 1, suggesting that the timing of the inference check in the 
procedure had no significant effect on the outcome of the implicit measure. The 
main effect of Instructions Order, however, was significant, F(1, 505) = 9.52, p < 
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.01, partial η
2 
= 0.02. In condition Instructions Before, the IAT score was negative 
(M = -0.08, SD = 0.50) and significantly different from zero, t(250) = -2.60, p = 
.011, d = 0.16, whereas in condition Instructions After, the IAT score was positive 
(M = 0.05, SD = 0.48) but not significantly different from zero, t(257) = 1.74, p = 
.082, d = 0.10. Thus, opposition instructions presented before the CS-US pairings 
led to implicit evaluation of the CSs opposite to the valence of their paired USs. 
On the other hand, when opposition instructions were presented after the CS-US 
pairings, participants showed no significant preference for one CS over the other. 
In an additional analysis based on only those participants who correctly 
answered the questions in the inference check (n = 236) and who therefore were 
likely to have processed all instructions correctly, the main effect of Instructions 
Order was still significant, F(1, 232) = 11.80, p < .001, partial η
2 
= 0.05. In 
particular, within this sample, the IAT score in condition Instructions Before was 
still negative (M = -0.16, SD = 0.46) and significantly different from zero, t(134) = 
-4.12, p < .001, d = 0.35. In condition Instructions After, the IAT score was still 
positive (M = 0.07, SD = 0.48), but not significantly different from zero, t(100) = 
1.41, p = .16, d = 0.15.  
Explicit evaluation. Explicit ratings were included for exploratory reasons 
only and should be interpreted with caution because they were always collected 
after the IAT. During the IAT, forgetting or additional learning might have taken 
place which could have biased the subsequent evaluative ratings. To make the 
results more comparable to those on the implicit measure, we computed 
difference scores based on the two CS ratings (CSpos - CSneg) that reflect the 
preference for the CSpos over the CSneg. A high explicit evaluation score thus 
represents a preference for the positively paired CS over the negatively paired 
CS. Data from eight participants who did not answer one or both of the explicit 
valence rating questions were excluded from the analyses. Overall, the explicit 
evaluation score was positive (M = 0.65, SD = 2.19), but not significantly different 
from zero, t(523) < 1, ns., d = 0.30. We conducted an ANOVA that did not reveal 
an interaction between Instruction Order and Inference Check Order, F < 1, nor a 
main effect of Inference Check Order, F < 1. The main effect of Instruction Order, 
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however, was significant, F(1, 520) = 10.63, p < .01, partial η
2 
= 0.02. The explicit 
evaluation score for participants in condition Instructions Before was negative 
(M = -0.25, SD = 2.23), but not significantly different from zero, t(257) = -1.71, p = 
.09, d = 0.11. In condition Instructions After, the explicit evaluation score was 
positive (M = 0.37, SD = 2.00), and significantly different from zero, t(265) = 3.00, 
p = .003, d = 0.19. When opposition instructions were presented only after the 
experience of the pairings, participants thus showed a standard EC effect, that is, 
a preference for the CSpos over the CSneg. When participants are instructed 
before the pairings about their opposite relations, the EC effect is descriptively 
(but not significantly) reversed.  
 Also for the ratings, we performed an additional analysis based only on 
the data of participants who performed the inference test correctly (n = 243). 
Overall, participants showed a negative explicit evaluation score (M = -0.22, SD = 
2.14), but not significantly different from zero, t(242) = -1.59, p = .11, d = 0.10. 
The ANOVA did not reveal a significant Instruction Order x Inference Check Order 
interaction, F < 1. We found, however, a main effect of Instruction Order, F(1, 
239) = 4.83, p = .03, partial η
2 
= 0.20. In the reduced sample, participants in 
condition Instructions Before showed a negative explicit evaluation score (M = -
0.53, SD = 2.19) which was different from zero, t(136) = -2.81, p < .01, d = 0.24. 
Participants in condition Instructions After showed a positive score (M = 0.18, SD 
= 2.02), but their preference did not differ from zero, t(105) = -0.91, ns, d = 0.09. 
This analysis shows that, among participants who probably made the correct 
inference about the real nature of the CSs, explicit evaluation was in line with the 
valence implied by the inference but only in condition Instructions Before. We 
also found a main effect of Inference Check Order, F(1, 239) = 9.98, p = .002, 
partial η
2 
= 0.40. Participants who performed the inference check before the IAT, 
showed a positive explicit evaluation score (M = 0.14, SD = 2.05), but this 
preference did not differ from zero, t(146) = 0.85, ns, d = 0.07. Furthermore, 
participants who received the inference test after the IAT, and therefore right 
before the explicit evaluation measure, showed a negative explicit evaluation 
score (M = -0.77, SD = 2.16), which differed significantly from zero, t(95) = -3.49, 
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p = .001, d = 0.36. This result suggests that, for participants who made correct 
inferences about the nature of the CSs, the proximity of the inference check to 
the moment in which the explicit evaluation took place led to a preference for 
the CSneg over the CSpos, that is, a preference in line with the valence implied 
by the inference and not by the mere co-occurrences. Implicit and explicit 
evaluation scores were significantly correlated, r = .40, p = .01. 
 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 provided a conceptual replication of Experiment 3 of Peters 
and Gawronski (2011). We presented a series of CS-US pairings, as well as 
relational information that implied a relation of opposition between CSs and USs. 
We also manipulated the time at which this relational information was available, 
that is, before or after the CS-US pairings. Afterwards, implicit and explicit 
evaluation were measured. Our results confirmed those of Peters and 
Gawronski, showing that opposition instructions that were presented before the 
experience of CS-US pairings led to an implicit preference for the CS paired with 
a negative US over a CS paired with a positive US. When instructions implying 
opposition were presented after all the CS-US pairings were shown, there was no 
difference between the implicit evaluation of the CSpos and the CSneg. We 
cannot draw strong conclusions about explicit evaluation, since our explicit 
valence ratings were presented always after the implicit measure. However, our 
results did not reveal a difference between the evaluation of the CSpos and 
CSneg in condition Instructions Before but explicit evaluations were in line with 
the valence of the CS-US pairings in condition Instructions After.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
With Experiment 2, we aimed at testing the assumption that the mere co-
occurrence of a CS and US is perceived as a cue that suggests equivalence of 
those stimuli and therefore leads to an evaluation of the CS that is in line with 
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the evaluation of the US. We therefore tried to create a context in which the 
mere co-occurrence of two stimuli could be spontaneously interpreted as a cue 
that the two stimuli are opposite to each other. To this end, we presented three 
series of stimulus pairings before the target CS-US series was shown. Each of the 
three training series was followed by verbal instructions that implied a relation of 
opposition between the stimuli being shown. We hoped that, as a result of this 
pre-training phase, participants would spontaneously frame the CS-US pairings of 
the fourth series as being opposite in valence. In addition, after the acquisition 
phase, we presented instructions implying a relation of opposition between the 
CSs and the USs, instructions implying a relation of equivalence between the CSs 
and the USs or no instructions. Finally, implicit and explicit evaluation of the CSs 
were measured. In order to measure implicit evaluations, some participants 
completed the IAT whereas others completed a personalized version of the IAT. 
Although both measures are procedurally similar, there is evidence suggesting 
that they can be dissociated in important ways (e.g., Han, Czellar, Olson & Fazio, 
2010). For the present purposes, however, it is only important to note that by 
using different measures, we could test the generality of our findings.  
 
Method 
Participants. A total of 1098 English-speaking volunteers (mean age = 
29; 69.1 % women) participated online in the experiment, which was posted on 
the website of Project Implicit (http://implicit.harvard.edu). The computer 
program randomly assigned participants to one of three groups (Conditions 
Equivalence instructions, Opposition instructions, or No instructions). 
Materials. Learning phase. In the learning phase, pairings of neutral and 
affectively relevant words, as well as verbal instruction pages were presented. 
The nonwords were “SARICIK”, “ENANWAL”, “SOKOG”, “UYATA”, “HILEJ”, 
“AFUBO”, “LAAPIAN”, and “NIFFIAN”, whereas the affectively relevant words 
were the English words “LIFE”, “SAD”, “PLEASANT”, “SICKNESS”, “LOVE”, 
“FAILURE”, “HAPPY” and “UGLY”. The CSs were the nonwords “LAAPIAN” and 
“NIFFIAN”, and the USs were the words “HAPPY” (USpos) and “UGLY” (USneg). 
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Half of the participants were presented with the nonword “LAAPIAN” as CSpos 
and the nonword “NIFFIAN” as CSneg, and the reverse assignment was 
presented to the other half of the participants. Both nonwords and affectively 
relevant were presented in white, capital letters on, respectively, the center-left 
and the center-right of a black screen, in 30pt Arial font. The verbal instructions 
were written in black, 18pt Arial font, presented on a white page. 
IAT and Personalized IAT. The stimuli employed in the IAT and in the 
Personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004) were identical to those of the IAT of 
Experiment 1, except for the target stimuli used (the nonwords “LAAPIAN” and 
“NIFFIAN”).  
Explicit valence ratings. Participants rated their liking of each of the CSs 
with the same scale as used in the previous experiments.  
Procedure. Like in Experiment 1, at the beginning of the experiment 
participants were instructed that they were about to take part in a study about 
the meaning of words, and that they would see pairings of Turkish and English 
words. In this experiment, the initial instructions stated that there were in total 
four series of pairings. Participants were encouraged to pay attention to the 
pairs, because questions were going to be asked about this later on in the 
experiment. In addition, participants were informed that the relationship 
between the presented words was to be communicated only after the series of 
pairings. After reading the instructions, participants could move to the first 
acquisition phase by pressing a key. The first pairing series consisted of the Apos 
and Bneg pairs (nonword A paired with a positive word and nonword B paired 
with a negative word), paired six times each. After all twelve pairs were shown, 
an instruction page was presented that asked participants to imagine that the 
Turkish and English words presented together were antonyms of each other, that 
is, that they had the opposite meaning in a similar fashion to Experiment 1. We 
will again refer to this type of instructions as “opposition instructions”. In order 
to facilitate the understanding of the relation, also an example (e.g., if you had 
seen the pair “KADIRGA – LIGHT”, the real meaning of the word “kadirga” would 
be “dark”, that is, the opposite of “light”) was given. At this stage, participants 
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were also asked to take a moment to think about the real meaning of the 
allegedly Turkish words, in light of the instructions just received. By pressing a 
key, participants could move on to the next phase, which was a manipulation 
check in which they had to indicate the English meaning of the nonwords A and 
B. With this manipulation check we could assess whether participants had 
combined the information derived from the pairings with that derived from the 
post pairings instructions. After the first series’ manipulation check, another two 
series of pairings (Cpos, Dneg and Epos, Fneg), opposition instructions and 
manipulation checks followed, with the same modalities as the first series. After 
the third series, the CS-US pairings were presented in the same way as the A-B, 
C-D, and E-F pairings. 
 What followed after the CS-US pairings varied across conditions. In 
condition Equivalence instructions, participants were asked to imagine that the 
CSs were actually synonyms of the USs they were paired with, and that they 
hence had the same meaning. An example was also given to make sure that the 
relation was clearly described. In condition Opposition instructions, participants 
were asked to imagine that the CSs were actually antonyms of the USs they were 
paired with, and that they therefore had the opposite meaning. Also in this case, 
an example of this relation was provided. In condition No instructions, no further 
instructions were presented. In conditions Opposition instructions and 
Equivalence instructions, participants were asked to take a little time to think 
about the real meaning of the CSs, that is, to integrate the information implied 
by the CS-US pairings with the information implied by the post-pairings 
instructions. After this last instruction page, followed the implicit measures, 
designed to measure the implicit evaluation of the CSs. Half of the participants 
were administered an IAT, and the other half on a personalized IAT. The 
personalized IAT differed from the standard IAT in two important ways. First, the 
attribute labels “Positive” and “Negative” were replaced by the labels “I like” and 
“I don’t like”. Second, there was no error feedback for the attributes. In our 
version of the personalized IAT, we decided, however, not to implement the 
second feature. This decision was taken due to the fact that the experiment was 
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conducted online and that it was therefore likely that some participants would 
without error feedback give random responses. This version of the personalized 
IAT had already been successfully employed by Smith, De Houwer and Nosek (in 
press). In addition, in order to ensure the non-normative nature of the 
categorization task, participants were asked to indicate whether they liked or 
disliked each of the attributes employed in the last phase of the experiment. This 
procedure allowed us to select only the participants that genuinely liked the 
positive attributes and disliked the negative attributes. 
After the implicit measure, but only in no instructions condition, 
participants were informed that the meaning of the CSs was actually the 
opposite of that of the English words they were paired with (similar to the 
instructions of condition Opposition instructions). The subsequent phase 
consisted of a series of explicit ratings of the pleasantness of the CSs that served 
as a measure of explicit evaluation. After the explicit valence ratings were given, 
a series of manipulation checks was presented, in order to test participants’ 
memory of the stimuli presented. Finally, the group who performed the 
personalized IAT also rated whether they liked or disliked the attributes 
presented in the implicit measure  
 
Results 
Implicit evaluation. For both the standard and the personalized IAT, 
scores were calculated using the D2-algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003). We 
excluded IAT data from 47 participants (4.3%) because of too high error rates 
(greater than 40% in a single block or greater than 30% overall) and data of 185 
participants (16.8%) who performed the personalized IAT but did not indicate to 
like all likeable attributes and dislike all dislikeable ones. This restriction did not 
affect the results. The resulting sample consisted of 899 participants who were 
randomly assigned to one of three groups, resulting in 304 participants assigned 
to condition Equivalence instructions, 298 participants assigned to condition 
Opposition instructions and 297 participants assigned to condition No 
instructions. As in Experiment 1, positive IAT scores indicate an implicit 
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preference for the CSpos over the CSneg, that is, a preference for the 
conditioned stimuli in line with the valence of the unconditioned stimuli they co-
occurred with.  
Overall, the IAT score was positive (M = 0.10, SD = 0.53), and significantly 
different from zero, t(865) = 5.72, p < .001, d = 0.19. This result shows an implicit 
evaluation of the CSs in line with the valence of the US with which they co-
occurred. We conducted a 3 (Instructions: Equivalence, Opposition, No 
instructions) x 2 (Implicit measure: Standard vs. Personalized IAT) ANOVA. The 
interaction was not significant, F(5, 860) = 2.21, p = .11, but there was a 
significant main effect of Instructions, F(2, 860) = 4.47, p = .012, partial η
2 
= 0.01. 
Participants in condition Equivalence instructions showed a positive IAT score (M 
= 0.14, SD = 0.55), that was significantly different from zero, t(290) = 4.24, p < 
.001, d = 0.25. Also in condition No instructions the IAT score was positive (M = 
0.14, SD = 0.52), and significantly different from zero, t(289) = 4.42, p < .001, d = 
0.27. Therefore in these two conditions, participants showed an implicit 
evaluation in line with the valence of the US with which they co-occurred. 
Moreover, in condition Opposition instructions, the IAT score was also positive 
(M = 0.04, SD = 0.51), but it did not differ from zero, t(284) = 1.17, p = .24. A 
contrast test showed that the IAT score in condition Equivalence instructions did 
not differ from that in condition No instructions, t(863) = 0.02, p = .99, whereas 
the IAT score in condition Opposition instructions significantly differed from 
condition No instructions, t(863) = -2,28, p = .02. The contrast test between 
condition Equivalence instructions and condition Opposition instructions also 
showed a significant difference, t(863) = -2,30, p = .02. These results show that 
the instructions in condition Opposition instructions led to an attenuation of the 
EC effect but the instructions in the equivalence condition did not strengthen the 
IAT effect. Finally, there was also a main effect of implicit measure, F(1, 860) = 
4.64, p = .031, partial η
2 
= 0.005. The personalized IAT showed a stronger 
preference for the CSpos over the CSneg (M = 0.15, SD = 0.53), t(364) = 5.22, p < 
.001, d = 0.28, than the standard IAT, (M = 0.07, SD = 0.53), t(500) = 3.07, p = 
.002, d = 0.13.  
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Explicit evaluation. As in Experiment 1, explicit evaluation measures were 
administered for exploratory reasons only and always administrated after the 
IAT. Like with the implicit measure, scores for each of the two explicit valence 
rating questions were combined into a single score that reflects the preference 
for the CSpos over the CSneg. In other words, a high explicit evaluation score 
represents a preference for the positively paired CS over the negatively paired 
CS. Data of 26 participants who did not answer to one or both of the explicit 
valence rating questions were excluded from the analyses. Overall, the explicit 
evaluation score was positive (M = 0.41, SD = 2.70), and significantly different 
from zero, t(872) = 4.47, p < .001, d = 0.15. This result shows an explicit 
preference for the CSpos over the CSneg. A 3 (Instructions: Equivalence, 
Opposition, No instructions) x 2 (Implicit measure: Standard vs. Personalized IAT) 
ANOVA was also conducted. The interaction was not significant, F(5, 867) = 1.99, 
p = .14, nor was the main effect of the type of Implicit measure, F(1, 860) = 1.65, 
p = .20. However, the main effect of Instructions was significant, F(2, 860) = 
26.99, p < .001, partial η
2 
= 0.06. Participants in condition Equivalence 
instructions showed a positive explicit evaluation score (M = 1.28, SD = 2.55), 
that was significantly different from zero, t(294) = 8.64, p < .001, d = 0.50. This 
result represents an explicit preference for the CSpos over the CSneg. In 
condition Opposition instructions the explicit evaluation score was negative, (M 
= -0.45, SD = 2.66), but was not different from zero, t(289) = -0.29, p = .77. Also in 
condition No instructions the explicit evaluation score was negative (M = -0.31, 
SD = 2.68), and not different from zero, t(287) = -0.20, p = .84. A contrast test 
showed that the manipulation in condition Opposition instructions did not differ 
from condition No instructions, t(870) = -0.06, p = .95, whereas the manipulation 
in condition Equivalence instructions significantly differed from condition No 
instructions, t(870) = 6.03, p < .001. The contrast test between condition 
Equivalence instructions and condition Opposition instructions showed a 
significant difference, t(870) = 6.10, p < .001. Thus, in conditions Opposition 
instructions and No instructions, explicit evaluation scores show an attenuation 
of the EC effect. It is important to note that, in condition No instructions, 
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relational information implying a relation of opposition was given after the IAT. 
Therefore, whereas implicit evaluation could be influenced only by the 
acquisition phase, explicit evaluation could have been influenced also by these 
additional instructions. Overall, implicit and explicit evaluation scores were 
significantly correlated, r = .28, p < .001. This was the case also for each of the 
three conditions analyzed separately (condition Equivalence instructions, r = .30, 
p < .001; condition Opposition instructions, r = .36, p < .001; condition No 
instructions, r = .18, p < .01)  
 
Discussion 
 Results showed that the training series of opposite CS-US pairings did not 
lead to a reverse EC effect in any of the conditions. In the conditions Equivalence 
instructions and No instructions participants showed an implicit preference in 
line with the valence of the co-occurrences, that is, a standard EC effect. In 
condition Opposition instructions, however, participants showed an attenuation 
of the EC effect, therefore confirming that post-pairings opposite instructions 
can lead to a significant reduction of the standard EC effect (as shown also in 
Experiment 1). There are at least two interpretations of this result in terms of the 
mental processes that mediate EC. First, it might indicate that, unlike to what is 
assumed on the basis of propositional models, participants do not spontaneously 
form propositions about CS-US pairings. For instance, it is possible that in the 
absence of explicit relational information, CS-US pairings result only in the 
formation of associations in memory. These associations result in a transfer of 
valence from the US to the CS, an effect that can only be counteracted but not 
undone by subsequent information that the CS and US are actually opposites. 
Second, it is possible that participants still framed the CS and US as equivalent 
despite the pre-training that encouraged a framing in terms of opposition. In 
other words, one could argue that the pre-training was ineffective in changing 
the default assumption that CS-US pairings indicate equivalence and therefore 
did not provide an adequate test of propositional models of EC.  
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Although we cannot distinguish between these two options, our results 
do provide important new information about the effects of relational 
information on EC of implicit evaluations. Interestingly, the EC effect was as big 
in the No instruction condition as in the Equivalence instruction condition. This 
means that after CS-US pairings in the absence of explicit relational information, 
equivalence instructions seem to add little. Instead, difference between 
providing post-acquisition equivalence instructions and post-acquisition 
opposition instructions seems to be driven entirely by the opposition 
instructions. This results further constraints models of EC. Models which assume 
that CS-US pairings in the absence of explicit relational information result in the 
formation of associations must either assume that implicit evaluations are driven 
only by the associations (which contradicts the fact that post-acquisition 
opposition instructions do attenuate implicit evaluations) or that the effect of 
associations and propositions that imply equivalence is non-additive. 
Propositional models must assume that the co-occurrence of CS-US associations 
is a strong cue for the formation of propositions about the equivalence of the CS 
and US. Once these propositions have been formed during acquisition, providing 
equivalence instructions does not change or strengthen the effect of the initial 
propositions. 
Experiment 3 
 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to test assumption that the impact of the 
initial relational information is bigger on implicit evaluation than on explicit 
evaluation. Five groups of participants experienced a series of pairings of CSs and 
USs. Two out of five groups received congruent pre- and post-pairings 
instructions (i.e., Equivalence-Equivalence, Opposition-Opposition), whereas 
other two groups received incongruent instructions (i.e., Equivalence-Opposition, 
Opposition-Equivalence). A fifth control group received no relational 
information. After instructions and pairings were presented, implicit and explicit 
evaluation of the CSs were measured. 
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Method 
 
Participants. A total of 524 English-speaking volunteers (mean age = 
32.45, 65.5 % women) participated online in the experiment that was posted on 
the website of Project Implicit (http://implicit.harvard.edu).  
Materials. Learning phase.  As in the first two studies, the learning 
phase consisted of pairings of stimuli and of verbal instructions. The stimuli used 
as CSs were the nonwords “LAAPIAN” and “NIFFIAN”, whereas the stimuli used 
as USs were the English words “HAPPY” (USpos) and “UGLY” (USneg). The CSpos 
was the CS paired with the positive US, and the CSneg was the CS paired with the 
negative US. Half of the participants were presented with the nonword 
“LAAPIAN” as CSpos and the nonword “NIFFIAN” as CSneg, and the reverse 
assignment was presented to the other half of the participants. Both CSs and USs 
were presented in white, capital letters on, respectively, the center-left and the 
center-right of a black screen, in 30pt Arial font. The verbal instructions were 
written in black, 18pt Arial font, presented on a white page.  
Implicit association test. The IAT employed in this experiment was 
identical to that used in the previous experiments. 
Explicit valence ratings. Participants rated their liking of each of the CSs 
with the same scale as used in the previous experiments.  
Procedure. The cover story presented to the participants was identical 
to that of Experiments 1 and 2. Equivalence instructions implied that the Turkish 
and the English words being paired were synonyms, hence participants had to 
assume that they had the same meaning. Conversely, opposition instructions 
implied that the Turkish and English words being paired were antonyms, and 
therefore participants had to assume that they had the opposite meaning. After 
reading the initial instructions, participants could move to the following stage by 
pressing a key. The second phase consisted of six pairings of the CSpos and the 
USpos and six pairings of the CSneg and the USneg. In addition, the point in time 
at which specific relational instructions were presented, that is, before or after 
the pairings, was manipulated. In our manipulation, we fully crossed the type of 
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the first relational information (Equivalence vs. Opposition) and the type of the 
second relational information (Equivalence vs. Opposition), resulting in four 
different conditions (Equivalence-Equivalence, Equivalence-Opposition, 
Opposition-Equivalence, Opposition-Opposition) between participants. For 
example, a participant in condition Equivalence-Opposition learned (1) that the 
CSs have the same meaning as the USs they are paired with, (2) experience the 
CS-US pairings, and (3) learn that the CSs were actually opposite in meaning to 
the USs they were paired with, and that hence the initial instructions were 
incorrect. In addition, a condition No instructions, in which no relational 
information was shown either before or after the pairings adding up to a total of 
5 conditions. After the post pairings instructions were presented, participants 
performed implicit and explicit measures of evaluation for the CSs, of which, 
unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, the order was counterbalanced across 
participants. The counterbalancing of the order of the implicit-explicit evaluation 
measures was crucial to test our research question, as it allowed us to directly 
compare implicit and explicit evaluation. The implicit evaluation was measured 
with an IAT. Explicit evaluation was measured by a question.  
 
Results 
Implicit-explicit evaluations comparison. The main aim of Experiment 3 
was to compare the relative impact of the first vs. second proposition on implicit 
and explicit evaluations. In order to allow for the crucial comparison of the two 
types of evaluation, scores for implicit and explicit evaluation were z-
transformed. Then, a 2 (type of evaluation: implicit vs. explicit) x 2 (pre-
instructions: equivalence vs. opposition) x 2 (post-instructions: equivalence vs. 
opposition) ANOVA was administered. For the IAT, the raw scores were 
calculated using the D2-algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, positive scores indicate an implicit or explicit preference for 
the CSpos over the CSneg, that is, a preference for the conditioned stimuli in line 
with the valence of the unconditioned stimuli they co-occurred with.  
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The main effect of type of evaluation was not significant, F(1, 391) = .04, 
ns, whereas the interaction between type of evaluation and pre-instruction was 
significant, F(1, 391) = 8.03, p < .01, partial η
2 
= 0.02, as well as the interaction 
between type of instructions and post-instructions, F(1, 391) = 12.07, p = .001, 
partial η
2 
= 0.03. However, the three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 
391) = 0.20, p = ns.  
In order to unravel the crucial two-way interactions we conducted a 
series of t-tests. The analysis showed that, when averaged across post-
instruction condition, implicit evaluation was significantly influenced by the 
relation implied in the pre-instructions (Equivalence, M = 0.12, SD = 1.00; 
Opposition, M = -0.33, SD = 0.94), t(401) = 4.54, p < .001, d = 0.45. In line with 
our predictions, this effect was not present for explicit evaluation (Equivalence, 
M = -0.04, SD = 0.98; Opposition, M = -0.14, SD = 1.05), t(410) = 1.05, p = .29, d = 
0.10. We used a similar test also to check the effect of the post-instructions. 
Implicit evaluation was significantly influenced by the content of post-
instructions, (Equivalence, M = 0.03, SD = 1.03; Opposition, M = -0.23, SD = 0.95), 
t(401) = 2.59, p = .01, d = 0.26. The effect of post-instructions on explicit 
evaluation had the same direction but was more outspoken (Equivalence, M = 
0.24, SD = 0.88; Opposition, M = -0.42, SD = 1.04), t(410) = 6.91, p < .001, d = 
0.69.  
Implicit evaluation. IAT data from 25 participants were excluded (4.8%) 
because of too high error rates (greater than 40% in a single block or greater 
than 30% overall). The resulting sample consisted of 499 participants. The 
counterbalancing of the order in which implicit and explicit measures were 
presented did not appear to have an effect on implicit evaluation, F(1, 402) = 
1.17, p = .28. Overall, the IAT score was positive (M = 0.18, SD = 0.56), and 
significantly different from zero, t(498) = 7.04, p < .001, d = 0.32.This result 
shows an overall implicit evaluation of the CSs in line with the valence of their 
co-occurrences. In order to unravel the effect of the pre- and post- pairings 
instructions and their different relational content (equivalence vs. opposition 
relations), we conducted a 2 (pre-instructions: equivalence vs. opposition) X 2 
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(post-instructions: equivalence vs. opposition) ANOVA. The main effect of pre-
instructions was significant, F(1, 402) = 22.27, p < .001, partial η
2 
= 0.04. 
Participants who received equivalence instructions prior to the pairings showed 
an implicit liking (M = 0.24, SD = 0.57) in line with the co-occurrences, and this 
value was significantly different from zero, t(208) = 6.17, p < .001, d = 0.42. 
Conversely, participants who received opposition pre-instructions showed no 
implicit preference (M = -0.01, SD = 0.53) for any of the CSs, t(193) = -0.17, p = 
.86, d = 0.02. The main effect of post-instructions was also significant, F(1, 402) = 
8.38, p < .01, partial η
2 
= 0.02. Participants who received post-pairings 
equivalence instructions showed a liking in line with the valence of the co-
occurrences (M = 0.19, SD = 0.58), and this value was significantly different from 
zero, t(207) = 4.77, p < .001, d = 0.33. On the other hand, those who received 
opposition post-pairings instructions did not show an implicit preference for any 
of the CSs (M = 0.05, SD = 0.54), t(194) = 1.25, p = .21, d = 0.09. The interaction 
between pre- and post-pairings instructions was not significant, F(3, 402) = 0.21, 
p = .65.  
Participants in condition No instructions showed a positive IAT score (M = 
0.41, SD = 0.50), that reflects an implicit preference in line with the valence 
implied by the co-occurrences, t(95) = 7.98, p < .001, d = 0.82 . Contrast tests 
were used to compare the IAT score in condition No instructions with those of 
the other four experimental conditions. Except for the Equivalence-Equivalence 
condition, all other conditions significantly differed from the No instructions 
condition in terms of the IAT score. Means of the IAT scores and results of the 
contrast test for all five conditions can be found in Table 1. 
 Explicit evaluation. Data of 13 participants (2.5%), who did rate one or 
both of the CSs, were excluded from the analyses, which left us with a sample of 
511 participants. The counterbalancing of the order in which implicit and explicit 
measures were presented had also no effect on explicit evaluation, F(1, 511) = 
1.96, p = .16. Overall, the explicit evaluation score was positive (M = 0.40, SD = 
2.39), and significantly different from zero, t(510) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 0.17. 
Participants explicitly evaluated the CSpos more positively than the CSneg. To 
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test the effect of the type of relational information and of the timing of its 
availability, we conducted a 2 (pre-instructions: equivalence vs. opposition) X 2 
(post-instructions: equivalence vs. opposition) ANOVA. The main effect of pre-
instructions was not significant, F(1, 408) = 2.22, p = .14. Analyzing the conditions 
separately, however, showed that participants who received equivalence pre-
instructions evaluated the CSpos significantly more positively than the CSneg (M 
= 0.32, SD = 2.35), t(216) = 1.99, p < .05, d = 0.14. This difference was not 
significant for participants who received opposition pre-instructions (M = 0.07, 
SD = 2.51), t(194) = 0.37, p = .71. The main effect of post-instructions was 
significant, F(1, 408) = 48.73, p < .001, partial η
2 
= 0.11. Participants who received 
equivalence post-instructions evaluated the CSpos more positively than the 
CSneg (M = 0.97, SD = 2.10), t(209) = 6.68, p < .001, d = 0.46, whereas those who 
received opposition post-instructions evaluated the CSneg to be more positive 
than the CSpos (M = -0.62, SD = 2.49), t(201) = -3.42, p < .01, d = 0.21. The 
interaction between pre-instructions and post-instructions was not significant, 
F(1, 408) < 1, ns. Finally, participants in condition No instructions showed an 
explicit evaluation of the CSs in line with the valence of the CS-US co-occurrences 
(M = 1.24, SD = 2.03), t(98) = 6.10, p < .001, d = 0.61. A contrast test compared 
the explicit evaluation score in condition No instructions with those of the other 
four experimental conditions. Except for the Equivalence-Equivalence condition 
and of the Opposition-Equivalence condition, scores for all other conditions 
significantly differed from the No instructions condition. Means of the explicit 
evaluation scores and results of the contrast test for all five conditions can be 
found in Table 2. Implicit and explicit evaluation scores were significantly 
correlated, r = .30, p = .01. 
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Table 1. Means (and standard errors) of the implicit and explicit evaluation 
scores, and the results of contrasts test with the condition No Instructions, 
Experiment 3. 
Instructions Implicit 
evaluation 
Explicit 
evaluation 
Contrast: 
Implicit 
evaluation 
Contrast: 
Explicit 
evaluation 
Equivalence-
Equivalence 
0.31 (0.59)** 1,12 (1,92)** t(494) = -1.29, 
 p = .20 
t(506) = -0.38, 
p = .71 
Equivalence- 
Opposition 
0.18 (0.54)** -0.44 (2,47) t(494) = -3.05, 
 p < .01 
t(506) = -5.42, 
p < .001 
Opposition- 
Equivalence 
0.08 (0.55) 0.81 (2,26)** t(494) = -4.35, 
 p < .001 
t(506) = -1.38, 
p = .17 
Opposition- 
Opposition 
-0.11 (0.50)* -0.80 (2,51)** t(494) = -6.49, 
 p < .001 
t(506) = -6.24, 
p < .001 
- (No 
instructions) 
0.41 (0.50)** 1,24 (2,03)** - - 
* significantly different from zero at the .05 level 
** significantly different from zero at the .01 level 
 
 
Discussion 
Aim of Experiment 3 was to examine the assumption that when two 
conflicting proposition are formed one after the other, the first proposition 
would more strongly influence implicit evaluation than explicit evaluation and, 
vice versa, that the second proposition would have a bigger impact on explicit 
than on implicit evaluation. In line with this idea, our results showed that the 
type of relation implied in the pre-pairings instructions influenced implicit 
evaluation but not explicit evaluation whereas the effect of post-pairings 
instructions was significant for both implicit and explicit evaluation but bigger for 
explicit than for implicit evaluations. Another striking result was that implicit 
evaluations in the no instruction condition paralleled those in the equivalence-
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equivalence condition but differed from those in the other conditions. This 
finding confirms the conclusion of Experiment 2 that equivalence instructions 
seem to add little to the effect of actual CS-US pairings.  
 
General Discussion 
 
Across three experiments, we examined the impact of relational 
information on EC of implicit evaluations. Experiment 1 provided a conceptual 
replication of the key study of Peters and Gawronski (2011, Study 3). Participants 
were presented with two nonwords (CSs), each paired six times with either a 
positive word (USpos) or a negative word (USneg). Either before or after the CS-
US pairing, opposition instructions were presented that indicated that the 
nonword had a meaning that was the opposite of the word it was paired with. An 
IAT and rating measures were administered after the learning phase to capture 
implicit and explicit evaluations, respectively. Most importantly, results showed 
that the time at which opposition instructions were presented, influenced the 
implicit evaluation of the CSs. In particular, participants showed an implicit 
preference for the negatively paired stimuli (thus opposite to the valence implied 
by the mere co-occurrences) when opposition instructions were presented 
before the pairings, replicating Peters and Gawronski’s findings in their short-
delay condition. When opposition instructions were presented after the pairings, 
no implicit preference was found for one over the other CS. Therefore, 
confirming the conclusions of Peters and Gawronski’s, (1) relational information 
influences implicit evaluations (2) but more so when the relational information is 
presented before rather than after the CS-US pairings. 
Our results do not only confirm the robustness and generality of the 
findings of Peters and Gawronski, they also show for the first time that the 
observed effects of relational information are driven primarily by opposition 
instructions rather than equivalence instructions. In both Experiments 2 and 3, 
implicit evaluations in a baseline condition without equivalence or opposition 
instructions paralleled those in a condition with only equivalence instructions but 
THE IMPACT OF RELATIONAL INFORMATION ON IMPLICIT EVALUATION 133 
  
differed from those in conditions with opposition instructions. Regardless of the 
mental representations that mediate the effect of relational information on 
implicit evaluations, our findings suggest that equivalence instructions add little 
to the effect of merely observing CS-US pairings. Opposition instructions, on the 
other hand, can overrule the effect of CS-US pairings when presented before or 
during the pairings or reduce the effect of CS-US pairings when presented after 
the CS-US pairings.  
A second aim of this series of experiments was to test a post-hoc 
propositional explanation of the findings of Peters and Gawronski (2011). With 
Experiments 2 and 3 we tested the validity of two assumptions that must be 
made by propositional models in order to explain their results. 
Experiment 2 tested the first assumption, being that the mere co-
occurrence of a CS and a US is perceived as a cue that indicates the equivalence 
of the two stimuli. We aimed at changing this spontaneous framing by presenting 
participants with a pre-training phase that contained three training series of 
nonword-words pairs. Each of the three training series was followed by 
opposition instructions, in order to recreate an environment in which the co-
occurrence of two stimuli would be interpreted as a cue that actually indicated 
that the two stimuli had an opposite meaning and, consequently, an opposite 
valence. Later, a test series of the actual CS-US pairs was presented, followed 
either by opposition instructions (condition Opposition instructions), equivalence 
instructions (condition Equivalence instructions) or no instructions (condition No 
instructions). Contrary to our predictions, the results of Experiment 2 showed a 
standard EC effect in conditions Equivalence instructions and No instructions, in 
spite of the relational framing implied by the context represented through the 
three training series. As in Experiment 1, Opposition instructions merely 
attenuated but did not significantly reverse the implicit preference of the CSpos 
over the CSneg. The results of Experiment 2 therefore do not provide support for 
a post-hoc propositional account of the results of Peters and Gawronski (2011). 
One could argue, however, that we did not succeed in our attempt to change the 
default interpretation of co-occurrence as a cue for equivalence. Perhaps the 
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pre-training phase that aimed to change the default interpretation was not long 
enough or participants did not see the pre-training phase as relevant for the 
events during the actual CS-US pairings. Unfortunately, we did not have an 
independent way to verify whether our pre-training phase had the desired 
effect. Despite the fact that the results of Experiment 2 were inconclusive with 
regard to the validity of the post-hoc propositional account, the results of 
Experiment 2 again replicated the most important findings of Peters and 
Gawronksi (2011) and showed for the first time that equivalence instructions add 
little to the effect of CS-US pairings.  
In Experiment 3, we aimed at testing a second assumption of the post-hoc 
propositional account, namely that in a context in which two conflicting 
propositions are generated, the initial proposition has a stronger impact on 
implicit evaluation than on explicit evaluation. To this end, we presented 
participants with CS-US pairings that were preceded and followed by instructions 
describing the relation occurring between each CS-US pair. The relation could 
either be of equivalence (i.e., the CS is a synonym of the US) or opposition (i.e., 
the CS is an antonym of the US), thus creating two conditions with consistent 
instructions (equivalence-equivalence and opposition-opposition) and two 
conditions with inconsistent instructions (equivalence-opposition and 
opposition-equivalence). In addition, we implemented a control condition in 
which no instructions were shown. After the acquisition phase, implicit and 
explicit evaluations were measured. The order of the measures was 
counterbalanced across participants, to allow for a comparison between implicit 
and explicit evaluation. In line with our predictions, initial instructions had a 
bigger impact on implicit than on explicit evaluations. Post-hoc tests showed that 
implicit evaluations were in line with the initial relational information whereas 
explicit evaluations were not in line with this information. Assuming that the two 
pieces of relational information (before and after pairings) led to two conflicting 
propositions, our results thus support the idea that, compared to explicit 
evaluations, implicit evaluations are influenced more by the initial proposition 
than by the proposition that is formed afterwards. This result is in line with the 
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previous findings of Gregg et al. (2006), who found implicit evaluation to be 
affected only by the first information received, and, unlike explicit evaluation, to 
be unaffected by a conflicting second piece of information. However, our 
findings go beyond those of Gregg et al. in several ways. Most importantly, 
whereas Gregg always presented equivalence information as the first 
information, we also had conditions in which opposition instructions were 
presented first. Our results show that the first relational information has a bigger 
impact on implicit than on explicit information irrespective of whether the first 
information implied equivalence or opposition. Unlike Gregg et al., we can 
therefore conclude that the crucial variable is the order in which relational 
information is presented, rather than the type of relational information 
(equivalence or opposition) that is presented.  
Our findings impose important constraints on mental process models of 
(changes in) evaluation. In line with the findings of Peters and Gawronski (2011), 
we found that (1) implicit evaluations are sensitive to relational information (2) 
but more so when the relational information is provided before the CS-US 
pairings than after the CS-US pairings. As we explained in the introduction, these 
findings force all existing mental process models into adopting certain core 
assumptions. Our findings impose at least two additional constraints on these 
models: (1) Equivalence information adds little to the effect of CS-US pairings 
whereas opposition instructions counteract the effect of pairings; (2) When two 
conflicting pieces of relational information are encountered one after the other, 
the initial piece of information will have more impact on implicit than on explicit 
evaluations, regardless of whether the initial information implies equivalence or 
opposition. We will now address how association formation models, 
propositional models, and dual process models can deal with the latter two 
findings.  
Single process association formation models could accommodate the first 
conclusion if it is assumed that equivalence information allows for association 
formation whereas opposition information blocks association formation. 
However, such an explanation would not be able to explain the reverse EC effect 
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after opposition instructions as, for instance, found in Experiment 1 (condition 
Before). This reversed effect could not simply be explained by an absence of 
association formation as such. It could, however, be explained if it is assumed 
that associations are formed in line with the mental encoding of events. Simple 
pairings or equivalence instructions would then lead to mental encoding in line 
with equivalence and thus to associations between the CS representations and 
US representation. Opposition pairings would lead to different a mental 
encoding and thus association between CS representation and the 
representation of a US which means the opposite of the presented US. However, 
such a process would also imply the existence of a propositional system that 
guides the mental encoding. With regard to the second conclusion (i.e., first 
information has more impact on implicit than explicit evaluation), one could 
argue that associations that are formed first have a bigger impact on implicit 
than on explicit evaluation. Regardless of the merits of these post-hoc 
assumptions, it is clear that our findings do not fit well with and severely 
constrain single process association formation models.  
Dual process models can account for the first assumption in the same way 
as the single model-associative models. In fact, because dual process models 
allow for the existence of a propositional system, they fit well with the idea that 
CS-US associations are formed according to the valence implied by the mental 
(i.e., propositional) encoding of the events (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2011). Regarding the second assumption, a dual process account could argue 
that the first relational information leads to a certain encoding of the pairings 
that results in association formation. In addition, one must assume that the 
second relational information presented has little or no effect at the level of 
associations. Thus, the initially formed associations are the basis of implicit 
evaluation, and implicit measures show effects in line with them. Conversely, the 
impact of the initially formed associations is smaller on explicit evaluation 
because it is based mainly on propositional processes that can change (and even 
reverse) in content and thus cancel or reverse the effect of the first relational 
information. 
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Finally, single process propositional models postulate that changes in 
evaluation are based only on the formation of mental propositions. These 
models can explain the fact that equivalence information adds little to the 
effects of CS-US co-occurrences whereas opposition information can counteract 
those effects. The crucial assumption in this context is that stimulus co-
occurrences are by default (i.e., in the absence of conflicting relational 
information) interpreted as a cue that indicates similarity between the co-
occurring stimuli. Hence, in the case of equivalence instructions, instructions and 
CS-US pairings lead to the similar proposition (e.g., CS is similar to the US). 
Equivalence instructions therefore add little to the effect of CS-US pairings. 
Opposition instructions, on the other hand, do lead to a different proposition 
(i.e., CS is opposite to US) than CS-US pairings (i.e., CS is similar to US). 
Depending on which proposition is formed first, opposition instructions can 
therefore counteract the effect of CS-US pairings. Regarding the second 
assumption, it is possible that the firstly formed proposition has a stronger 
influence on implicit than on explicit evaluation. This effect could be due to the 
fact that only the firstly formed proposition can be retrieved automatically (e.g., 
because it has been practiced more often), whereas propositions that are 
formed afterwards are less likely to be retrieved in an automatic manner. This 
hypothesis can be tested by manipulating the probability of automatic retrieval 
of a proposition independently from the time at which the proposition was 
formed. 
To conclude, our results replicate and extend the intriguing findings of 
Peters and Gawronski (2011). In doing so, they impose important constraints on 
current and future models of EC and implicit evaluation.  
138  CHAPTER 3 
 
References 
 
De Houwer, J. (2007). A conceptual and theoretical analysis of evaluative 
conditioning. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 10, 230-241. 
http://www.ucm.es/info/psi/docs/journal/ 
De Houwer, J. (2009). The propositional approach to associative learning as an 
alternative for association formation models. Learning & Behavior, 37, 1-
20. doi: 10.3758/LB.37.1.1 
De Houwer, J., Hermans, D., & Eelen, P. (1998). Affective and identity priming 
with episodically associated stimuli, Cognition and emotion, 12, 145-169. 
doi: 10.1080/026999398379691 
De Houwer, J., Thomas, S., & Baeyens, F. (2001). Associative learning of likes and 
dislikes: A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative 
conditioning. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 853–869. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.127.6.853 
De Houwer, J. & Vandorpe, S. (2010). Using the Implicit Association Test as a 
measure of causal learning does not eliminate effects of rule learning. 
Experimental Psychology, 57, 2010, 61-67. doi: 10.1027/1618-
3169/a000008 
De Houwer, J., Gawronski, B., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2012). A functional-cognitive 
framework for attitude research. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Fiedler, K., & Unkelbach, C. (2011). Evaluative conditioning depends on higher 
order cognitive processes. Cognition & Emotion, 25, 639-656. doi: 
10.1080/02699931.2010.513497 
Gawronski, B. & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional 
processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit 
attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692–731. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.132.5.692 
THE IMPACT OF RELATIONAL INFORMATION ON IMPLICIT EVALUATION 139 
  
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2011). The associative-propositional 
evaluation model: Theory, evidence, and open questions. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 59-127. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-
385522-0.00002-0 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.74.6.1464 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using 
the Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 197-216. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.85.2.197 
Gregg, A. P., Seibt, B., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). Easier done than undone: 
Asymmetry in the malleability of implicit preferences. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 1-20. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.90.1.1 
Han, H. A., Czellar, S., Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2010). Malleability of attitudes 
or malleability of the IAT? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 
286-298. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.11.011 
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (Eds.). (2001). Relational Frame 
Theory: A Post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New 
York: Plenum Press. 
Hermans, D., Baeyens, F., & Eelen, P. (2003). On the acquisition and activation of 
evaluative information in memory: The study of evaluative learning and 
affective priming combined (pp. 139-168). In J. Musch & K. C. Klauer 
(Eds.), The psychology of evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and 
emotion. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Hofmann, W., De Houwer, J., Perugini, M., Baeyens, F., & Crombez, G. (2010). 
Evaluative conditioning in humans: A meta-analysis. Psychological 
Bulletin, 136, 390-421. doi: 10.1037/a0018916 
140  CHAPTER 3 
 
Hughes, S., Barnes-Holmes, D., & De Houwer, J. (2011). The dominance of 
associative theorising in implicit attitude research: Propositional and 
behavioral alternatives. Psychological Record, 61, 465–496. 
http://thepsychologicalrecord.siuc.edu/  
Lagnado, D. A., Waldmann, M. R., Hagmayer, Y. & Sloman, S. A. (2007) Beyond 
covariation: Cues to causal structure. In A. Gopnik & L. Schulz (Eds.), 
Causal learning: Psychology, philosophy, and computation, (pp. 154–72). 
Oxford University Press. 
Melchers, K. G., Lachnit, H., & Shanks, D. R. (2004). Within-compound 
associations in retrospective revaluation and in direct learning: A 
challenge for comparator theory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 57B, 25-53. doi: 10.1080/02724990344000042 
Mitchell, C. J., De Houwer, J., & Lovibond, P. F. (2009). The propositional nature 
of human associative learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 183-
198. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X09000855 
Moran, T. & Bar-Anan, Y. (2012). The effect of object-valence relations on 
automatic evaluation. Cognition and Emotion, 1-10. doi: 
10.1080/02699931.2012.732040 
Olson, M., & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the Influence of Extrapersonal 
Associations on the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. 
Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 86(5), 653-667, doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.653 
Peters, K. R., Gawronski, B. (2011). Are We Puppets on a String? Comparing the 
Impact of Contingency and Validity on Implicit and Explicit Evaluations. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bullettin, 37 (4), 557-569. doi: 
10.1177/0146167211400423 
Rydell, R. J., & McConnell, A. R. (2006). Understanding implicit and explicit 
attitude change: A systems of reasoning analysis. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 91, 995-1008. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.995 
THE IMPACT OF RELATIONAL INFORMATION ON IMPLICIT EVALUATION 141 
  
Smith, C. T., De Houwer, J., & Nosek, B. A. (in press). Consider the source: 
Persuasion of implicit evaluations is moderated by source credibility. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 
Unkelbach, C., Förderer, S., & Stahl, C. (2012). Changing CS features alters 
evaluative responses in evaluative conditioning. Learning & Motivation, 
43, 127-134. doi: 10.1016/j.lmot.2012.04.003 
Zanon, R., De Houwer, J., & Gast, A. (2012). Context effects in evaluative 
conditioning of implicit evaluations. Learning and Motivation, 43, 155-
165. doi: 10.1016/j.lmot.2012.02.003 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF START AND STOP RELATIONS ON 
EVALUATIVE CONDITIONING EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT 
EVALUATION 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
This study was conducted in collaboration with Jan De Houwer and Anne Gast
4 CHAPTER 
144  CHAPTER 4 
Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapters, we have investigated the impact of relational 
information on evaluative conditioning effects (EC). EC is defined as the change 
in liking of a stimulus (named conditioned stimulus or CS) that is due to its 
pairing with another stimulus (named unconditioned stimulus or US; De Houwer, 
2007; for reviews see De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; 
Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Levey & Martin, 
1975). Relational information is contained by any type of cue that indicates how 
events in the world are related. In our work, we have focused on two types of 
relations: a relation of equivalence, which implies that two events share certain 
features, and a relation of opposition which implies that two events have 
opposing values on certain dimensions . A number of experiments reported in 
the previous chapters, as well as in the literature (Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2011; 
Förderer & Unkelbach, 2012; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Zanon, De Houwer, & 
Gast, 2012) demonstrated that relational information can moderate EC, even 
when changes in implicit evaluation are registered.  
Moran and Bar-Anan (2012), however, recently reported a result that 
diverges from the majority of the previous research. In two experiments, they 
showed that opposite relational information influenced explicit evaluation but 
not implicit evaluation. Their manipulation consisted of the presentation of four 
CSs (CS1, CS2, CS3, and CS4). Each CS was presented either at the beginning or at 
the end of the reproduction of a sound that could be pleasant (USpos) or 
aversive (USneg). Two of the four CSs co-occurred with a USpos (CSpos) and two 
co-occurred with a USneg (CSneg). More specifically, in their design, CS1 was 
always presented at the beginning of the USpos and CS2 at its end. In addition, 
CS3 was always presented at the beginning of the USneg and CS4 at its end. 
Importantly, the CSs that were presented before the sounds were said to cause 
the start of the sounds whereas the CSs that were presented after the sounds 
were said to stop the sounds. Hence, the instructions provided information 
about how the CSs and USs were related.  
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According to Moran and Bar-Anan, the implications of such a mix of co-
occurrences and relational information for the transfer of valence between CSs 
and USs could be twofold depending on the impact of relational information. If 
relational information matters, then the changes in valence for the CSs that 
precede the USs would be opposite to the changes in valence for the CSs that 
followed the USs. More specifically, whereas the CS that start good sounds (CS1) 
should be liked more than the CS that start bad sounds (CS3), the CS that stops 
good sounds (CS2) should be liked less than the CS that stops bad sounds (CS4). 
If, however, relational information does not matter, both CSs that co-occur with 
the good sound (i.e., CS1 and CS3) should be liked more than the CSs that co-
occur with the bad sound (i.e., CS2 and CS4) regardless of whether the CSs start 
or stop the sound. Importantly, both explicit and implicit evaluations of the four 
CSs were assessed. Implicit evaluations were capture either by a standard 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or by a 
Sorting Paired Features task (SPF; Bar-Anan, Nosek; & Vianello, 2009).  
The results of their explicit evaluation ratings showed that the CS that 
started a USpos (CS1) was liked more than the CS that started a USneg (CS3).In 
addition, the CS that ended a USneg (CS4) was liked more than the CS that ended 
a USpos (CS2). This result indeed reflects an impact of relational information on 
explicit evaluation, because it shows that, depending on the implied CS-US 
relation (start or stop), the CS-US pairings produced different explicit evaluation 
effects. The implicit measures, however, showed always a relative preference for 
the CSs that co-occurred with the USpos, regardless of whether it was presented 
at the start or the end of the US. Importantly, this standard EC effect of implicit 
evaluations (CSpos liked more than the CSneg) was found even for the stopping 
CSs. If relational information would have had an impact on implicit evaluation, 
one should have observed a moderation of the effect of the CS-US pairings on 
implicit evaluation by the type of relational information, that is, a different EC 
effect for the starting and stopping CSs.  
Moran and Bar-Anan (2012) interpreted their results as strong support for 
the Associative-Propositional Evaluation model (APE, Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006). The APE model is a dual process model that postulates that implicit 
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evaluation is based on associations in memory whereas explicit evaluation is 
based on a combination of associations and propositions. Associations are 
conceived of as simple links between mental representations that are formed 
after repeated pairings of stimuli whereas propositions are qualified links that 
hold a truth value and can also represent relational information. Because only 
propositions contain relational information and propositions influence only 
explicit evaluations, the APE model indeed predicts that relational information 
will impact only on explicit evaluations but not implicit evaluations, as was 
observed by Moran and Bar-Anan. In particular, according to the APE model, CS-
US co-occurrences lead to the formation of mental associations regardless of 
whether participants were told that a CS started or stopped the US. These 
mental associations then determine implicit evaluations. Explicit evaluation, on 
the other hand, are assumed to be determined not only by these associations 
but also by propositions that do contain relational information.  
Moran and Bar-Anan, however, did not completely rule out a purely 
propositional explanation of their findings. Propositional models (De Houwer, 
2009; Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009) postulate that every source of 
information about the relation between stimuli can be encoded in propositions, 
including information about mere co-occurrences of stimuli. For instance, for 
CS2, participants might have formed both the proposition “CS2 co-occurred with 
the good sound” and the proposition “CS2 ended the good sound”. Likewise, for 
CS4, participants might have learned that “CS4 co-occurred with the bad sound” 
and “CS4 ended the bad sound”. If, for some reason, only the propositions about 
co-occurrence are retrieved during a measure, even a propositional model could 
explain that CS2 would be liked more than CS4. Therefore Moran and Bar-Anan’s 
results could be due to the effect of co-occurrence information that has been 
mentally represented in form of propositions, and not necessarily in form of 
associations. However, in order to take serious such a post-hoc propositional 
account, this account needs to make novel predictions that can be verified 
empirically. One such prediction is that interventions that increase the 
probability that participants (a) do from propositions that contain more than co-
occurrence information (e.g., “CS2 stops a good sound”) and (b) do retrieve 
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these propositions during the (implicit) measure, should increase the probability 
that (implicit) evaluations are determined by the information which specifies the 
type of relation between the stimuli (i.e., starting or stopping).  
In the present chapter, we report a study that was inspired by this 
prediction. We examined whether an impact of stop/start relational information 
on implicit evaluation could be obtained with the paradigm used by Moran and 
Bar-Anan when their design is modified in two, in our opinion crucial, ways. First, 
it is possible that in the original study of Moran and Bar-Anan, participants were 
not optimally encouraged to encode relational information. In their pre-pairings 
instructions (see Appendix 1), Moran and Bar-Anan instructed the participants 
that they would hear a series of human and musical sounds. Furthermore, they 
added that, in order to clearly separate the reproduction of two consecutive 
sounds, also a ticking noise would be presented during the break in between the 
sounds. In addition, they instructed participants that also four families of 
creatures would be presented, parallel to the sounds. The families, which 
corresponded to the CSs, were described as differing from each other, by their 
color and head’s shape. Each family was presented as having a specific role in 
stopping and starting the sounds, but in the final part of the instructions, the 
families were again described as simply appearing at the beginning or at the end 
of the sound fragments. Although these instructions do provide specific 
relational information about starting and stopping, they also emphasizes co-
occurrence and might thus not convey the start/stop relational information in an 
optimal way. This conclusion is in line with the fact that even for the explicit 
evaluations, the reversed EC effect for CS2 and CS4 (i.e., the CSs that stopped the 
sounds) was much smaller than the standard EC effect for CS1 and CS3 (i.e., the 
CSs that started the sound). Although the presence of a reversed EC effect for 
CS2 and CS4 demonstrates that participants did encode the start/stop relational 
information to some extent, it is possible that the level or degree of encoding of 
this information was not sufficient to also influence implicit evaluations. For this 
reason, in our replication we employed slightly different instructions (see 
Appendix 2), in which the role and the responsibility of each CS in the starting 
and stopping of the USs were particularly and consistently emphasized. Unlike 
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Moran and Bar-Anan’s, our instructions never referred to the CSs as co-occurring 
with the USs. Conversely, our instructions consistently stated that each family of 
creatures (CSs) determined the start and the end of each sound. This information 
was repeated several times, and emphasized using capital letters. This way, we 
aimed at clearly conveying the importance of the CS-US relation in the encoding 
of the CSs. 
The second important modification of Moran and Bar-Anan’s original 
design was the use of a personalized Implicit Association Test (personalized IAT; 
Olson & Fazio, 2004) as implicit measure of evaluation. In their two experiments, 
Moran and Bar-Anan employed a standard IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and a SPF 
(Bar-Anan et al., 2009) and found consistent results across the two implicit 
measures. The personalized IAT differs from the standard IAT (and also from the 
SPF) in that it requires the participants to give non-normative responses to the 
attributes presented. Positive and negative attributes have to be categorized 
using the labels I LIKE and I DO NOT LIKE, and no error feedback for the 
categorization of the attributes is presented. Hence, the personalized IAT 
encourages participants to respond according to their personal evaluations. 
Conversely, in a standard IAT and in an SPF attributes have to be categorized 
according to the normative labels POSITIVE and NEGATIVE, and an error signal 
appears in case of wrong categorization responses. Hence, the standard IAT 
requires responding in terms of what people in general like or dislike.  
Han, Czellar, Olson, and Fazio (2009) have argued that the personalized 
IAT, compared to the standard IAT, is less sensitive to extrapersonal associations, 
that is, associations based on information that may be inconsistent with people’s 
personal attitudes. Across three experiments, they found that the results of a 
standard IAT were susceptible to momentary contextual influences (induced by a 
previous, unrelated task) and that this influence disappeared when the labels 
were changed from normative (POSITIVE vs. NEGATIVE) to personalized (I LIKE vs. 
I DO NOT LIKE). In their Experiment 2, participants had been presented with a 
short scenario describing that, in a post nuclear world, flowers had actually 
become venomous (and therefore unpleasant) and insects had become the only 
edible items available (and therefore pleasant). In an IAT that followed this 
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manipulation they found a preference for insects over flowers (in line with the 
post-nuclear scenario), whereas in an personalized IAT they found the typical 
preference for flowers over insects. Han and colleagues concluded that the 
results of the standard IAT can be particularly malleable, and thus can be easily 
distorted by unrelated information (e.g., a previous task). They also concluded 
that the personalization of the labels (i.e., the use of a personalized IAT) led to 
results that can be considered more in line with people’s personal attitudes.  
Although Han and colleagues’ conclusions regard extrapersonal 
associations, we argue that it is also plausible to assume that in Moran and Bar-
Anan’s paradigm the standard IAT may have simply picked up the effect of the 
information derived from the mere co-occurrences of stimuli. In other words, the 
IAT might have detected that participants knew that some CSs went together 
with good sounds whereas other CSs went together with bad sounds. If that is 
the case, then the IAT might not have detected the personal attitudes that 
participants had towards the CSs. For this reason, in our study, we used two 
personalized IATs (one for the two stopping CSs, and one for the two starting 
CSs), hoping that it would be more effective in also tapping in information 
deriving from the CS-US relations, and therefore providing an index of implicit 
evaluation that takes into account all learning instances. 
A third difference with the original Moran and Bar-Anan’s design regards 
the order of the implicit and explicit measures. One of their goals was to examine 
potential dissociations in implicit and explicit evaluation, and therefore they 
presented their implicit and explicit measures in an order that was 
counterbalanced across participants, to allow for they comparison. In our study, 
our main focus was on whether relational information could reverse EC of 
implicit evaluation because such a result would demonstrate that relational 
information does influence implicit evaluation. To this end, we always presented 
participants first with the implicit measure (the personalized IAT), and then with 
the explicit measure (the valence ratings). In particular, the personalized IAT 
designed to test implicit evaluation for the stopping CSs was always presented 
first, followed by the personalized IAT for the starting CSs. Greenwald, Nosek, 
and Banaji (2003) argued that, when more than one IAT are presented in a row, 
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the measurement effect in the first one of the series is larger, whereas those of 
the following IAT are smaller in magnitude. For this reason, we implemented this 
order to ensure an optimal measurement of the dependent variable in which we 
were most interested in, that is, the implicit evaluation of the oppositely related 
(stopping) CSs.  
 In sum, this experiment aimed at testing the moderation of relational 
information on implicit evaluation with a paradigm similar to the one used by 
Moran and Bar-Anan (2012). In our experiment, we adopted instructions that 
emphasize the salience of the CS-US relations (i.e., stop or start), and used 
another implicit measure, that is, the personalized IAT. We hypothesized that the 
start-CSpos would be implicitly liked more than the start-CSneg, but that implicit 
evaluation for the stop-CSs would be reversed (stop-CSneg liked more than the 
stop-CSpos). 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Forty-eight students at Ghent University participated. They either 
received course credits or four Euros (mean age = 20.70, SD = 3.38; 79% were 
women). 
 
Materials  
Acquisition phase. During the acquisition phase, sixteen color pictures of 
cartoon creatures (size 400 x 250 pixels) were employed as CSs, and presented 
on a white background. The creatures were said to belong to four families that 
differed in color (red, green, yellow and purple) and in the shape of their head 
(squared, rectangular, trapezoidal and circular). Each family was composed of 
four elements. In addition, the sound of a soft melody (presented in the 
instructions as a melody sound fragment) was employed as USpos, and the 
sound of a loud scream (presented in the instructions as a human sound 
fragment) was employed as USneg. Finally, as a cue that signaled the end of each 
trial, a ticking noise, was employed. All CSs, USs, and the ticking noises were 
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identical to those used by Moran and Bar-Anan (2012). All sounds were briefly 
described in the initial instructions, and actually played during the acquisition 
phase. The assignment of the CSs to the USs was counterbalanced across 
participants, as well as the assignment of the CSs to their relation (start or stop). 
The result of the counterbalancing was that green and red creatures always had 
the same relational role, either stop or start, and differed only in terms of the US 
(positive or negative) that co-occurred with each of them. The same 
counterbalancing principle applied to the purple and yellow creatures (same 
relational information, different US contingency). 
Personalized IAT. Two personalized IATs were presented, one that 
assessed the relative implicit valence of the stopping CSs, and one that assessed 
the relative implicit valence of the starting CSs. In the personalized IAT, the same 
color pictures employed as CSs in the acquisition phase were presented, and had 
to be categorized according to their color (green or red; yellow or purple). The 
target categories to be compared were those that held the same relational 
function. Therefore in one personalized IAT, purple and yellow creatures were 
compared, and in a second personalized IAT, green and red creatures were 
compared. For both personalized IATs, the likeable attributes were the Dutch 
words for “holiday” (VAKANTIE), “party” (FEEST), “present” (CADEAU) and 
“summer” (ZOMER). The dislikable attributes were the Dutch words for “war” 
(OORLOG), “vomit” (BRAAKSEL), “accident” (ONGELUK) and “divorce” 
(SCHEIDING). The target category labels were the Dutch words for “red 
creatures” (RODE WEZENS), “green creatures” (GROENE WEZENS), “yellow 
creatures”(GELE WEZENS), and “purple creatures” (PAARSE WEZENS). The labels 
for the attributes were the Dutch words for “I like” (HEB IK GRAAG) and “I do not 
like” (HEB IK NIET GRAAG). All attributes were presented in capital letters, black 
color, font Arial Black 48, on a white background. 
Explicit valence ratings. Participants were asked to rate on a 9-point 
Likert scale how pleasant they found one random exemplar for each of the four 
families of creatures. Participants could respond by selecting a value ranging 
from 1 (very unpleasant) to 9 (very pleasant). This measure was identical to that 
used by Moran and Bar-Anan (2012). 
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Manipulation check. Two manipulation checks were added at the end of 
the experimental procedure. First, participants had to indicate, for an exemplar 
member for each of the four families, presented in random order, whether it 
started or stopped a sound. Second, participants had to indicate, for an exemplar 
member for each of the four families, presented in random order, whether they 
had co-occurred with a human sound fragment (i.e., the negative US) or with a 
melody sound fragment (i.e., the positive US). Again this was identical to the 
manipulation check used by Moran and Bar-Anan (2012). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with an instruction page that explained their 
task. Unlike Moran and Bar-Anan’s instructions (see Appendix 1), the instructions 
we employed (see Appendix 2) emphasized consistently the role of each of the 
families in starting and stopping the sounds. The creatures were described as 
responsible for starting or stopping the reproduction of a specific sound, and not 
simply as co-occurring with the beginning and end of the sound. This way, we 
wanted to convey the message that the creatures were actually actors that 
influenced the experience of the pleasant and of the aversive sounds. The 
sounds were described as being either a human sound fragment (USneg) or a 
musical sound fragment (USpos). In order to ensure attention in the acquisition 
phase, the instructions also warned the participants that their memory about the 
events of the acquisition phase was going to be tested later in the experiment 
and that, in case of an insufficient performance, the acquisition phase would 
have to be repeated.  
After participants had read the instructions, they could proceed to the 
pairing phase by pressing a key. The pairing phase was identical to that used by 
Moran and Bar-Anan (2012) and consisted of a sequence of twenty trials. In each 
trial, a first creature (CS1 or CS3) appeared on the screen. After 500ms of silence, 
a sound (USpos or USneg) was played. The sound length could vary within 10000, 
15000, 20000, 25000 or 30000 ms. Each positive and negative sound was 
presented twice in every length, in random order, making a total of ten positive 
and ten negative sound reproductions (i.e., trials).The first creature stayed on 
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the screen for the first 2000 ms of the sound, after which it disappeared, leaving 
the screen blank. 2000 ms before the end of the sound, a second creature (CS2 
or CS4) appeared on the screen, and remained on the screen for a total of 2500 
ms, thus co-occurred with the sound for 2000ms and with silence for 500 ms. 
Between each trial, a ticking sound on a blank screen signaled the intertrial 
interval. The length of each intertrial interval was randomly determined, and 
could either last 5000, 10000, or 15000 ms. A first family of creatures would 
always start the positive sound (CS1), a second would always stop the positive 
sound (CS2), whereas a third would always start the negative sound (CS3) and a 
fourth would always stop the negative sound (CS4).  
After all twenty pairings were presented, a short instructions page 
reminded the participants that in the previous phase their task was to learn and 
remember which families started or stopped the sounds. Then participants 
performed the first personalized IAT, in which always the stopping families of 
creatures were presented. After the first personalized IAT, participants 
performed a second personalized IAT, in which the starting families of creatures 
were presented. We decided to present the personalized IAT for the stopping 
creatures always first because the effect of the relation “CS stops US” was crucial 
in determining the impact of relational information on implicit evaluation, given 
that it implies an effect in the opposite direction than the mere co-occurrences. 
The personalized IAT consisted of seven blocks. The first block consisted in an 
attribute discrimination phase, in which only likeable and dislikeable attributes 
were presented and had to be categorized. The second block consisted in a 
target discrimination phase, in which members of the stopping (starting) families 
of creatures were presented and had to be categorized according to their color. 
The third and fourth phases were two combined blocks, in which both attributes 
and targets were presented and had to be categorized. The fifth block was a 
reversed target discrimination phase, in which only the target creatures were 
presented, but their assignment to the left and right key was reversed. Finally, in 
the sixth and seventh blocks attributes and targets were presented again, but 
targets had reversed key assignments, in line with those of Block 5. The order of 
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the combined and reversed combined blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
After participants had completed the two personalized IATs, they 
performed the explicit valence ratings of four creatures, one per family, 
presented in random order. At the end of the experiment, participants answered 
two questions, which served as manipulation checks. They were presented with 
the picture of a randomly selected member of each family, and asked to indicate 
for each one whether it was starting or stopping a sound in the pairings phase. 
Later, they were also asked to indicate whether a randomly selected member for 
each of the four families of creatures had co-occurred with a human sound (the 
negative US) or with a musical sound (the positive US). Finally, participants were 
thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation check  
Ninety-two percent of the participants answered all eight questions of the 
manipulation check correctly. Results of both implicit and explicit evaluation did 
not change when excluding from the analyses the participants who failed the 
manipulation check. 
 
Personalized IAT 
Scores were calculated according to the D4 scoring algorithm (Greenwald 
et al., 2003). High scores represented an implicit preference in line with the 
valence of the co-occurrences (CSpos liked more than the CSneg). The D score in 
the personalized IAT for the stop-CSs was not significantly different from zero (M 
= −0.01, SE = 0.63), t(47) = −0.21, p = .83, d = 0.03. This result shows that the 
personalized IAT did not detect an implicit preference for either of the stopping 
CSs over the other stopping CSs. The score in the personalized IAT for the start-
CSs was positive, (M = 0.16, SE = 0.63) and significantly different from zero, t(47) 
= 2.57, p = .013, d = 0.37. This result indicates that the CSpos that started a 
positive sound was evaluated more positively than the CSneg that started a 
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negative sound. The fact that the order of the two personalized IATs was not 
counterbalanced renders it problematic to make a statistical comparison 
between the two. 
 
Explicit evaluation 
A 2 (relation, start vs. stop) x 2 (valence, positive vs. negative) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on the explicit valence ratings for the four CSs. 
We did not find a main effect of relation, F(1,47) = 2.46, p =.12, partial η
2
 = 0.05. 
The main effect of valence, however, was significant, F(1,47) = 41.61, p < .001, 
partial η
2
 = 0.47, and so was the interaction, F(1,47) = 22.96, p < .001, partial η
2
 = 
0.33. The CS that started a positive sound was evaluated more positively than 
the CS that started a negative sound, t(47) = 6.53, p < .001, d = 0.94. However, 
the CSs that stopped a positive or a negative sound did not differ significantly in 
explicit evaluation, t(47) = -1.11, p = .27, d = 0.16. Means of the explicit valence 
ratings can be found in Table 1.  
 Finally, the implicit and the explicit measures did not correlate (stopping 
CSs: r = -.26, p = .07; starting CSs: r = .05, p = .75). The scores of the two 
personalized IAT did not correlate with each other either (r = -.03, p = .82), but 
the explicit evaluations of starting and stopping CSs were negatively correlated (r 
= -.53, p < .001). 
 
Table 1. Means (and standard errors) of the explicit valence ratings for the four 
CSs. 
Relation US valence Explicit valence rating 
Start Positive 6.77 (0.32) 
Start Negative 3.21 (0.33) 
Stop Positive 5.15 (0.25) 
Stop Negative 5.60 (0.31) 
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General Discussion 
 
In the present experiment, we investigated the effect of relational 
information on an implicit measure of evaluation in an experiment similar to the 
one reported by Moran and Bar-Anan (2012). In their original experiment, they 
presented four CSs, either at the beginning or at the end of the reproduction of a 
pleasant sound (USpos) or of an unpleasant sound (USneg). A CS1 was always 
presented at the start of the USpos, a CS2 was always presented at the end of 
the USpos, a CS3 was always presented at the start of the USneg, and a CS4 was 
always presented at the end of the USneg. Moran and Bar-Anan found no impact 
of relational information (i.e., start or stop) on implicit evaluation. In other 
words, the CSspos (the CSs that always co-occurred with the positive sound) 
were on an implicit measure always liked more than the CSsneg (the CSs that co-
occurred with the negative sound), regardless of whether they started or 
stopped it (i.e., regardless of relational information). Conversely, explicit 
evaluation was moderated both by the information deriving from CS-US co-
occurrences and by relational information. In other words, their explicit 
evaluation results showed that the CS that started a USpos (CS1) was liked more 
than the Cs that started a USneg (CS2). In addition, the CS that ended a USneg 
(CS3) was liked more than the CS that ended a USpos (CS4). In terms of the 
mental processes involved, Moran and Bar-Anan explained their results as a 
strong support for the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  
 Moran and Bar-Anan’s controversial result contradicts a number of other 
findings presented in this thesis (see Chapters 1 and 3), as well as from other 
literature (Peters & Gawronski, 2011), that have reported an influence, 
moderated by several factors (e.g., content, timing, modalities of presentation), 
of relational information on implicit evaluation. We argue that, if the relational 
information was optimally implemented, one would find a moderation on 
implicit evaluation even when employing Moran and Bar-Anan’s (2012) 
procedure. In particular, we emphasize the importance of employing pre-pairings 
instructions that unequivocally describe the relations occurring between CSs and 
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USs (also see Chapter 3). In addition, we argue that the features of the implicit 
measure of evaluation employed could be another possible moderator of the 
effect. 
For this reason, our experiment modified the one by Moran and Bar-Anan 
in three crucial respects. First, the importance of the CS-US relations was made 
more salient in our instructions. Second, in an attempt to tap into personal 
attitudes rather than into knowledge relating to the mere co-occurrence of 
stimuli, we used a personalized IAT instead of a standard IAT as an implicit 
measure (see Han et al., 2009). Finally, it is worth noting that, in order to 
distinguish between the effect of CS-US co-occurrences and relational 
information, the crucial measurement outcome would be that of the implicit 
measure comparing the stopping CSs. For this reason, in our procedure the 
personalized IAT for the stopping CSs was always presented before the one for 
the starting CSs (for a review on effects of IAT experience see Greenwald et al., 
2003). Moreover, given that our main focus was on implicit evaluation, in our 
procedure we always presented the implicit measures before the explicit ratings. 
We expected to find both explicit and implicit evaluation to be moderated by 
relational information. In particular, with regard to implicit evaluation, we 
expected a preference in line with the co-occurrences (i.e., CSpos liked more 
than the CSneg) for the starting CSs and a reverse impact on implicit preferences 
(i.e., CSneg liked more than the CSpos) for the stopping CSs.  
Our results showed that, for the start-CSs, the findings of Moran and Bar-
Anan were replicated exactly, for both implicit and explicit evaluation: the CSpos 
was preferred over the CSneg. For the stop-CSs, however, no significant 
preference for either of the CSs was found, neither on implicit nor on explicit 
evaluation. Hence, the results for the critical condition (the implicit evaluation of 
the stopping CSs) did not show a significant preference for any of the CSs, 
making their interpretation more difficult. The fact that the personalized IAT 
showed a standard EC effect for the starting CSs may at least rule out the 
possibility that the implicit measure was not suitable to pick up any acquired 
preferences. Hence, the absence of the EC effect for the stopping CSs is probably 
due to the (opposite) relational information implied by the instructions and by 
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the way they co-occurred with the CS (i.e., that the CSs stopped the USs). 
However, we cannot be certain whether the difference to the results by Moran 
and Bar-Anan was due to either the different relational instructions or to the use 
of the personalized IAT. On the one hand, it is plausible that our instructions may 
have conveyed the relation of CS and US more clearly and hence led to an 
implicit evaluation that is actually moderated by the relational information. 
Note, however, that we did not find a reversal in the explicit ratings of the stop-
CSs whereas Moran and Bar-Anan did find this reversal. Hence, it seems unlikely 
that our instructions indeed conveyed the relational information more clearly 
than those of Moran and Bar-Anan. On the other hand, it is also possible that the 
use of a different implicit measure (the personalized IAT instead of the standard 
IAT/SPF) has led to this different result. Han and colleagues (2009) argue that the 
personalized IAT is less sensitive to extrapersonal associations (e.g., its 
measurement outcomes are less influenced by unrelated learning tasks). Building 
on this assumption, it could be argued that the personalized IAT is therefore 
more sensitive to the actual evaluations of the CSs, which are influenced by 
start/stop relational information. However, in order to sustain this assumption, 
more research is needed. More specifically, we plan to conduct a new 
experiment in which we use both a standard IAT and a personalized IAT to 
measure evaluations of the stop-CSs. The prediction is that the standard IAT will 
reveal more positive attitudes towards the stop-USpos CS than toward the stop-
USneg CS (i.e., a standard EC effect) whereas the personalized IAT would reveal 
no or a reversed effect.  
Assuming that our personalized IAT results do reflect a similar evaluation 
of the two stop-CSs, it would imply that implicit evaluations are to some extent 
determined by relational information, namely to the extent that it can 
counteract the effect of CS-US co-occurrences. At the level of mental processes, 
this suggests that propositions do mediate implicit evaluation (but see our earlier 
chapters for caveats regarding this statement). It is not clear, however, whether 
only propositions mediate implicit evaluation or whether both propositions and 
associations in memory play a role. Although it will be difficult to distinguish 
between these two positions empirically, future research on the impact or 
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relational information on implicit evaluation will continue to reveal new facts 
about implicit evaluation which will further constrain theories about the mental 
processes that mediate implicit evaluation.  
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Appendix 1 
 
In the first part of this study you are going to listen to two kinds of sound 
segments: 
1. Human sound segment–vocal sound.  
2. Musical sound segment–melody sound.  
The two different segments will be repeated few times in different lengths. 
In order to make it easy to understand when each segment starts and stops, you 
will hear a ticking noise that indicates the break between two segments. 
Parallel to the sound segments, four kinds of creatures will appear on the 
screen. Each type of creature will have one of four roles:  
1. After the appearance of one kind of the creature, the musical sound 
segment will start.  
2. After the appearance of one kind of the creature, the musical sound 
segment will be stopped.  
3. After the appearance of one kind of the creatures, the human sound 
segment will start.  
4. After the appearance of one kind of the creatures, the human sound 
segment will be stopped.  
Your task is to learn what the permanent role of each type of the creatures is; at 
the end of this task your memory will be checked.  
The four types of creatures that you are going to see are: 
(pictures of the 16 creatures) 
 
The study is about to start. Remember, your task is to learn what the permanent 
role of each type of creature is:  
1. Begin the musical sound segment.  
2. Stop the musical sound segment.  
3. Begin the human sound segment.  
4. Stop the human sound segment.  
In the end of the study we will check what you have learned. 
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Appendix 2 
 
In the first part of this research you will hear two different sound clips: 
1. Human sound–vocal sound  
2. Musical sound–melodic sound 
These two different fragments will be presented a number of times in different 
lengths. 
To clarify when each sound fragment starts and stops, a ticking sound will be 
played between the fragments. This ticking sound indicates a break between two 
consecutive fragments. 
The appearance and disappearance of the human and musical sound WILL BE 
DETERMINED by four different families of creatures. 
These four different families differ in color and shape of their head. You will see 
the Green Rectangles, the Purple Circles, the Red Squares and the Yellow 
Trapezoids.  
Each creature will EITHER END OR START the reproduction of a sound.  
More specifically, you will encounter the following situations: 
1. A certain type of creature STARTS the musical fragment 
2. A certain type of creature STOPS the musical fragment 
3. A certain type of creature STARTS the human sound fragment 
4. A certain type of creature STOPS the human sound fragment 
 
Your task is to learn which specific type of creature is responsible for STARTING 
and STOPPING the human and the musical sound fragment. At the end of this 
task your memory will be tested. 
The study will begin immediately. Remember, it is your task to learn which family 
of creatures (Green, Purple, Red, Yellow) STARTS or STOPS a specific sound 
(Human or Musical). 
Please be therefore very attentive. If you fail on the memory task, you will have 
to repeat the entire learning phase. 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Implicit evaluation refers to those instances of evaluation that occur 
under conditions of automaticity (De Houwer, 2009a). Researchers have 
acknowledged the importance of implicit evaluation in predicting and changing 
behavior, and its role has been investigated across various domains (for an 
overview, see Gawronski & Payne, 2010). Besides documenting moderators that 
influence implicit evaluation, researchers have also tried to define the cognitive 
mediators of implicit evaluation. Surprisingly, there has been only one 
dominating mental process account of implicit evaluation ever since researchers 
directed their attention to this phenomenon (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & De 
Houwer, 2011, for a review). The longstanding assumption was that implicit 
evaluation is a product of mental associations. Associations are unqualified links 
between mental representations. Associations are assumed to be formed after 
the experience of pairings of stimuli. Pairings of stimuli have repeatedly been 
shown to cause a change in liking, an effect that is named evaluative 
conditioning (EC; for reviews see De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas, & 
Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). So, 
according to an associative view, if a neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) 
is repeatedly paired with a valenced stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, US), 
individuals would form an association between the mental representations of 
the CS and the US. Later, when encountering the CS, the CS-US association would 
be excited automatically, which activates the US representation and with it the 
valence of the US. As a result, the implicit evaluation of the CS changes.  
Although the associative conceptualization of implicit evaluation has 
served psychological science for many years and has given rise to many process 
models (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; Fazio, 2007; 
Olson & Fazio, 2009), we argue that research could profit from an alternative 
approach to the study of implicit evaluation. A main reason why this shift in 
conceptualization is important is that, given the unqualified nature of the 
associative links, it is clear that they have limitations in representing more 
complex relations that could exist in the environment. It is evident that the way 
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stimuli are related is an important element that, if taken into account, can 
completely change the way in which people respond to a stimulus. For example, 
imagine a substance that co-occurs with a disease: the mere co-occurrence of 
the substance and the disease does not tell us much about the properties of that 
specific substance. However, knowing that the substance causes, or prevents, 
the disease is a piece of information that becomes crucial in order to form a 
positive or negative evaluation of it. In order to be able to mentally represent 
relations such as, for example, “X causes Y”, or “X prevents Y”, one needs a 
conceptual construct that holds qualifying properties.  
To this end, propositional accounts (De Houwer, 2009b; Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) postulate that every instance of associative learning 
is mediated by the formation of propositions, thus refuting the relevance of 
associations. Propositions are qualified links or statements about the world that 
possess a truth value. Therefore, propositions are mental constructs whose 
properties allow for the representation of any kind of relation between stimuli. 
So far, their importance in the acquisition of explicit evaluation has been 
recognized not only by propositional models, but also by dual process models 
(e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). However, 
dual process models typically still assume that implicit evaluation is exclusively 
the product of the automatic activation of associative links. In contrast, 
propositional models argue that also propositions can be activated 
automatically, and therefore can account for implicit evaluation without the 
need of employing the construct of associations. Our main research question 
stemmed from the inspiration provided by the propositional account of implicit 
evaluation. Using procedures from evaluative conditioning research (i.e., 
stimulus pairings between neutral and valenced stimuli), the aim of this 
dissertation was to investigate whether and to which extent relational 
information (i.e., the relation between the CS and the US) impacts implicit 
evaluation. 
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Overview of the studies and findings 
 
 In Chapter 1, we tested the assumption that the impact of stimulus 
pairings on implicit evaluation can be moderated by a context consisting of other 
pairings that imply a certain rule. Across three experiments, we tested this 
assumption by employing an implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998), an affective priming procedure (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995), and a personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004), as implicit 
measures of evaluation.  
In condition Opposite we operationalized the context by presenting Apos 
(cue A followed by a positive outcome), Bpos, ABneg (compound of cues A and B 
followed by a negative outcome), Cneg, Dneg, and CDpos. In condition Same, we 
presented Apos, Bpos, Abpos, Cneg, Dneg, and CDneg. In condition Opposite, the 
context rule implies that a single stimulus (e.g., A) is followed by a certain 
outcome (e.g., in the pairing Apos) when on its own, and by the opposite 
outcome when presented in compound with a second cue (e.g., in the pairing 
ABneg). Conversely, in condition Same a single cue was always followed by the 
same outcome, regardless of whether it was presented alone or in compound 
with another cue (e.g., in the pairings Apos and ABpos). The aim of this 
procedure was to create two contexts of stimulus pairings, each of which 
followed a different rule. After the context pairings, in both conditions the target 
pairings XFpos and YHneg were presented. Later, implicit and explicit evaluation 
for the single cues X and Y (our CSs) were measured. Note that the CSs X and Y 
were never presented on their own during the acquisition phase, but always in 
compound with other cues (F and H, respectively). We hypothesized that the 
relational information derived from the contexts would have an impact on the 
encoding of the pairings of X and Y, and that we would have observed a 
difference in evaluation between conditions Same and Opposite. Our results 
showed that the different contexts significantly moderated implicit evaluation. 
While in condition Same the positively paired cue (CSpos, X) was implicitly liked 
more than the negatively paired cue (CSneg, Y), we found no implicit preference 
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for any of the cues in condition Opposite. We observe that this difference can be 
only due to the characteristics of the context pairings, that were the only 
elements that differed across conditions. Regardless of the mental mediators of 
this effect, we argue that relational information, specifically in form of contextual 
cues, moderates implicit evaluation. 
In Chapter 2, we tested whether the type of implicit measure might 
moderate the impact of relational information on implicit evaluation. Different 
implicit measures are tasks that create different situations to which individuals 
have to respond in many ways. A measurement outcome is then calculated, 
based on the participant’s performance on the task. Therefore, different 
measurement outcomes may be more or less sensitive to relational information, 
depending on the features of the situation that the implicit measure creates. In 
particular, in Chapter 2 we were interested in testing the sensitivity to relational 
information of three different implicit measures of evaluation: the IAT 
(Greenwald et al., 1998), the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), and the evaluative priming task with naming 
responses (Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, & Eelen, 2006). 
Experiments 1-3 employed the same design, and differed only in terms of the 
implicit measure of evaluation that was administered. Similarly to the 
experiments reported in Chapter 1, we adopted a procedure that contained 
stimulus pairings and relational information. In the initial instructions, a stimulus 
R was described as a special cue that had the function of reversing the outcome 
of the cue it was paired with. Therefore, if a certain cue was always followed by a 
negative outcome when presented alone (e.g., Bneg), it would be followed by 
the opposite outcome (e.g., BRpos) when appearing in compound with the cue R. 
In addition to the verbal instructions, four context pairings (Apos, ARneg, Bneg, 
and BRpos) were repeatedly presented, with the intent of showing the role of 
the cue R in action and clarifying its function. In addition, two target CSs, X and Y, 
were consistently presented in compound with the cue R, and followed by a 
positive or by a negative outcome (USs), respectively, resulting in the pairings 
XRpos and YRneg. Importantly, the cues X and Y were never presented on their 
own, but always in compound with the cue R (i.e., XR, YR). Clearly, context 
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relational information predicts an outcome for the CSs that is opposite to that 
indicated by their mere co-occurrence with the USs. After the acquisition phase, 
participants had to indicate for the single cues X and Y whether they would have 
been followed by a positive or by a negative outcome if encountered again on 
their own. Later, participants performed an implicit measure (IAT in Experiment 
1, AMP in Experiments 2 and 3), designed to measure implicit evaluation for the 
single target cues X (CSpos) and Y (CSneg). The results of the IAT showed a 
reversed EC effect of implicit evaluation, that is, a preference for the CSneg over 
the CSpos. This result shows an impact of relational information on implicit 
evaluation, and, given the direction of the effect, the magnitude of this impact is 
bigger than that of the mere CS-US co-occurrences. However, the results of the 
AMP diverged from those of the IAT, and showed only a null effect, that is, an 
absence of EC effect for any of the CSs. Across the two measures, the same 
manipulation resulted in different implicit measurement outcomes: whereas the 
IAT showed an effect in line with relational information, the AMP did not show 
any effect.  
Finally, with Experiment 4 we aimed at testing the sensitivity of the 
evaluative priming with naming responses to relational information. Previous 
research (Spruyt et al., 2007) suggested that results in this implicit measure may 
be particularly sensitive to effects of spreading of activation of CS-US 
associations. Therefore, effects in this naming task might be mostly insensitive to 
the impact of relational information, that is, information that cannot be 
represented by mere associations. Experiment 4 employed the procedure of the 
long-delay condition of Experiment 3 of Peters and Gawronski (2011). Pictures of 
four male individuals A, B, C, and D (CSs) were paired with either positive or 
negative behavioral statements as USs, resulting in the pairings Apos, Bpos, 
Cneg, and Dneg. After these pairings were presented, participants were told that 
the information provided about individuals A and C was true (equivalence 
relation) and that about individuals B and D was false, and its implications had to 
be reversed (opposite relation). Therefore, this design produced four different CS 
conditions (positive-true, positive-false, negative-true, negative-false). After the 
acquisition phase, implicit and explicit evaluation were measured. As implicit 
170  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
measure we used an evaluative priming procedure with naming responses. 
Results of the implicit measure did not show a preference for any of the four CSs. 
Importantly, even for the truly-related CSs we did not find a preference, 
suggesting that the picture-picture naming task might have failed at tapping into 
any type of implicit evaluation of the CSs. 
The aim of Chapter 3 was to test whether relational information in form 
of verbal instructions, and the time at which the instructions are presented, 
moderates implicit evaluation. In Experiment 1, we conducted a conceptual 
replication of the studies of Peters and Gawronski (2011). Participants were 
presented with two nonword CSs, each of which was repeatedly paired either 
with a word positive in valence (USpos) or with a word negative in valence 
(USneg). Participants in condition Instructions Before were instructed, before the 
CS-US pairings, that each CS was a foreign word opposite in meaning to its paired 
US (opposite relation). Participants in condition Instructions After received the 
identical instructions, but only after all the CS-US pairings were presented. Later, 
implicit evaluation of the two CSs was assessed, employing an IAT. Interestingly, 
participants in condition Instructions Before showed a reversed EC effect of 
implicit evaluation, that is, an implicit preference for the CSneg over the CSpos. 
On the other hand, participants in condition Instructions After did not show a 
preference for any of the CSs, that is, they did not show any EC effect. Evidently, 
the point in time at which opposite relational information was made available 
moderated the implicit evaluation of the CSs, thus replicating the results of 
Peters and Gawronski (2011). In addition, whereas Peters and Gawronski 
presented relational information after each pairing in their short-delay condition, 
we obtained the same reversed EC effect employing only one presentation of the 
relational information, before the CS-US pairing series.  
In Experiment 2 of Chapter 3, we aimed at testing whether the simple co-
occurrence of a CS with a US already represents a cue that indicates a relation of 
equivalence between the two. To this end, we tried to change this spontaneous 
framing. Participants experienced three training series of pairings, in which two 
CSs were paired with either a USpos or with a USneg. Each series was followed 
by instructions describing a relation of opposition between each CS and its 
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paired US. The aim of this manipulation was to create a context that encouraged 
participants to encode co-occurring stimuli as being opposite to each other. After 
the training series, a target CS-US series of pairings was presented. In order to 
test the resilience of the newly established framing of opposition to post-pairings 
instructions this series was followed either by equivalence instructions 
(describing equivalence between each CS and its paired US), by opposite 
instructions (describing opposition between each CS and its paired US) or by no 
instructions. Later, implicit evaluation for the CSs was assessed, adopting a 
standard IAT and a personalized IAT. The results showed that our manipulation 
was ineffective in changing the spontaneous framing of equivalence deriving 
from mere CS-US co-occurrences. However, the post-pairings instructions 
significantly moderated implicit evaluation of the CSs. On the implicit measures 
both conditions Equivalence Instructions and No Instructions showed a standard 
EC effect (a preference for the CSpos over the CSneg), whereas participants in 
condition Opposite Instructions showed an absence of preference for any of the 
CSs. On the one hand, these results show that we did not succeed in changing 
the spontaneous framing of co-occurring CSs and USs from equivalence to 
opposition. On the other hand, they show that post-pairings instructions that 
imply equivalence between CSs and USs do not add anything to the standard EC 
effect, that is obtained even without relational instructions, whereas opposite 
instructions can attenuate it until its complete dissolution, as shown by a series 
of contrast effect tests.  
Finally, with Experiment 3 of Chapter 3, we aimed at testing the post-hoc 
assumption that, in a situation in which several contrasting relations are 
experienced, implicit evaluation is more strongly influenced by the first 
proposition about CS-US relations, whereas explicit evaluation is not. This would 
allow us to explain recent patterns of results (e.g., Peters & Gawronski, 2011) in 
light of a propositional account, and it would also shed light on the determinants 
of implicit and explicit evaluation. To this end, we presented participants with a 
series of CS-US pairings. In addition, participants were presented with verbal 
instructions describing the relation between the CSs and their paired USs. 
Participants received instructions both before and after the stimulus pairings. 
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These relations could be of equivalence (each CS is equivalent to its paired US) or 
opposition (each CS is opposite to its paired US). Therefore, in two conditions the 
relational information presented before and after the pairings was congruent 
(equivalence-equivalence, and opposition-opposition). Conversely, in two other 
conditions this information was incongruent (equivalence-opposition and 
opposition-equivalence). In the case of incongruent relations, the last one that 
was presented was indicated to be the valid one. In addition, a control condition 
in which no instructions were presented was also added to the design. The order 
of implicit and explicit measures of evaluation of the two CSs was 
counterbalanced across participants, allowing for a direct comparison of the two 
types of evaluation. Results showed that implicit evaluation was moderated by 
the content of the first relational instructions presented. On the contrary, explicit 
evaluation was not moderated by the first, but only by the second piece of 
relational information that was experienced. Therefore, the results confirmed 
our predictions. 
Finally, Chapter 4 consisted in a replication of a study reported by Moran 
and Bar-Anan (2012). In their study, they realized four CS conditions (CS1, CS2, 
CS3, and CS4). At the beginning of the experiment, participants were instructed 
that each CS had a specific role in the reproduction of one of two sounds. The 
CS1 always started the reproduction of a pleasant sound (USpos), and the CS2 
always stopped its reproduction. The CS3 always started the reproduction of an 
aversive sound (USneg), and the CS4 always stopped it. Therefore, two CSs (CS1 
and CS2) always co-occurred with an USpos, and two other CSs (CS3 and CS4) 
always co-occurred with a USneg. After this acquisition phase, Moran and Bar-
Anan measured implicit and explicit evaluation of the four CSs, adopting as 
implicit measures an IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and a Sorting Paired Features 
task (SPF; Bar-Anan, Nosek, & Vianello, 2009). Interestingly, their results showed 
that relational information (i.e., the start/stop relations) did not moderate in any 
extent implicit evaluation. The CSpos were always evaluated more positively 
than the CSneg, regardless of whether they started or stopped the 
correspondent US. 
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 In our replication, we added three, in our opinion important, 
modifications to the original design of Moran and Bar-Anan. First, in our initial 
instructions we emphasized the role of each CS in starting or stopping the 
experience of the USs, in order for them to be encoded as active agents in the 
modulation of each US experience. Second, we employed a series of two 
personalized IATs as implicit measures of evaluation, because it is possible that 
the personalized IAT is more sensitive to the implications of relational 
information (see Han, Czellar, Olson, and Fazio, 2009, for a set of studies on the 
effect of the personalization of the labels on IAT outcomes). Finally, unlike Moran 
and Bar-Anan we always presented the implicit measure of evaluation of the 
oppositely related CSs (CS2 and CS4) first. This procedure was adopted to ensure 
an optimal measurement of the crucial dependent variable of our manipulation, 
that is, the implicit evaluation in the presence of opposite relational information 
(see Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji, 2003, for an in-depth analysis of the use of 
multiple IATs). In line with Moran and Bar-Anan’s results, we observed a 
standard EC effect of implicit evaluation for the CSs equivalently related to the 
USs (the staring CSs). However, contrary to Moran and Bar-Anan, for the CSs that 
were oppositely related to the USs (the stopping CSs), no preference for any of 
the CSs was observed. This difference between conditions shows that relational 
information can moderate implicit evaluations also in the design by Moran and 
Bar-Anan, although without leading to a reversed EC effect. 
To sum up, the experiments reported in the four empirical chapters 
investigate, across several aspects, how and when relational information can 
impact implicit evaluation. In the following section, we will summarize the most 
important findings and explain their implications for mental process models of 
evaluation. 
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Implications of our findings 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the impact of relational information on 
implicit evaluation has been studied only recently (Peters & Gawronski, 2011; 
Moran & Bar-Anan, 2012; Zanon, De Houwer & Gast, 2012). Therefore, ideas 
about the mental mediators of these effects are still in a relatively early stage. 
Our findings have relevant implications for theories about these mediators. 
Across all experiments, we have manipulated relational information between the 
CSs and the USs by realizing two basic relations: equivalence and opposition. 
These relations have been implemented in different ways, employing context 
cues (Chapter 1; Chapter 2, Experiments 1-3), verbal instructions (Chapter 2, 
Experiment4; Chapter 3), or both (Chapter 4). Across all experiments, we have 
always kept the CS-US co-occurrences constant, manipulating the relations 
occurring between CSs and USs and assessing implicit evaluation of the CSs. In 
order for us to be able to investigate the impact of relations on implicit 
evaluation, the analysis of the effect of opposite relational information, and its 
comparison with that of equivalence information, are the crucial ones. That is, 
whereas the implications of equivalence instructions are in line with those of CS-
US co-occurrences (and therefore do not allow one to distinguish between the 
separate impact of each source of information), the implications of opposite 
relational information are, by definition, contrary to those of the mere CS-US co-
occurrences. Hence, given that the CS-US pairings are always kept constant, 
differences between conditions could tell us whether the content of the 
relational information moderated the acquisition of implicit evaluation of the 
CSs.  
Most importantly, in several experiments, we observed that relational 
information did influence implicit evaluation. Our first important finding, that 
models must try to accommodate, is that opposite relational information can 
reduce (when presented after the CS-US pairings) or even reverse (when 
presented before or during the CS-US pairings) standard EC effects of implicit 
evaluation. Specifically, we have shown this effect both for relational information 
presented in form of a contextual rule (Chapter 1 and 2) and in form of verbal 
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instructions (Chapter 3 and 4). A second important finding (reported in Chapter 
3) is that the first experienced relational information has more impact on implicit 
than on explicit evaluation.  
In general, these results are difficult to explain adopting a purely 
associative account of implicit evaluation. Single process associative models (e.g., 
Baeyens, et al., 1992; Fazio, 2007; Olson & Fazio, 2009) assume that the CS-US 
co-occurrences are encoded in form of mental associations, and that implicit 
evaluation is mediated exclusively by these associations. However, in our studies 
we have always kept the CS-US co-occurrences equal, and manipulated the 
content of the relations between CSs and USs, observing different effects on the 
implicit evaluation measures. Yet, given these conditions, an associative account 
would predict that the same CS-US mental associations would be always formed, 
and that the same implicit evaluations would be always observed, regardless of 
the content of the relational information (i.e., equivalence or opposition). Given 
our results, at a first glance purely associative models therefore seem inadequate 
to explain our findings. However, single process associative models could 
account for attenuations of EC effects due to the impact of (opposite) relational 
information if they assume that opposite relational information does block the 
process of CS-US association formation. Nevertheless, this assumption could 
explain an absence of EC effect, but could not account for the reported reversed 
EC effects. According to associative models, implicit evaluation must be based 
exclusively on associations, and on a reversed EC effect these associations must 
be formed between the mental representations of the CSs and the opposite of 
the USs. One could argue that participants may form these associations at the 
time of the encoding of the CS-US pairings, and therefore that the effect of 
stimulus pairings on associations depends on the interpretation of the 
experienced events. A mental representation, opposite to the physical US 
encountered, would be formed and associated to the mental representation of 
the CS. For instance, the pairing of the nonword BAYRAM with the word HAPPY 
in a context that implies a relation of opposition, could be mentally represented 
as a pairing of the BAYRAM and SAD, and hence lead to an association between 
the representations of BAYRAM and SAD in memory. Although such an account is 
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feasible, it implies the existence of a propositional system that allows for the 
mental interpretation of events on the basis of relational information. As such, it 
would effectively transform the single process associative account into a dual 
process account. Consequently, this would rule out the hypothesis of a purely 
associative explanation of reversed EC effects of implicit evaluation. With regard 
to the assumption on the timing moderation on the impact of relational 
information on implicit and explicit evaluation, an associative account could 
argue that the first associations are greater in strength than secondly formed 
associations, and therefore are more effective in influencing implicit evaluation. 
This explanation suffers from the same issues of the first explanation: in case of 
opposite relational information presented first, a purely associative model would 
require to refer to propositional processes in order to explain the opposite 
association formation. To sum up, it is evident that purely associative models are 
severely constrained by the findings reported in the present dissertation. That is, 
in order to maintain the idea that associations always mediate implicit 
evaluations, very specific supplementary assumptions have to be made about 
the factors that influence the formation and activation of those associations.  
 Dual process models (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006) traditionally account for effects on implicit evaluation in a 
similar fashion as purely associative models. However, by postulating the 
existence of a propositional system, dual process models allow for association 
formation that is mediated by the (propositional) encoding of the CS-US pairings 
(i.e., taking into account relational information). Therefore, most recent dual 
process models (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) could account for 
reversed EC effects of implicit evaluation, assuming that people can form 
associations between the mental representation of the CSs and the mental 
representation of the opposite of the physically experienced US (formed via 
propositional processes at the time of encoding). In addition, they can explain 
the absence of EC effects when relational information is presented after the 
stimulus pairings by assuming that the CS-US associations are counteracted by 
propositional processes, formed on the basis of the (opposite) relational 
information. This mechanism would also explain the stronger impact of the first 
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relational information on implicit evaluation than on explicit evaluation. The 
latter, based on propositional processes, could be more easily corrected after a 
second, valid, piece of relational information is made available. Conversely, the 
associations that guide implicit evaluation, once established could only be 
blocked by, incongruent, second information, and not reversed. 
Finally, purely propositional processes (e.g., De Houwer, 2009b; Mitchell, 
De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) postulate that all changes in evaluations are 
based on propositions. Therefore, both information derived from CS-US co-
occurrences and relational information are encoded in propositional format. It is 
therefore possible that multiple, even incongruent, propositions about the same 
CS are formed. Different effects of relational information on implicit evaluation 
could therefore be explained by the conflict of these incongruent propositions. 
The reversed EC effects of implicit evaluation, obtained when opposite relational 
information is presented before or during the stimulus pairings, would thus imply 
that the relational proposition has a stronger impact than the co-occurrence 
proposition. Conversely, the absence of EC effects when relational information is 
available only after the stimulus pairings would suggest that the two propositions 
have the same impact, and that they therefore cancel each other out. In 
addition, in order to address our second finding, a propositional model would 
have to assume that the proposition formed on the basis of the first relational 
information has a stronger effect on implicit than on explicit evaluation. 
Propositions formed afterwards would then be able to influence explicit 
evaluation but not implicit evaluation. 
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Limitations and future directions 
 
 In order to define possible future directions of research on this topic, it is 
important to note that, in the present dissertation, we report a series of 
functional findings, inspired by the functional-cognitive framework of De Houwer 
et al. (2012). According to this framework, the elements of the environment are 
potential moderators of evaluation, that is conceived as an effect. Consequently, 
stimuli that convey relational information can be functionally conceived as a type 
of moderator. We have shown that relational information can moderate implicit 
evaluation in a substantial extent. Therefore, our findings contribute to the body 
of knowledge on the possible moderators of implicit evaluation. At the same 
time, our functional findings constrain existing mental process accounts, which 
are responsible for defining the (mental) mediators of evaluation effects. Given 
the importance of evaluation in explaining and predicting behavior, future 
research should aim at extending our knowledge of the moderators of (implicit) 
evaluation. Psychological research would profit from such an approach, because 
the discovery of the functional moderators of evaluation would allow for new 
psychological theories to arise, and for the existing ones to adapt their 
assumptions in order to fit with the empirical evidence. Although we are still far 
from discarding existing accounts of the mental mediators of evaluation, it is 
evident that this line of research would lead to the improvements of the current 
mental process models, and consequently to a better explanation and prediction 
of human behavior. 
 In the experiments reported in this dissertation, we have consistently 
focused on the relations of equivalence and opposition. However, these are only 
two of the vast range of relations that could occur between stimuli in the 
environment (see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001). To name a few, there 
are also comparative (i.e.,” more than / less than”), hierarchic (i.e.,” a part of”), 
or temporal (i.e., “before / after”) relations. As the moderation of relations of 
oppositions and equivalence on implicit evaluation has been demonstrated in 
several experiments, it is reasonable to think that also other relations may serve 
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as moderators for implicit evaluation. For instance, Molet, Macquet, and Charley 
(in press) have examined the impact of comparative relations on explicit 
evaluation. They presented three cues that differed only in size (small, medium, 
and big) and found that when the medium-sized cue was said to be paired with a 
USneg (a shock), the small-sized cue was explicitly evaluated more positively 
than the big-sized cue. However, when the medium-sized cue was said to be 
paired with a USpos (an amount of money), the big-sized cue was explicitly 
evaluated more positively than the small-size cue. Even though Molet et al. 
examined only explicit evaluation, these results are promising and show that 
evaluation can be moderated also by relational information other than 
equivalence and opposition. Potentially, also the moderation of other relations 
could be investigated. In any case, it would be very interesting to explore 
whether effects similar to those of Molet et al. could be obtained also on implicit 
evaluations. 
 Another possible moderator, that we have started to explore in Chapter 
3, is the effect of the conditions under which relational information is made 
available. In line with the findings of Peters and Gawronski (2011), our results 
show that the moderation of the timing in which relational information is 
presented is particularly important, in that it can lead to very different implicit 
evaluations. In this class of moderators, another possible option for future 
studies could be the distinction between instructed and experienced relational 
information. For instance, one could compare the effects of relations 
experienced without the use of verbal instructions (e.g., through a matching-to-
sample procedure, Hayes et al., 2001) to that of purely instructed relations (e.g., 
via verbal instructions). Another interesting property to explore would be the 
number of repetitions of pairings and relational information. for example, one 
could present participants with opposite relational information, followed by a 
small number of CS-Us pairings. Our previous findings have shown that, at this 
point in time, implicit evaluation is likely to be in line with relational information. 
However, it would be interesting to see whether implicit evaluation changes if 
many more CS-US pairings are presented. It would be possible that the effect of 
relational information becomes stronger, keeps equal or disappears
 1
.  
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In Chapter 4, we have seen how important consistency of relational 
information is in order to obtain a moderating effect on implicit evaluation. 
When participants were asked to focus on both relations and co-occurrence 
information (see Moran & Bar-Anan, 2012), relational information showed no 
moderating effect on implicit evaluation. However, our results of Chapter 4 may 
also suggest that, in order for relational information to be effective, participants 
must consistently focus on the relations occurring between stimuli, and not on 
the mere co-occurrence of the stimuli. One interesting experiment would be to 
present two groups with the same CS-US pairings and opposite relational 
information and to draw participants’ attention to either (opposite) relational 
information or to co-occurrence information. A difference in implicit evaluation 
of the CSs between these two conditions would let us speculate about the way in 
which relational information is encoded. For instance, it would be possible that 
this process requires a certain level of attention drawn to relational information, 
as well as an amount of cognitive resources available. This latter assumption 
could be easily tested by giving one of the groups a secondary task to perform, at 
the same time in which relational information is presented.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that individuals differ in terms of 
their ability to process relational information. Measures of interindividual 
differences (e.g., need for cognition, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) may be a valuable 
addition to almost every experiment on this topic, and would be particularly 
useful to explain unclear results (e.g., null effects due to a number of participants 
who show to have not encoded relational information properly). 
The manipulation of cognitive resources would also be interesting in 
order to test for the automaticity features of the acquisition and activation of 
relational information. It would test whether relational information moderates 
implicit evaluation in an efficient matter. Moors and De Houwer (2006) define 
automaticity as a term that refers to a number of features (e.g., uncontrollability, 
unconsciousness, efficiency, etc.) that are distinct and independent from each 
other. Therefore, a process or effect can be automatic according to one feature 
and non-automatic according to another. Hence, it is worth exploring 
automaticity features separately. For instance, another feature of automaticity 
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that could be worth exploring is goal-independence. In an experiment in which 
both relational information and pairings of stimuli are presented, one could give 
participants the goal to focus on relations between stimuli, or the goal to focus 
on the co-occurrences, or simply no goal, and measure the resulting implicit 
evaluation. This could tell us whether the impact of relational information on 
evaluation is automatic in the sense of goal-independent. In addition, in another 
study relational and co-occurrence information could be presented either 
explicitly or subliminally, in order to explore whether relational information 
could moderate implicit evaluation also unconsciously. 
In terms of the limitations of the present research, the experiments with 
null effects or attenuations of EC effects, are particularly open to improvements. 
Perhaps the null effects were due to the use of insensitive implicit measures 
either to implicit evaluations or to the impact of relational information on 
implicit evaluations. In Chapter 2, for instance, the AMP or the evaluative 
priming with naming task might not have picked up any trace of implicit 
evaluation. In this sense, future research could extend its scope to other implicit 
measures that we have not considered in the present dissertation (e.g., the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Test, De Houwer, 2003; the Go/No-Go Association Test, 
Nosek & Banaji, 2001; the Approach-Avoid task, Rinck & Becker, 2007). Besides 
the most traditional implicit measures, the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP, see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Power, Hayden, & Milner, 
2006), is a recent implicit measure designed to tap in relational responses, which 
has lately been gaining popularity within evaluation researchers. This implicit 
measure is definitely worth exploring, in the domain of relational information 
and EC, and future research could profit from a comparison between its 
measurement outcomes and those of the more traditional implicit measures 
(e.g., IAT, personalized IAT, affective priming). Indeed, this effort could lead to an 
extensive taxonomy of the vast range of implicit measures of evaluation, 
according to their sensitivity to relational information, which would represent a 
very useful tool for evaluation researchers. 
To conclude, research on the impact of relational information on implicit 
evaluation should aim at extending its body of functional moderators. However, 
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in order to guide research, it would be important to prioritize the investigation of 
the moderators whose explanation maximally constrains the assumptions of the 
existing mental process models. We are confident that research on both the 
functional moderators and on the mental mediators of evaluation would 
eventually lead to an improvement of the actual mental process models and 
consequently to reach the ultimate goal of a more accurate explanation and 
prediction of human behavior. 
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 NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
De invloed van relationele informatie op impliciete evaluatie 
 
Evaluatie is een belangrijke determinant van gedrag. Daarom speelt de 
studie hiervan een grote rol in psychologisch onderzoek. We definiëren evaluatie 
als het effect van stimuli op evaluatieve responsen (De Houwer, Gawronski & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2012). Traditioneel focuste onderzoek zich op zogenaamde 
expliciete evaluaties. Dit zijn intentionele en gecontroleerde evaluaties (De 
Houwer, 2009a). Impliciete evaluaties zijn automatische, ongecontroleerde 
evaluaties (De Houwer, 2009a), typisch gemeten door zogenaamde impliciete 
maten van evaluatie. Hun belang werd aangetoond in verschillende domeinen 
van psychologisch onderzoek (voor een overzicht, zie Gawronski & Payne, 2010).  
 Een typische manier om impliciete evaluaties te exploreren en te 
veranderen is door het paren van stimuli. De verandering in het leuk vinden van 
een neutrale stimulus (geconditioneerde stimulus, CS) nadat het herhaaldelijk 
gepaard werd met een positieve of negatieve stimulus (ongeconditioneerde 
stimulus, US) is een effect dat evaluatieve conditionering genoemd wordt (EC; De 
Houwer, 2007). Wanneer we kijken naar veranderingen in impliciete evaluaties, 
spreken we van EC van impliciete evaluaties. Traditioneel nemen vele 
associatieve modellen (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; 
Fazio, 2007; Olson & Fazio, 2009) en twee-proces modellen (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006) aan dat impliciete evaluatie 
gemedieerd wordt door de associaties tussen de mentale representaties van de 
CSen en de USen, die gevormd werden na het veel voorkomen van CS-US paren. 
Eens deze ongekwalificeerde associaties gevormd zijn, kunnen ze automatisch 
geactiveerd worden wanneer de CS wordt aangeboden. Hieruit volgt dat de 
aanbieding van de CS automatisch resulteert in de activatie van de mentale 
representaie van de US, inclusief de representatie van de valentie van de US. Op 
die manier zal de CS een automatische impliciete evaluatie ontlokken.  
Onderzoeker zijn echter pas recent gestart om na te gaan of ook de 
manier waarop CS en US gerelateerd zijn, een invloed kan hebben op impliciete 
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evaluaties. We gebruiken de term “relationele informatie” om te verwijzen naar 
informatie over het type van relatie tussen gebeurtenissen. Het is bijvoorbeeld 
duidelijk dat of een substantie (CS) een ziekte (USneg) uitlokt of deze juist 
voorkomt een belangrijk gegeven is om deze substantie te evalueren. Daarom 
gaan propositionele modellen (e.g., De Houwer, 2009b; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009) ervan uit dat alle informatie bewaard wordt in de vorm van 
proposities. Deze proposities zijn gekwalificeerde verbindingen tussen mentale 
representaties (vb. “de CS is het effect van de US”). In tegenstelling tot 
associaties kunnen deze verbindingen dus ook relationele informatie bevatten. 
Van zodra er aangenomen wordt dat proposities automatisch geactiveerd 
kunnen worden, dan men postuleren dat ook proposities kunnen leiden tot 
impliciete evaluaties. De experimenten die beschreven zijn in het huidige 
proefwerk werden geïnspireerd door de propositionele benadering van 
impliciete evaluaties en richten zich tot het onderzoeken van de modererende 
rol van relationele informatie op het verwerven van impliciete evaluaties. 
 In Hoofdstuk 1 presenteerden we dezelfde CS-US paren in twee condities. 
In beide condities werden ook andere, zogenaamde context paren 
gepresenteerd. In de conditie Tegenovergesteld, impliceerden de context paren 
een regel die een tegenstelling suggereerde tussen de CSen en USen. In de 
conditie Zelfde daarentegen, impliceerden ze een regel die gelijkheid tussen de 
CSen en US suggereerden. Nadien werden de evaluaties van de CSen gemeten. 
We vonden een significante moderatie van de context regel die een standaard EC 
effect van impliciete evaluaties produceerde in de conditie Zelfde en een 
verzwakking van het EC effect van impliciete evaluaties in de conditie 
Tegenovergesteld. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 testten we een potentiële moderator van het effect van 
relationele informatie op impliciete evaluaties, namelijk de eigenschappen van 
de gebruikte impliciete maat. In vier experimenten testten we de sensitiviteit 
voor relationele informatie van drie verschillende impliciete maten van evaluatie. 
De resultaten toonden aan dat hoewel de impliciete associatie test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) een zekere sensitiviteit vertoonde, de 
affectieve misattributie procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 
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2005) en de evaluatieve priming met het benoemen van responsen (Spruyt, 
Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, & Eelen, 2006) geen significante EC 
effecten vertoonden. Onze resultaten laten ons daarom niet to om sterke claims 
te maken over de sensitiviteit van de maat van relationele informatie.  
 In Hoofdstuk 3 testten we hoe relationele informatie, in de vorm van 
verbale instructies, een impact kan hebben op impliciete en expliciete evaluaties. 
In Experiment 1 presenteerden we tegengestelde relationele informatie ofwel 
voor ofwel na een serie van CS-US paren. In Experiment 2 probeerden we de 
assumptie te testen dat het samen voorkomen van CS-US wordt aanzien als een 
cue die wijst op een equivalentie tussen de CSen en USen. Ten slotte, in 
Experiment 3, testten we de assumptie dat,in vergelijking met expliciete 
evaluatie, impliciete evaluatie meer beïnvloed wordt door de eerste 
gepresenteerde relationele informatie. Onze resultaten bevestigden deze 
hypothese. Bijkomend vonden we dat relationele informatie over het feit dat CS 
en US equivalent zijn, niets toevoegt aan het effect van het louter samen 
voorkomen van CS en US op impliciete evaluaties. Informatie over het feit dat CS 
en US tegengesteld zijn, had echter wel een effect dat tegengesteld is aan het 
effect van het louter samen voorkomen van CS en US. 
 Tot slot, in Hoofdstuk 4 repliceerden we de studies van een 
controversiële paper van Moran and Bar-Anan (2012). Zij onderzochten de 
moderatie van de start-stop relaties op impliciete evaluaties. Ze vonden geen 
bewijs voor de impact van relationele informatie op impliciete evaluatie. We 
brachten echter enkele modificaties aan het design toe die de rol van relationele 
informatie zouden kunnen versterken. Hoewel de resultaten niet sluitend waren, 
boden ze steun voor het idee dat relationele informatie ook in het opzet van 
Moran en Bar-Anan een invloed kan hebben op impliciete evaluaties.  
 Onze resultaten hebben belangrijke implicaties voor mentale proces 
modellen van impliciete evaluaties. Om onze resultaten te verklaren, moeten 
bestaande modellen van impliciete evaluatie zeer specifieke assumpties maken. 
Als dusdanig leggen onze resultaten duidelijke restricties op aan huidige en 
toekomstige modellen van impliciete evaluatie. Onze bevindingen zijn het meest 
problematisch voor puur associatieve modellen. Langs de andere kant, meer 
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recente twee-processen modellen Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) kunnen 
onze bevindingen verklaren op voorwaarde dat ze toelaten dat propositionele 
processen impliciete evaluaties kunnen beïnvloeden. Tot slot, propositionele 
modellen kunnen onze bevinden verklaren op voorwaarde dat verondersteld 
wordt dat proposities een automatische invloed kunnen hebben op preferenties.  
Toekomstig onderzoek kan zich richten op de analyses van functionele 
moderators van evaluatie. We toonden aan dat relationele informatie inderdaad 
een belangrijke moderator is van impliciete evaluatie. Verder onderzoek zou 
onze huidige kennis verder kunnen uitbreiden door het exploreren van deze 
functionele moderator, bijvoorbeeld het in rekening brengen van verschillende 
relaties (bvb vergelijkende, temporele, hiërarchische), de automaticiteit van de 
relationele informatie, de condities onder welke de relationele informatie 
effectief is. Functionele bevindingen zouden het toelaten om nieuwe en meer 
accurate mentale processen theorieën van de mentale processen die impliciete 
evaluaties mediëren. Deze verbeteringen aan de huidige mentale processen 
modellen zouden dan leiden tot betere verklaringen en voorspellingen van het 
menselijk gedrag. 
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